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 This thesis explores the figure of the expert in a range of contemporary 
performance practices. Much has been written in recent years about the rise of 
education, pedagogy and research as both curatorial strategies and modes for 
making art (see below for cited texts). The significance of theatre and 
performance within these practices has also been asserted (see, for instance, 
Shannon Jackson’s Social Works). I argue, however, that the specific use of the 
figure of the expert within the conjunction of pedagogy, research and 
performance has not been fully addressed. I further argue that looking at the 
expert in performance practices provides valuable insight into the broader 
contemporary dynamic of knowledge and power, as well as telling us much about 
the current state of performance itself.  
 
 This is clearly a broad topic, with many possibilities for analysis. In this 
introduction, therefore, I will outline the rationale behind my choices of practices 
and critical resources, and I will discuss the rationale behind the geographical 
and temporal limits that I have chosen. I will also define my key terms, while 
noting that all of them are both contested and subject to change. I will discuss my 
methodology, including the various ways I have accessed the performance 
events and documentation that are included in this thesis, and my approach to 
the interdisciplinarity that necessarily underpins a project with such potentially 
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broad scope as this one. Finally, I will briefly outline the six chapters which form 
the body of this study, again indicating reasons for the choices I have made, as 
well as drawing a few initial connections between practices and ideas.  
 
FIELDS	  
Research	  and	  Pedagogy	  as	  Contemporary	  Curatorial	  and	  Artistic	  Strategies	  	  	  
  
 This project began as a conjunction between personal interests that I have 
developed regarding performance practice and theory, and observation of 
growing trends in the style and forms that other performance practitioners around 
me are producing. When I began to think about this thesis in 2008, I found myself 
increasingly invested in thinking how knowledges and information could be 
produced, troubled, exploited, distributed, confused and managed with and 
through performance. During the same period, I also attended Hannah Hurtzig’s  
Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Non-knowledge, several of Walid Raad’s  
Atlas Group lecture-performances, the Brussels chapter of the international 
Public School network, among many other events, exhibitions, festivals, 
symposia and one-off performance projects which have drawn on performance in 
order to think through and stage broader political, social and cultural issues 
around the production of knowledge and expertise in various contemporary 
contexts.   
 The field of work that this thesis addresses, then, is the burgeoning field of 
knowledge-production-as-art. This unwieldy phrase needs some unpacking. 
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What is ‘knowledge production’ and how is it ‘art’? In The Postmodern Condition, 
Jean-François Lyotard identifies ‘research’ and ‘pedagogy’ as two modes through 
which knowledge is produced and circulated. 1  This distinction can be felt, 
perhaps, in the difference in this country between ‘taught’ degrees and ‘research’ 
degrees, where one of the qualifying factors of a research degree is the 
contribution of original knowledge. Teaching and research: these are the 
activities ‘experts’ undertake, at least in the classical sense of the rational 
scientific expert. In recent years, cultural producers have turned to both of these 
modes as a way of structuring art production and distribution as well. In the 
hands of artists, curators and cultural theorists (among other participants in the 
ongoing production of ‘culture’), these modes have taken on complications 
specific to the institutions and political investments of the art world. In order to 
wrestle this field of practice into something at least provisionally manageable, I 
will briefly outline a few underlying ideas and key examples of ‘research’ and 




As stated above, much has been written about a turn toward educational 
objectives and forms in contemporary art.  Among the recent texts which tackle 
education as both a mode and subject of art production, there are: Education, 
                                                
1 Jean-Luc Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 4. 
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edited by Felicity Allen (part of the Whitechapel Gallery’s ongoing ‘Documents in 
Contemporary Art’); Curating and the Educational Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill 
and Mick Wilson; Notes for an Art School, compiled for the (cancelled) Manifesta 
6; multiple articles from the e-flux online journal, particularly the themed issued 
from March, 2010 on ‘Education, Actualised’; and ‘Pedagogic Projects’ a chapter 
from Clair Bishop’s Artificial Hells. These texts respond to, accompany, or in 
some cases initiate a host of projects, which press the boundaries of education, 
curating and art production, including: unitednationsplaza in Berlin, which was 
continued as night school (2008-2009)at the New Museum in New York; the 
Wide Open School exhibition at the Hayward Gallery in London (2012); Fritz 
Haeg’s ongoing Sundown Schoolhouse project; Tania Brugera’s Cátedra Arte de 
Conducta (Behaviour Art School) (2002-2009); On the Future of Art School, a 
symposium at the University of Southern California (2007); and SUMMIT: non-
aligned initiatives in education culture in Berlin (2007) – to name just a few of 
these projects and events. 
Irit Rogoff is an oft-cited figure in this field of cultural production, and her 
article on the ‘educational turn’ is a particularly useful discussion of this trend and 
the issues surrounding recent intersections between art and pedagogy. In this 
article, she gives an overview of specific projects that exemplify this turn and lays 
out what might be at stake in any such ‘turning’. She asks whether a ‘turn’ in 
contemporary art might constitute the development of an ‘interpretive model’ or 
whether it involves the layering of a ‘pedagogical system’ over a system of 
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‘display exhibition and manifestation’ so that each opens the other to something 
new. Finally she questions whether ‘turning’ might be more than a reading or 
interpretation system, and might be rather ‘a generative moment in which a new 
horizon emerges into being’.2 Can the ‘educational turn’ give us a new way to 
think, not just about education and art, but about broader political and cultural 
possibilities? 
Significantly, Rogoff is wary of the emergence of a ‘pedagogical 
aesthetic’,3 or any easily recognisable set of conventions that reproduce the 
materials of education (desks, files, archives, lecture series) without questioning 
the often conservative and dominating power dynamics that can be generated 
along with such materials.  However, Rogoff insists that there is value in the 
‘educational turn’ in the art world. This is rooted in the inclusion of ‘conversation’ 
as both a legitimate practice and an area for focusing critical investigation. While 
the value of conversation for Rogoff is largely in its open-endedness and the 
potential for dissolving hierarchical categories, she argues that even this has 
risked over-emphasising the development of formulas which themselves might 
sediment into rote conventions. Rogoff argues, then, that ‘the “turn” we are 
talking about must result not only in new formats, but also in another way of 
recognizing when and why something important is being said’.  
In order to suggest how this recognition might occur, Rogoff draws on 
Michel Foucault’s remarks about the Greek term parrhesia, which is ‘generally 
                                                
2 Irit Rogoff, ‘Turning’, e-flux 0, 2008 <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/turning/> [accessed 14  
December 2011].   
3 Rogoff, ‘Turning’. 
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perceived as free speech, and ... those who practice it are perceived to be those 
who speak the truth’. Importantly, this speaking of truth is also an active making 
of truth; for Rogoff, truth ‘is not a position but a drive’. Even more significantly, 
parrhesia must occur in public and for an audience, and ‘it must take the form of 
an address’.4 It is the articulation of particular realities in a specific context, but 
far from being a radically subjective, individualised pursuit, this making of truths 
happens always in relation to others. For Rogoff, this particular mode of making 
and speaking of truth defines the political potential for the ‘educational turn’ in art 
production. 
For me, this analysis also indicates the necessity of performance for 
pedagogical art practices that aim to balance both the liberating possibility of 
open-endedness and the imperative to be politically strategic within concrete 
situations. In other words, I am interested in work that challenges hierarchies in 
its form, but that also specifically addresses local political content. I think that 
Rogoff’s understanding of parrhesia as address helps show how performance is 
useful for creating such work. Techniques for thinking through a relationship 
between speaker and audiences are fundamental to performance practices. 
Performance is made in the interaction between performers and audiences, and 
performance studies has produced many tools for thinking through how this 
interaction occurs.  
Moreover, the connection of public address with the ‘educational turn’ 
suggests to me the importance of thinking about the figure of the expert. To 
                                                
4 Rogoff, ‘Turning’. 
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extend Rogoff’s assertion that the educational turn must result in ‘another way of 
recognizing when and why something important is being said’, I argue that it must 
also result in new ways of thinking who says important things. If the answer to 
the question ‘who says important things?’ is ‘experts’, we must expand how we 
think about expertise. If we want to change that answer, we must challenge some 
of the ways in which expertise is thought. 
 
Research	   	  
  
If pedagogy, or the transmission of knowledge, has been generative for 
artists in recent years, research, or the production of knowledge, has been at 
least as widespread a strategy. Indeed, the adoption of information or archival 
aesthetics is so ubiquitous and diffuse a strategy that it is certainly beyond the 
scope of this thesis to adequately represent it. Tom Holert usefully summarises 
the impulse, traced at least to the beginning of Conceptual Art in the 1960s, to 
draw from academic procedures, often to critical or interventionist ends, writing: 
 
Administrative, information, or service aesthetics, introduced at various 
moments of modernist and post-modernist art, emulated, mimicked, 
caricaturized and endorsed the aesthetics and rhetoric of scientific 
communities. They created representations and methodologies for 
intellectual labour on and off-display, and founded migrating and flexible 
archives that aimed to transform the knowledge spaces of galleries and 
museums according to what were often feminist agendas.5 
  
                                                
5 Tom Holert ‘Art in the Knowledge-based Polis’, e-flux 3, 2009 < http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/art-in-the-knowledge-based-polis/> [accessed 10 January, 2013] 
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The archival projects of, for instance, Renée Green, such as Import/Export Funk 
Office (1992), which is both subjective and treats a subject – hip-hop – with a 
complicated relationship to official histories, might be one example of this 
emulation or caricaturization of research aesthetics. Further examples of the 
archive as artistic and curatorial strategy can be found in, for example, Arkive 
City6, Interarchive. Archival Practices and Sites in the Contemporary Art 
Field7, Archive fever: uses of the document in contemporary art8, among many 
other texts which anthologise and reflect upon the archive in contemporary art 
practice. 
 Some of the work I address in this thesis does not necessarily come from 
this genealogy of conceptual art, even as I argue that it significantly develops 
what might be thought of as a ‘research’ function for art and performance.  Some 
emerges, for instance, at the intersections of activism and cultural production 
(sometimes labeled ‘tactical media’) and some emerges from artists’ 
engagements with science. Tactical Biopolitics and New Art/Science Affinities are 
two recent publications that trace this field of work. In my first chapter, I look 
more closely at these intersections, in relationship to my discussion of the Critical 
Art Ensemble. I believe that the framework of ‘expertise’ helps me connect these 
multiple genealogical threads. 
                                                
6 Julie Bacon, Ed., Arkive City, (Newcastle, England, and Belfast, Northern Ireland: Interface and 
Locus+ Archive, 2008). 
7 Hans-Peter Feldman, Hans Ulrich Obrist, Diethelm Stoller, Ulf Wuggenig 
(ed.) Interarchive. Archival Practices and Sites in the Contemporary Art 
Field (Lueneburg/Koeln: Publishing House Bookshop Walther Koenig, 2002) 
8 Okwui Enwezor and Willis E. Hartshorn, Archive fever: uses of the document in contemporary 
art (London: Steidl, 2008) 
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Indeed, for me, the most interesting way to think about research is part of 
a relationship between knowledge and power. The expert is fundamentally 
implicated in the sites in which power as a function of knowledge accrues. In my 
interaction with performance practice and theory, I am, perhaps foremost, 
committed to engaging these sites of power from both a critical and 
interventionist perspective. The expert has become a valuable figure for such 
engagement, and for an investigation of particularly contemporary configurations 
of power and knowledge. 
 Holert’s proposals for what might constitute artistic research more broadly 
are useful in this sense. Couched in a description of a proposed research project 
titled ‘Art in the Knowledge-based Polis’, Holert describes a system that would 
combine science-based processes with art-based ones, without privileging either. 
Key to this is a productive tension which I hope to develop further in this thesis: 
the relationship of art production to forms of non-knowledge. Holert writes about 
‘the traditional claim that artists almost constitutively work on the hind side of 
rationalist, explicated knowledge—in the realms of non-knowledge (or emergent 
knowledge)’. Artists are mystics or visionaries according to this claim, either 
seeing beyond rational frameworks or seeing past them to future frameworks. As 
one-dimensional as this take on artistic activity might be, the value of it is that it 
sidestephs the instrumentalised goals of the knowledge-based economy 
(‘efficiency, innovation, and transferability’ as Holert phrases them). It is this 
‘apparent incompatibility’ between knowledge and nonknowledge that Holert 
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champions as the political potential for ‘research’ if it is to contribute to the 
overcoming of dominant regimes.9  
 
Live	  Art	  and	  Expertise	  
  
 Having briefly addressed pedagogy and research as broad curatorial and 
artistic strategies in contemporary art, I want to shift focus slightly, to consider the 
term Live Art and its relationship to expertise. Many of the artists I consider in this 
thesis have shown their work in a context associated with Live Art. Moreover, it is 
a term that has a specific sense in the United Kingdom, in the context in which I 
have produced this thesis. In attempting to delineate the field I have studied, it is 
important to pause for a moment with Live Art.  
 It is a contested term, and there is some recent work that historicises both 
the development of the term and the practitioners and institutions associated with 
it.10 In a themed issue of Contemporary Theatre Review Dominic Johnson argues 
for the importance of ‘accounting for Live Art as a geographically and historically 
situated set of practices’. This is particularly important because unlike 
Performance Art, which Johnson calls a ‘formal tradition’ with a set of 
recognizable styles and recurrent themes, ‘Live Art is a sector’. 11  It is a term that 
                                                
9 Holert, ‘Knowledge-based Polis’ 
10 Since the writing of this thesis, an edited collection on this topic has come out, which would be 
useful to consider in further developments of this project. See Deirdre Heddon and Jennie Klein, 
Histories and Practices of Live Art (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 
11 Dominic Johnson, ‘Introduction: The What, When and Where of Live Art’, Contemporary 
Theatre  
Review, 22.1 (2012), p. 1. Note: an article I co-authored titled ‘Gobsmacked: Getting Speechless 
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was developed strategically by artists and institutions, particularly in the UK, who 
were looking for a place to situate practices that were marginalized or had no 
other vocabulary to describe themselves – and thus little access to funding or 
institutional support.  
 Historicizing ‘Live Art’ then, is especially difficult because its practitioners 
have often displayed a reluctance to positively define the term. Joshua Sofaer, 
for instance, in the text of his lecture performance What Is Live Art?, states that 
‘The term “Live Art” came into usage in the UK in the mid-1980’s, and was born 
out of a frustration by arts professionals to account for art practices that 
expanded or escaped the classifications in use’. 12  In other words, Sofaer 
suggests that any tracing of the history of Live Art as a category must account for 
the desire on the part of its practitioners to ‘escape’ or in other ways go beyond 
categorisation. Sofaer goes on to describe various ways that artists have found 
value in the term Live Art, and to show how there are thematic and 
methodological links between these artists. Many artists who focus on presence, 
for instance, or the body, or the marginalisation of certain bodies have all found 
Live Art a hospitable term.  
 
 However, Sofaer insists that, ‘at least part of the definition of Live Art has to 
be its resistance to definition. Maybe it’s called “live” precisely because it hasn’t 
                                                                                                                                            
in Performance’ appears in this issue.  
12 Joshua Sofaer, What Is Live Art? prod. by Outsmart Productions, 2002,  
<http://www.joshuasofaer.com/2011/06/what-is-live-art/> [accessed 14 March 2012]. 
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yet solidified into a category; it is a live process of change and challenge’.13 
Similarly, The Live Art Development Agency (one of the most vocal advocates for 
live work in the UK and for practitioners of challenging performance) states that: 
Live Art is not a description of an artform or discipline, but a cultural strategy 
to include experimental processes and experiential practices that might 
otherwise be excluded from established curatorial, cultural and critical 
frameworks.14   
This resistance to formal definitions and insistence on the value of broadly 
accepting practices that might otherwise not find space will be familiar to anyone 
who has encountered Live Art and its institutions. 
 
 So is Live Art the genre that defies genre? Possibly, but there are a few 
caveats that need to be considered first. To return to Johnson’s essay, he 
expresses concern that Live Art might ultimately be limiting in its strategic aims, 
becoming ‘a parochial system for presenting work that sometimes feels 
unhelpfully cut off from the wider histories and conventions of artistic 
production’. 15  Championing marginalized practices can sometimes feel like 
championing marginalization itself. Yet by rigorously situating Live Art in a 
context, without succumbing to the stifling impulses of orthodox categories, it 
might be possible to realize a much broader potential for Live Art as a way of 
understanding uncompromising and political performance practices. For 
Johnson, this potential can be realized if we ‘search for the bite, the flinch, the 
                                                
13 Sofaer. 
14 Live Art Development Agency, What Is Live Art?,  
<http://www.thisisliveart.co.uk/about_us/what_is_live_art.html> [accessed 14 March 2012]. 
15 Johnson, p. 8. 
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grimace of one’s confusion in the face of Live Art, and never settle for anything 
less, despite the consolations that convivial forms might sometimes offer’.16 The 
provocation is to understand Live Art as an engine for challenging what we know 
about performance, not a cozy refuge from the messy outside world. Understood 
this way, Live Art has been a productive framework for my investigation. 
 
 So how to consider expertise as it functions in Live Art? Does this ‘sector’ or 
‘strategy’ have its own experts, or its own anxieties around knowledge production 
and power? Returning to Sofaer’s lecture performance on the definition of Live 
Art might help to answer these questions. An important thing to note about this 
performance is that he performs the text to a camera, on a busy urban pavement. 
He is wearing a suit, and his delivery is authoritative and confident. He is a white 
man who is convincing as an expert. As he speaks, passersby continually turn to 
look back at him, many of them laughing and pointing. The reason for this 
surprising behaviour becomes clear only at the end of the performance, as the 
camera pans out and rotates behind Sofaer, to reveal that the seat of his trousers 
has been cut out, and his bare buttocks are prominently on display. I take this 
performance as a metonym for a broader approach to knowledge and expertise 
that occurs under the umbrella Live Art when it is at is most interesting. It is a 
combination of serious, searching questions and articulations, alongside the 
unexpected, the disruptive or the inappropriate.   
  
                                                
16 Johnson, p. 16. 
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 I am interested, in this thesis, to draw on this combination of careful thinking 
and articulation around categories and expertise, and of strategies for 
undermining and collapsing categories and expert positions. I believe that it is 
possible to connect common political intentions and identify collective aesthetic 
stakes, without reducing the work to brands or labels, and still to maintain a 
careful, critical position around issues of hierarchy that arise from canon- 
building. I also argue that instances of excess, failure, contradiction – and the 
straight up piss-take – have been deployed masterfully by the artists I am 
interested in to complicate this thinking and to question this carefulness. It is this 
dynamic and never easily resolved combination that I explore in what follows.  
  
 While I do not want to use Live Art as a way to avoid outlining contexts or to 
make uninformed comparisons, I do value the strategic dimension of the term as 
a way to think critically about the limits of categories and ways of rigourously re- 
thinking boundaries.  Within the development of institutions that support Live Art, 
there is a self-identified attempt to be actively inclusive of marginalised bodies, 
not just abstractly, but at an institutional, programming level. Again, the Live Art 
Development Agency is a useful example of these kinds of programming 
objectives. In recent years, their large-scale projects Documenting Live and 
Access All Areas, for example, have addressed issues facing artists of colour 
and disabled artists, respectively, in ways that are complex, challenging and not 
easily resolvable. Projects such as these are not tokenistic but argue, rather, that 
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the experiences of marginalised groups are constitutive materials for the field of 
Live Art as such. This is not, I argue, the same thing as championing 
marginalization – it is a material effort to engage with types of knowledges that 
are actively excluded from mainstream discourse. When Live Art challenges us to 
commit to activist cultural politics, it is valuable to my own investments.   
 
Performance	  Studies,	  Disciplinarity	  and	  Expertise	  
  
 If Live Art is a vital mode because of its complex relationship to expertise, 
the value of performance studies as an academic framework for considering this 
relationship comes also from the anxieties and tensions within the discipline 
around expertise. Indeed, the particular purchase that performance studies has 
on these questions is fundamentally related to its sometimes self-identification as 
an anti-discipline. My investigation reflects the anxieties felt towards disciplinarity 
among many who study performance, while maintaining an awareness of how 
these anxieties only increase as the institutional footing of performance studies 
also increases and narratives of its development take hold. I argue that this 
ambivalent attitude towards expertise in the academic study of performance 
actually makes it a fertile space to think about the problems of expertise for 
performance.  
 One of the useful critical tools that has been developed through the anxiety 
around disciplinarity in performance studies is the use of jarring comparisons 
which de-stabilise disciplinary boundaries without necessarily rejecting them 
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outright. Rebecca Schneider, for instance, urges us to be ‘serious about 
imprecision’, citing Fred Moten’s In the Break for its ‘cross-medial comparisons’ 
in which considerations of ‘the sound of a photograph’,17 for instance, might 
simultaneously enrich the study of his particular cultural objects of choice, and 
refigure conventions that delineate what constitutes ‘study’.18  These sorts of 
practices are significant because they do not rely on the complete negation of 
disciplinary borders, but rather require a canny understanding of how disciplinary 
boundaries work in order to ever so carefully reorganise how they operate. As 
Schneider writes, ‘it is the almost wrong that helps us get something almost 
right’.19 However, the practice of recognising when and where these ‘almosts’ 
begin and end is tricky. I hope to approach expertise in a way that strikes a 
balance between indeterminacy and comprehensibility – and which draws on the 
valuable tools developed within performance studies to do so.   
 Schneider deploys this ‘betweenness’ as a way to approach historicity as a 
central methodological problem for performance studies, which gets to the heart 
of what performance studies may be able to contribute to knowledge production. 
While it is crucial for many performance scholars to understand the historical 
processes that produce the material conditions that surround both the production 
and reception of theatre and performance, at the same time scholars balance the 
desire to emphasise liveness and subjective and embodied experience, which 
                                                
17 Rebecca Schneider, ‘Intermediality, Infelicity, and Scholarship on the Slip’ Theatre Survey, 47.2  
(2006), p. 254.  
18 For more on Moten’s significant work on the concept of study, see Fred Moten and Stefano  
Harney, ‘The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses’, Social Text 22.2 (2004), pp.  
101-115.  
19 Schneider, ‘Intermediality’, 258. 
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may seem in conflict with the arguably more abstracted perspective of long term 
social movements. However, as Schneider argues, within performance ‘the tug 
between the extremes of “presentness” on one side and extremes of “historicism” 
on another will not (and arguably should not) find precise resolution’.20  For 
Schneider, it is precisely the tension between these two poles, and the 
unwillingness to give way on either point, which make performance studies a 
politically valuable framework. For me, this type of tension between seemingly 
opposed modes of understanding what constitutes valuable knowledge also 
make performance studies a politically useful framework for thinking about 
expertise. 
 The history of performance studies itself, along with its relationship to 
expertise, is hotly contested. How much does performance studies owe to 
theatre, or to anthropology, or to visual arts, or to linguistics? How indebted is the 
field to its point of origin (e.g. the Department of Performance Studies at Tisch 
School of the Arts at New York University, often understood to be the first 
department of its kind)? How do national contexts affect what is considered to be 
performance studies, and how does the dominance of a North American, or a 
Western European perspective affect what is considered to be legitimate expert 
research activities in the field? A number of studies have come out in recent 
years which attempt to account for the historical trajectory of performance studies 
and its institutional affiliations, often while attempting to maintain some spirit of 
indeterminacy which could allow for alternative histories and affiliations to 
                                                
20 Schneider, ‘Intermediality’ p. 257. 
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emerge.  
 Shannon Jackson’s work, for instance, both lays out particular narratives of 
the development of performance studies and reflects on the consequences of 
doing so. For Jackson, the claim on the part of performance studies scholars that 
the performance studies field is charting unknown waters needs to be tempered 
by looking at the already entrenched histories of the development of fields like 
drama and theatre in the (particularly for Jackson, North American) academy. 
Looking at such histories allows us to ‘further demonstrate how saturated 
oppositional discourse is with what it claims not to be’.21 Jackson argues that it is 
crucial for scholars in performance studies to participate in disciplinary 
genealogies of this sort because it is ‘a means of approaching the past to 
unsettle the heretofore stable’. 22  Significantly, Jackson also argues that 
performance studies is not unique in having a genealogy (or genealogies) that 
are contested and riddled with anxiety. She argues, instead, that it is in the 
nature of disciplinarity to be the site of conflicting investments, even if it is often 
thought to be the place for the definition of stable categories.  
 I argue, however, that the self-conscious attention currently being paid to 
these anxieties and conflicting investments by scholars such as Jackson in the 
field of performance studies makes this discipline ripe for a larger project of  
problematising expertise. The anxiety around the cohesion and institutionalisation 
                                                
21 Shannon Jackson, ‘Professing Performance: Disciplinary Genealogies, TDR, 45.1 (2001), p.  
85.  
 
22 Jackson, ‘Professing’, 92. 
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of performance studies – and the consequent anxiety around the modes of 
expertise that it (performance studies) creates – are, I argue, factors which 
makes performance studies a particularly valuable place from which to launch an 
investigation into the politics and aesthetics of expertise. As those who 
developed the foundations of performance studies as a discipline – foundations 
that were, at least for some, intended to be permanently unstable – become 
increasingly looked to by newer generations of academic performance scholars 
as experts, the implications of this needs to be considered. On the one hand, it 
may be important to examine self-consciously the status positions embedded and 
developing in the discipline of performance studies. On the other hand, if one 
wants to investigate how a discipline might confront the assumptions and 
processes behind its own development, it might be a good idea to consult the 
experts – and performance studies might be a good place to find expert 
understanding of disciplinary anxiety.  
 
Performance	  Studies	  and	  Practice-­‐As-­‐Research	  
  
 One of the places expertise is being negotiated in the discipline of 
performance studies is in the space of intersection between ‘practice’ and 
‘research’.  Having discussed broadly the significance of ‘research’ as a mode for 
contemporary art, I want to look a bit more carefully at the specific situation of 
practice as research within performance studies as an academic discipline. 
There has been a perceived need in a growing number of university performance 
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studies departments not to separate conventional academic activities from artistic 
activities. Increasingly these departments are characterised not only by the 
working side by side of people who make performance and people who write 
about performance, but also by people whose professional lives consist of some 
balance of both.   
 Some of the motivation and energy behind such developments has come 
from the forceful arguments of performance studies figures such as Dwight  
Conquergood. For Conquergood, there is an underlying political urgency behind 
the question of practice as research. Conquergood writes of ‘the dominant way of 
knowing in the academy’ which is ‘that of empirical observation and critical 
analysis from a distanced perspective’. This dominance results in an academy 
that centres on text to the exclusion of all other forms of knowing and transmitting 
knowledge. For Conquergood, the re-evaluation of performance practice is an 
attempt to create some parity with the production of text. This re-evaluation does 
more than attempt a balance between artists and scholars, however. It also 
addresses ‘ways of knowing that are rooted in embodied experience, orality, and 
local contigencies’. These ways of knowing need to be emphasised because they 
are often the domain of ‘subordinate people’ who ‘do not have the privilege of 
explicitness, the luxury of transparency, the presumptive norm of clear and direct 
communication, free and open debate on a level playing field that the privileged 
classes take for granted’.23  Performance studies has had the opportunity to 
                                                
23 Dwight Conquergood, ‘Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research’, TDR 46.2 
(2002), p. 146. 
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propose, however modestly, concrete mechanisms for supporting embodied, 
local knowledge alongside and among the abstract and critical thinking that is 
more easily associated with expert academic work as it is conventionally 
understood. The degree to which these proposals will be seriously taken up 
remains to be seen. 
 The history and future of practice as research is complex and contested, 
and much work has been done to investigate its problems and potentials. The 
five-year-long research project Practice as Research in Performance (PARIP) at 
the University in Bristol, for example, was initiated in 2002 as an attempt to 
articulate some of the challenges facing this type of work, and to refine some of 
its terms. Questions around definition (e.g. does ‘practice as research’ differ 
materially from ‘practice-based research’?) were addressed alongside questions 
of legitimacy, access and evaluation. In his introduction to the resulting 
publication, Baz Kershaw attempts a partial narrative of the development of 
practice as research in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, highlighting 
institutional obstacles and loopholes, and proclaiming, optimistically, that this 
type of work ‘could well have a future that is profoundly sustainable’.24  
 
 The layers of complexity that attend the questions around practice as 
research are vast.  There also needs to be a consideration of how practice as 
                                                                                                                                            
 
24 Baz Kershaw, ‘Practice-as-Research: An Introduction’, Practice-as-Research in Performance  
and Screen, eds. Ludivine Allegue, Simon Jones, Baz Kershaw, Angela Piccini (Basingstoke:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.16. 
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research has been treated in different (though often intersecting fields) such as 
visual culture, music or dance research. The field might be enriched by thinking 
how ‘practice’ is defined in academic fields that are further afield – mathematics, 
say, where the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ might be interesting to 
compare to performance study’s ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. I do not have the space to 
address these points in detail. I do, however, want to point out that despite  
Kershaw’s optimism the future of practice as research in performance studies is 
far from clear, as the increasing demands on higher education to do more with 
less will no doubt continue to affect the ability of institutions to experiment outside 
of predictable instrumental outcomes. Additionally, at a more general level, there 
is a question about whether the dominance of text is still to be taken for granted.  
Might, for example, the ability to manipulate and circulate images be a more 
important form of expertise to understand and critique? At least since Guy  
Debord’s pronouncements on the ‘whole life of those societies in which modern 
conditions of production prevail’ being ‘an immense accumulation of 
spectacles’,25 such image critique has developed (and has become an object of 
critique) throughout the humanities fields. Is the performance studies field (such 
as it is) sufficiently nimble to accommodate and respond to shifts and tremors in 
the wider context? Is it a choice between institutional sedimentation and 
permanent precarity, or are there ways to think about knowledge and skill that 
offers other alternatives? I suspect that these questions underlie much of the 
                                                
25 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 3rd edn., trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New  
York: Zone Books, 1994), p. 3. 
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work that has emerged in recent years in the intersections between expertise and 
performance, and I propose that these anxieties link a lot of otherwise disparate 
practice.  
 
Performance	  Art:	  Institutionalisation	  and	  Legitimacy	  
 
 As the place of performance ‘practice’ is being negotiated within the 
academy, one of the primary objects of performance studies has undergone a 
massive shift in institutional positioning. Performance art, often understood as 
being part of a fine art or visual art genealogy, has gained new traction within 
wider arts discourse. Marina Abramović has ascended to canonical status in 
major museums, and along with other such superstar figures, performance art 
more generally is beginning to have a new understanding of itself and its place in 
art history. There are anxieties that attend these shifts as well. Can there be a 
radical programme for performance art when it is embraced by the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York or the Tate Modern in the UK? Exactly whose work is 
being embraced? How is the work of earlier generations being remembered, and 
what does that do to the field of performance art more generally?  
 The three-year-long research project Performance Matters, begun in 2009 
and based jointly at Roehampton University and Goldsmiths, University of 
London is one initiative that has undertaken to address such questions. Its two 
major streams Performing Idea and Trashing Performance take on the dual 
notion that performance is simultaneously achieving new forms of knowing and 
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circulating knowledge, and also producing a mess. As the project website states, 
the current position of performance in a broader cultural context means the time 
is ripe to ask ‘whether such forms of cultural practice are now being taken 
seriously in culture more broadly, and how they may possess the potential to 
refashion understandings of what, and how, things matter in the contemporary 
world’.26 Is it possible for performance to leverage its new foothold in cultural 
positioning to contribute to a more profound shift in the legitimizing functions of 
culture more broadly? How can the producers of performance insist on the 
ongoing need for questioning the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ (and perhaps also the 
‘who’) of things that matter. 
 Part of this is down to the forms of knowledge that performance can 
contribute, even at the level of self-knowledge of performance histories. It seems 
important to briefly mention the rise of the performance re-enactment as a 
popular form in museums, galleries and symposia internationally. This thesis 
does not explicitly address performance re-enactment, but I suspect that the 
‘educational turn’ may have a relationship with this mode which has become 
nearly as ubiquitous as the performance lecture. On the one hand, Abramović’s 
historical re-enactments the Guggenheim Museum in New York (CITE) or her 
orchestration of re-enactments of her own performance histories at the Museum 
of Modern Art (also in New York) might be seen as part of either playing into a 
particular moment of fashionability or perhaps a more weighted introduction of 
                                                
26  Performance Matters, ‘Introduction: Performance Matters’  
<http://www.thisisperformancematters.co.uk/what-and-why.html>, [accessed 14 December 2011] 
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performance into an institutionalised canon. On the other hand, re-enactment has 
been a strategy at smaller scale, but perhaps, I argue, with more interesting 
results, by artists like Robin Deacon (with his ongoing project on the experimental 
downtown New York performance artist Stuart Sherman), Janez Janša (one of 
three Slovenia-based artist to officially change their names to that of the right-
wing Slovenian prime minister, and who produced a number of re-enactments of 
1960s Yugoslavian performance) or Mel Brimfield (who has recently published a 
collection of works titled This Is Performance Art ). Affection, disruption, fiction 
and humour thread through these and other practices, offering different 
possibilities for how we might know performance. In these examples, 
performance practitioners use their own tools to produce knowledge both about 
their own disciplinary histories, and about how history might be known. They are 
not only developing their own narratives and producing their own evidence, but 
also proposing alternative modes of narrative, and alternatives ways of thinking 




 I have touched on a few broad issues found at the intersections of 
performance and expertise. There are, of course, countless others. It would be 
possible to investigate the ongoing professionalisation of the artist, and how this 
operates alongside other cultural ideals such as, for instance, the Romantic 
notion of the artist as divinely inspired, outside or above economics or industries, 
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or the avant-garde ideal of the fusion of art and life. There are also sets of 
questions to be asked about the performative and theatrical dimension of cultural 
ideas about expertise, from the rhetorical styles of persuasive speech, to the 
semiotics of costume among say, scientists, political analysts and professional 
athletes. Indeed, a performance studies PhD thesis could be devoted to studying 
people with Drama degrees who contribute to the public speaking curricula in 
business schools. For this study, I have limited my inquiry to artists working with 
performance (not necessarily exclusively but at least in significant ways) who are 
self-consciously and explicitly drawing on expertise either as an object of critique, 
material to be mined for its formal properties, or as a site (both physically and 
conceptually) to locate a practice.  
 My decision to focus on this set of parameters is largely in response to 
trends in performance work that I have witnessed. The baseline observation that 
motivated the development of this thesis is this: in recent years, many artists 
have been explicitly drawing on intersections between knowledge production and 
performance to create work. I then discovered that thinking expertise as a frame 
helps bring some seemingly disparate practices into useful conversation, and 
focuses what could be an impossibly broad field of study. The impulses behind 
the works I have witnessed are varied. Some of these include: creating 
alternative academies and institutions; critiquing the professional art industry; 
activism against other institutions ranging from the pharmaceutical industry to 
national border security; expanding the definition of the word ‘expert’, and who 
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can be included in it; and working towards interdisciplinary models for 
collaboration between artists and other institutions. I wanted to explore this trend 
as an overarching theme, while at the same time maintaining the variety and non-
cohesiveness that exists between the artists I have encountered.   
 What, specifically am I looking at? Having outlined broadly the fields of 
practice and fields of study I have drawn from, what is specific to the set of artists 
I have looked at? I have already discussed how Live Art is a useful frame for 
considering the set of practices I consider as a whole, without erasing the 
different backgrounds and motivations of the diverse set of practices I look at.  
These backgrounds include, as I have already discussed, an explicitly activist 
framework (ACT UP, Critical Arts Ensemble and the noborders movement). I also 
look at work that is in the visual art performance tradition (Kira O’Reilly, Bobby  
Baker, Aaron Williamson, William Pope L., Walid Raad). There is the related 
segment of ‘postdramatic theatre’ represented herein (Rimini Protokoll), as well 
as the somewhat different area of so-called ‘bio-art’ (O’Reilly and Critical Art 
Ensemble again). Each of these areas has its own relationship to expertise, and 
produces its own motivation for addressing it or incorporating it into the practice 
and the politics. At the same time, none of these areas has a permanent 
boundary, and indeed the practitioners I have looked at often operate in multiple 
settings and for multiple types of audiences. Once again, I have aimed to build a 
structure for my analysis that maintains these elements of both multiplicity and 
intersection, rather than forcing an inappropriate field that would elide difference 
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for the sake of neat categories.  
 Nevertheless, there are important limits to this study, and before I move on 
to defining my key terms, and outlining my thesis chapters, I want to briefly 
discuss two significant areas where I have had to draw lines around the work I 





I want to briefly discuss the time frame I have chosen to work with. In the title for 
this thesis, I have used the word 'contemporary' to describe the time frame. To be 
more specific, the earliest work I look at is from the late 1980s, and the most 
current work I look at is ongoing at the time of this writing, with most of the work 
being concentrated between 2000-2010. (I consider the work of Bobby  
Baker, whose career began before the period I have just indicated, but the pieces  
I consider are her later 'How to Live' pieces.)  
 Periodisation is always a fraught and imprecise activity, but the work I look 
at is influenced by external political factors like the rise of neoliberal, globalised 
economic models and the subsequent global economic crisis, composed as a 
sequence of burst ‘bubbles’ – technology, credit, housing – which have been felt 
most spectacularly since 2008, but which reach much earlier. The economic 
austerity programmes which have been enacted in response have, certainly in 
this country, materially affected the type of work that is being made in this 
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‘contemporary’ period, as budgets are slashed and remaining resources are 
concentrated in already elite institutions. Ideologically as well, however, the 
transition from a neoliberal New Labour government to a conservative coalition 
administration means that understandings of the social function of the arts, and 
the types work that is valued and knowledges that are legitimated have shifted. 
The global 'War on Terror' declared in response to the events of September 11, 
2001 also certainly conditions the work I consider here, as do the attendant 
restrictions on immigration in North America and Western Europe, the curtailing 
of civil liberties enacted through such policies as the Patriot Act in the USA, and 
the more abstract deployment of unspecified and ongoing ‘threat’ that has been 
opportunistically adopted by the governments of powerful nations to justify a 
spectrum of violence, ranging from detainment to torture. 27  Finally, ongoing 
advances in information and communication technology, characterized 
particularly in this period by the near ubiquity (in wealthy communities) of mobile 
communication devices and the rise of social media, are both directly influencing 
the work I look at, in terms of expanding and shaping what is technically possible, 
and by changing how we think about (at least) subjectivity, competence, 
ownership and accessibility.  
 This is a list of conditions that is simultaneously too broad to adequately 
address in this thesis, and fatally limited in terms of actually acknowledging the 
complexities of the contemporary period in which we are living.  Moreover, in this 
                                                
27 For a theorisation of ‘threat’ see Brian Massumi, ‘The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The 
Political Ontology of Threat’ in The Affect Theory Reader, eds. Seigworth, Gregory J. and Melissa 
Gregg (Durham, Duke University Press, 2010). 
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thesis I want to focus on performance work, and to find my way to broader issues 
through the analysis of this work. However, I have made this list because I think 
there is a particular urgency around thinking about expertise now, that is crucially 
different from, say, the period of the 1960s and 70s that Lyotard marks as the 
period of the ‘postmodern’ (which I will address in more detail below). If the last 
few decades are no less subject to computerisation, the continued dominance of 
data and information as legitimated forms of knowledge, or the ongoing fracturing 
of grand metanarratives than was the year 1979, nevertheless the particular 
conditions of permanent yet diffuse crisis, the possible waning dominance of 
North America and Western Europe (and particularly of the United States as a 
global superpower), and the precaritisation of large swathes of the so-called 
knowledge economy has, perhaps paradoxically, lent renewed significance to the 
questions of what is an expert, what types of knowledge count, and who decides. 
 On a more modest level, the period between the late 1980s-2010 is useful 
as well for thinking how the discipline of performance studies itself has an 
ongoing relationship to expertise, as a new, but no longer quite so new as it was, 
discipline.  Further, as performance as an art form undergoes ongoing 
permutations and takes on new positions within discourse and institutional 
valuation, the relationship between performance and broader understandings of 
expertise becomes more complex. The ‘contemporary’, however inadequate it 
might be as a descriptive term, nonetheless demands attention as forming a 





 I also want to acknowledge that there are limits to the field of study I am 
considering in terms of geography. The work I look at, while it often alludes to 
political issues and dynamics in a global context, is largely emanating from 
Western Europe and the United States, and the majority of performance 
examples I consider  when not from the United Kingdom are based in Germany 
and the United States. Similarly, the critical literature I engage with, while keenly 
aware of a range of political contexts and histories, is also largely European and 
North American in origin. This geographical bias certainly betrays my own 
educational and professional history. However, I am also interested in the ways 
anxieties around expertise and challenges to dominant forms of expertise within 
these geographical limits betray broader anxieties around and challenges to the 




 Having cleared some space for investigation, in terms of the fields of 
practice and disciplinary contexts I will draw from, and limits to these fields that I 
have provisionally constructed, I will now undertake to define the key terms of my 
argument.  ‘Knowledge’, ‘affect’ and then ‘expertise’ itself are the primary terms 
that I need to address, though I proceed with the understanding that each of 
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these terms is both too large to adequately summarise, and too hotly contested 
to define uncontroversially. These definitions should be understood as provisional 
and functional, highlighting key issues and usages that help frame the 




 I will focus on four aspects of knowledge that particularly influence my 
understanding of expertise as a project for contemporary performance. First, I 
assert that knowledge cannot be defined as a single category, but must be 
understood as referring to a diverse set of categories, each involving different 
criteria for legitimation or truth-value. Second, these categories are subject to 
change, and shift over time. As a consequence, a period in history may be 
characterized, at least in part, by the operations of the categories of knowledge in 
play. Third, knowledge has a fundamental relationship to power, and any political 
work that aims to disrupt existing configurations of power must deal with 
configurations of knowledge (and vice versa). Finally, fourth, the 
knowledge/power relation plays out in our understanding of the competencies, or 
capacities for knowledge, or different individuals. This means, I argue, that the 
question of who is considered to be knowledgeable may be as important to a 
politically committed investigation of expertise as the question of what is 
considered to be knowledge. 
 So, to begin: for the purposes of this thesis, knowledge must be understood 
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as existing in multiple categories, and these categories are characterised by 
differing criteria when it comes to determining legitimacy or truth. These differing 
criteria may, indeed, exclude other forms of knowledge at various times. I draw 
on Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition to help me support this assertion (and a 
consequent assertion that I make below). As Lyotard argues: 
 [W]hat is meant by the term knowledge is not only a set of denotative 
statements, far from it. It also includes notions of 'know-how', 'knowing how 
to live', 'how to listen', etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence 
that goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of 
truth, extending to the determination and application of criteria of efficacy 
(technical qualification), of justice and/or happiness (ethical wisdom), of the 
beauty of a sound or colour (auditory and visual sensibility), etc.28  
 
So knowledge may allow one to know how something works, whether something 
is right, or if an object is beautiful, among other forms of knowledge or knowing. 
The criteria for all of these are different. One who is understood to be 
knowledgeable may broadly be understood to be competent, but these 
competencies vary:  
Knowledge is what makes someone capable of forming 'good' denotative 
utterances, but also 'good' prescriptive and 'good' evaluative utterances… It 
is not a competence relative to a particular class of statements (for 
example, cognitive ones) to the exclusion of all others. On the contrary, it 
makes 'good' performances in relation to a variety of objects of discourse 
possible: objects to be known, decided on, evaluated, transformed… 29 
 
Knowledge and competence are mutually self-supporting, but different types of 
knowledge may lead to different types of competencies, and vice versa. Indeed, 
one form of knowledge may result in competence that looks like incompetence 
                                                
28 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 19. 
29 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 19. 
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under another criteria for knowledge.   
 Lyotard addresses this last point when he focuses particularly on the 
distinction between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge. For Lyotard, 
the pragmatics of science, on the other hand, are fundamentally defined by their 
concern for questions of legitimacy in the determination of facts about the world. 
Science is the set of knowledge that is concerned with ‘denotative’ statements – 
statements of truth, or statements which correspond with reality. The practice of 
making such statements is necessarily concerned with the practice of evaluating 
such statements. Thus the meta-discourse of science, which determines the 
rules of how things can be said to be true, is as important as the discourse of 
science, or statements of truth.   
 On the other hand, the pragmatics of narrative knowledge are not 
concerned with questions of legitimacy, though it operates with relation to 
legitimacy. Narrative is a process by which criteria for legitimacy are determined 
and circulated. Narratives nominate those subjects that have a right to speak and 
be heard, and narratives distribute those words. Insofar as narratives have force, 
‘they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do'.30 The stories 
we tell about who we are and how we behave constitute a type of knowledge that 
works, whether or not it is true. 
 In summary, then, narrative knowledge does not prioritise legitimation, 
rather, 'it certifies itself in the pragmatics of its own transmission without having 
                                                
30 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 23. 
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recourse to argumentation and proof'. 31  Narrative knowledge is knowledge, 
insofar as it is passed down as knowledge. Whereas scientific knowledge must 
be accessible to legitimation – it is knowledge insofar as it can be proved and 
stand up to argument. One consequence of this is that scientific knowledge looks 
to narrative knowledge with its own criteria and finds narrative knowledge falls 
short. While narrative develops criteria of legitimation that science draws from, 
science cannot legitimate narrative.  
 All this is to show, then, how knowledge exists in multiple categories, and 
one category of knowledge might challenge the fundaments of another category 
of knowledge. On to the second point in my definition of knowledge, which 
complicates the first point about the diversity of categories of knowledge. 
Categories of knowledge shift and change over time – as does the predominance 
of some categories over other categories. Additionally, the configuration of 
categories of knowledge characterises a historical moment. So, drawing from 
Lyotard again, the shift from ‘modernity’ to ‘postmodernity’ is a shift from one 
configuration of knowledge sets to another configuration. Even the word 
‘configuration’ is difficult, because it suggests a stable, if provisional, structure. 
My point is that stability is not a necessary characteristic of knowledge, even if 
the integrity of a certain category of knowledge or the dynamics between 
knowledges may have duration, whether extended or brief.  
 Lyotard demonstrates this point in his detailed analysis of the shift from 
modernity to postmodernity, characterised as a shift in the function of knowledge 
                                                
31 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 26. 
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in correspondence with other shifts in political paradigms. So, for instance, the 
question of legitimacy in modern scientific knowledge was determined by a 
specific type of narrative knowledge – the grand meta-narrative, such as the 
concept of Spirit in German Idealist philosophy. This is the result of the 
development of a certain self-consciousness within the realm of modern scientific 
discourse:  
It is recognised that the conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of the 
game of science, are immanent in that game, that they can only be 
established within the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, 
and that there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus 
extended to them by the experts.32  
 
In order to lend authority to the consensus of experts, the experts looked outside 
of scientific discourse, seeking for some unity that would stabilize the rules of the 
game. With this understanding of legitimacy also comes the concept of progress, 
and the idea of a cumulative teleology became a fundamental characteristic of 
modernity. And thus unity became the major philosophical project of modernity, in 
a context of knowledge production which aimed to produce 'fully legitimated 
subject[s] of knowledge and society'.33 In the German Idealist tradition:  
Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into 
separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education; it can only 
achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as 
moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a 
rational narration, or rather meta-narration.34 
 
Postmodernism is ‘post-‘ because legitimation is no longer characterised in these 
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33 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 33/ 
34 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 33. 
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terms. With the rise of information technology, 'the grand narrative has lost its 
credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses’.35 The game of science 
is shattered, or might seem to be, 'by revealing that it is a language game with its 
own rules…and that it has no special calling to supervise the game of praxis (nor 
the game of aesthetics for that matter). 36  The pessimistic response to this 
shattering is to bemoan the failure of philosophy, the loss of the subject, the 
reduction of grand unities to diminished specialisms. However, for Lyotard, the 
important move for postmodern science is a self-awareness that understands 
that the production of truth statements is governed by rules, and that rules are 
not themselves statements of truth. The ‘game’ of postmodernism is to search for 
the paradox, or the broken rule, and the ‘moves’ players of this game make are to 
rally for new rules, or new ways of thinking and speaking.  
The third point about knowledge that I want to make here is implicit in the 
first two points (that knowledge has multiple categories and is intertwined with 
history). That is that knowledge has a fundamental relationship with power. Here 
and elsewhere in this thesis, I draw on Michel Foucault’s formulation of power as 
multiple and dynamic. For Foucault, power needs to be understood as ‘force 
relations’ produced through processes of ‘ceaseless struggles and 
confrontations’. These relations are mutually self-supporting, and take effect 
under strategies ‘whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied 
in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social 
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hegemonies’.37 Power, then, is neither centralised nor static, though it is often 
expressed through recognizable channels. There is a danger that this 
understanding of power as dispersed and ever-present might lead to political 
apathy or exhaustion if the ground of power constantly crumbles only to re- 
emerge elsewhere, and stronger. However, I take this understanding of power to 
mean that it can be produced and wielded in surprising places and to non- 
determined ends, and thus that working for change can produce results.  
For Foucault, knowledge and power are not only related but productive of 
one another. He criticizes, for instance, the idea that power functions exclusively 
to repress knowledge, arguing that ‘power would be a fragile thing if its only 
function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of censorship, 
exclusion, blockage and repression’. If this were the case, knowledge would be 
the enemy of power, and revelation a sufficient weapon against control. This isn’t 
how power works, Foucault insists: ‘if…power is strong this is because, as we 
are beginning to realize, it produces effects at the level of desire – and also at the 
level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it’.38  What 
and how we know is a result of the mechanisms of power.  
One of Foucault’s major examples of the way power produces is at the 
level of knowledge about bodies, understandings of which are based on regimes 
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of discipline that have developed in the modern and contemporary period. In his 
study of the prison system, for instance, Foucault demonstrates how the 
technologies of the body – the everyday rigours and routines that operate not 
only on the incarcerated but on entire populations via institutions of religion, 
education, the military or others – constitute a ‘micro-physics of power’.39 It is 
through these everyday systems that knowledge of what a body is and can do is 
produced. Foucault calls the interdependence of power and knowledge ‘power-
knowledge relations’ and argues that it is impossible to understand a system of 
power without a corresponding system of knowledge, and vice versa.  
 Knowledge cannot be thought, then, as the province of free and 
disinterested individuals, as the modern understanding of knowledge might have 
it. Rather, ‘the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of 
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental 
implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformation’.40 Having 
asserted that power and knowledge are inseparable companions, still the 
question of the subject who knows must be dealt with a bit further here. My fourth 
and final point to make about knowledge concerns how we think about 
competence, and who is capable of knowing. In recent years, the work of 
Jacques Rancière has been influential in formulating this point as a question of 
intelligence. This work is based on a radical assumption of equality of 
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intelligence, understood in a particularly technical way that does not frame 
intelligence as a quantity possessed equally by all, but rather asserts that the 
assumption of equality is a political action that disrupts stultifying regimes of 
power. 
 In The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière argues that the dominant 
pedagogical regime is based on a model of explication, with a teacher who 
knows and student who is ignorant. The actors in this model may presume that 
the goal of pedagogy is equality of intelligence, that with enough explication the 
student will become as knowledgeable as the schoolteacher. However, Rancière 
writes: 
Explication is not necessary to remedy an incapacity to understand.  On the 
contrary, that very incapacity provides the structuring fiction of the 
explicative conception of the world.  It is the explicator who needs the 
incapable, and not the other way around; it is he who constitutes the 
incapable as such.  To explain something to someone is first of all to show 
him he cannot understand it himself.41  
 
He argues that the model of explication necessarily perpetuates inequality, that 
explication structurally produces a distance between the knowledgeable and the 
ignorant that it cannot then ever reduce. He proposes an alternative to 
explication, the ignorant schoolmaster, who does not know more than his 
students and who therefore cannot presume to explain. In her introduction to The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, Kristin Ross describes this alternative by asking: 
What would it mean to make equality a presupposition rather than a goal, a 
practice rather than a reward situated in some distant future so as to all the 
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 44 
better explain its present infeasibility?42 
 
As a question for a project on the politics of expertise, this proposal for equality 
as a practice resonates strongly. 
 However, what are the practicalities of such a practice? Claire Bishop draws 
on Rancière in a recent chapter on pedagogical art practices, arguing that the 
most successful of these combine his theoretical proposals for equality as a 
practice with more concrete analyses of actual hierarchical regimes. As an 
example of this second type of analysis, she draws on Paulo Freire in Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed, which frames the teacher as a facilitator who uses the position 
of authority not necessarily to explain but strategically to gain access or to foster 
communication. Freire’s pedagogy is fundamentally concrete, a practice of 
‘reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it'.43 For Bishop, then, 
pedagogical projects are interesting when:  
…the artist operates from a position of amateur enthusiast rather than 
informed expert, and delegates the work of lecturing to others. It is as if the 
artist wants to be a student once more, but does this by setting up their own 
school from which to learn, combining the student/teacher position.44  
 
I argue, however, that it is important to look at how expertise is handled in 
pedagogy projects, even in projects where the artist specifically places herself in 
the position of an amateur. I also argue that it is important to look at how artists 
employ strategies for dealing with expert authority - not just delegating, though 
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that is one interesting strategy - but also by collaborating, appropriating, 
subverting and performing expertise. 
 To summarise, then, this thesis assumes that knowledge is made of 
multiple categories. These categories change with history and they also change 
history. Knowledge is necessarily in a relationship with power. One way to tip the 
balance of power is through the practice of what Lyotard calls ‘paralogy’, or the 
seeking out of paradox within the rules that define knowledge, and the petitioning 
players in the games of knowledge to accept new rules. However, in thinking 
about knowledge as a game, the question of who is competent to play arises. In 
thinking about competency, I want to balance my support for Rancière’s radical 
assumption of an equality of intelligence with Freire’s practical interventions in 
the conditions which limit the field for some players.  
 
Non-­‐knowledge	  
 Having settled on the figure of the expert as a way to organise thinking 
around knowledge, power and performance over the course of my research, I 
have also developed a keen interest in the flip side of this investigation – the 
ways that non-knowledge and non-expertise also interact with power, and 
particularly how performance has staged these interactions.  I became keen to 
identify instances of destablisation, when the conventions of expertise and 
knowledge were not simply being reproduced, but reproduced paradoxically, or 
badly, or in ways that forced a fundamental re-thinking of those conventions. I 
was drawn to artists who saw contradiction as comprising important structural 
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elements of expertise, and who developed these contradictions into critique or 
into interventionist actions, or both. Thus, while I have maintained my focus on 
the figure of the expert in performance throughout, the practices I have looked at 
tend to emphasise contradictions, failures, gaps or excesses which destabilise 
category boundaries. I argue that performance is particularly equipped to exploit 
these areas, and draw on the significant work that has been done, both by 
scholars and by artists, around the constitutive contradictions and failures in 
performance itself. 
 Some of my understanding of what non-knowledge might be has come 
from engaging Georges Bataille’s work on the concept, figured as a confrontation 
with limits, which was also deeply influential for the postmodern/poststructuralist 
exploration of transgression. Importantly, Bataille’s concept of nonknowledge is 
arrived at not through the abandonment of systematic thinking but through its 
exhaustion. Analysing Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, he admits an 
attraction to the protagonist’s ‘sovereignty’ that Bataille associates with 
nonknowledge.  However, he admits to reservations about what seems to be 
avoidance, on Hemingway’s part, to take the route to nonknowledge through 
knowledge itself.  He writes: 
I would like to emphasize the rather painful feeling that fills me with the 
same hate that someone like Hemingway has for the intellectual effort of 
men; not that I don’t perceive and even that I don’t share the possibility of 
feeling a great repugnance in regard to everything that is intellectual, but I 
think that this repugnance must also be overcome.  It is necessary to 
overcome it.  In fact, I don’t believe in the possibility of avoiding going to 
the end of things… I think that, in this world of work, we are like people 
who submit to its law, we cannot escape it, we cannot play fisherman, 
 47 
hunters, and amateur bullfighters who have nothing else to do, and, 
reciprocally, we cannot ignore what is represented by the desperate effort 
of men to go to the end of their intellectual possibilities’.45  
 
Much as we might like to ‘play fisherman, hunters, and amateur bullfighters who 
have nothing else to do’, the ‘world of work’ cannot be ignored.  The relations of 
bodies to rationality and productivity can only be shifted by taking the systems 
which structure them to the extreme limits.  Jean-Luc Nancy affirms this 
dimension of Bataille’s thought – the necessity of ‘going to the end of things’, the 
end of the thought, the end of meaning and the end of language.  Further, Nancy 
emphasizes that Bataille’s practice of nonknowledge itself involved its own sort of 
‘acting.’ He writes, ‘Bataille always played at being unable to finish… It was a 
game and an act, for he wrote ceaselessly, writing everywhere, always, the 
exhaustion of his writing'.46 This writer who could never stop writing about the 
impossibility of writing would provide a key irony for a later generation of writers 
writing on writing. 
 Foucault uses Bataille’s work on transgression – discussed above as 
Bataille’s interest in ‘going to the end of things’ – to elaborate concepts that 
would become crucial both to his own later work, and to the work of his 
contemporaries, namely the function of ‘limits’ and the role sexuality in the 
practice of limits in a newly secular culture. Foucault writes:  
                                                
45 Georges Bataille, The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, ed. Stuart Kendall, trans. Michelle 
Kendall and Stuart Kendall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 149 
46 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Excription’, trans. by Katherine Lydon, Yale French Studies 78 (1990), p 60. 
 48 
…sexuality [as a product of modernity] is a fissure – not one that 
surrounds us as the basis of our isolation or individulity, but one which 
marks the limit within us and designates us as a limit.47 (30) 
  
Formerly, when Christianity was the hegemonic cultural structure in Europe, God 
represented both the limit of understanding, and structured the understanding of 
limitlessness. For Foucault, the sacred no longer has a form, so can only become 
manifest negatively, through profanation: 'the speech given to sexuality is 
contemporaneous, both in time and in structure, with that through which we 
announce to ourselves that God is dead'.48 God is a limit (that which is 'beyond' 
what we understand or experience).  The existence of God is the existence of 
limits.  To kill God is to destroy limits, and to kill a God who never existed is to 
experience the non-existence of limits, thus:  
…the death of God does not restore us to a limited and positivistic world, 
but to a world exposed by the experience of limits, made and unmade by 
that excess which transgresses it.49  
For Foucault, sexuality then comes to operate as that which limits understanding, 
and simultaneously structures the understanding of limitlessness – a historically 
bound and constructed development of modernity and modern subjectivity. 
 This preoccupation with transgression would come to inform a host of 
cultural theory concerned with the deconstruction of modern subjectivity.50  
As well, as Suzanne Guerlac writes, for Foucault, Bataille’s concept of 
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transgression is crucial to expanding philosophy beyond 'the realm of cognitive or 
rational activity’.51 Thus, ‘in this way Foucault etablished transgression as an 
alternative to the machine of dialectical contradiction'.52 However, as Guerlac 
goes on to argue, many later postructuralist interpretations of Bataille’s 
transgression were limited to text and how it might function as a poetics of non-
representation.  She writes, 'When transgression is analyzed in exclusively 
linguistic terms, that is, in relation to the "fundamental scandal of the arbitrariness 
of the sign", it becomes writing (in the emerging poststructuralist sense)'.53 Thus 
the postructuralist, and indeed, postmodernist, aesthetic came to be dominated 
by ‘various practices of avant-garde poetics’ characterized by ‘a refusal of 
figuration in all its forms’.54  This refusal would function as Bataille’s ‘going to the 
end of things’ – the end of representation as the ends of language. 
 However, I am also interested in ways that different experiences of not-
knowing have specific emotional or affective characteristics that might not be 
entirely addressed by questions about writing, or indeed by questions about 
transgression. How does confusion feel? Can the transmission of, for instance, 
stupidity be described? What are the political ramifications? In the middle two 
chapters of this thesis, I look at the ways artists have combined performance, 
expertise and non-knowledge to answer these and other questions. 
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 While knowledge must clearly be a significant part of any exploration of 
expertise, and non-knowledge helps me as a framing device to understand how 
contradiction, paradox and failure thread through the performative engagements I 
consider in this thesis, I also draw on the affective dimensions of expertise, which 
are distinct, thought certainly not separate, from knowledge and non-knowledge. 
So what is affect? One of the trickiest parts of pinning this concept down (putting 
aside for a moment the fact that affect may used to problematise the pinning 
down of things) is differentiating affect from emotions, or feelings. This is only 
made more difficult because scholars who think about affect have wildly different 
and sometimes contradictory stances on the relation between emotion, affect and 
feeling. As Kristyn Gorton writes, in her survey of feminist engagements with 
affect theory: 
The nature and degree of difference between emotion and affect is often 
contested. Some argue that emotion refers to a sociological expression of 
feelings whereas affect is more firmly rooted in biology and in our physical 
response to feelings; others attempt to differentiate on the basis that 
emotion requires a subject while affect does not; and some ignore these 
distinctions altogether'.55  
 
Is emotion cultural and affect biological? Are feelings contingent and affects 
autonomous? Or are these all words for the same swirling, messy atmosphere 
that both separates and connects bodies of all types?  
 Gorton emphasises one significant thread running through all the works she 
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surveys, which is ‘the way in which feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and 
experienced through the body'. For Gorton, the body and the public sphere are 
two poles on a spectrum that partly constitutes the field of affect. I find this 
synthesis useful, though it arguably ignores the strands of affect theory that 
emphasise the non-human and the non-organic. However, for this study, I accept 
that affect helps me think about the politics of expertise operating at the nexus of 
feeling, bodies and publics. I also assert that in this thesis, emotion plays a 
significant role, and even if affect cannot be reduced to emotion, nevertheless, 
many strands categorised under the umbrella of ‘affect theory’ help me think 
through the relationship between emotion and expertise. 
 Thus, despite its complexities (and also because of them) I draw on the 
concept of affect, and on affect theory, for a number of reasons. First, it helps me 
to think about expertise as something that is not necessarily synonymous with or 
reducible to knowledge (or even non-knowledge). Expertise sometimes exceeds 
and sometimes falls short of categories of knowledge, and affect helps to 
consider what else might be happening in the development and transmission of 
expertise beyond the production and transmission of knowledge (though as I've 
shown above, these latter processes are anything but straightforward 
themselves). How does the figure of the expert appear and what are the somatic 
and emotional reactions that it produces? While these questions are certainly 
related to knowledge production, they can't be answered solely in reference to it.  
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I am not suggesting that affect – or feelings, or emotions – are wholly 
separate from knowledge, however. Indeed, as Sara Ahmed argues in The 
Cultural Politics of Emotion, it is crucial that emotions and feelings be perceived 
as constitutive elements of knowledge.  She insists that feminist politics requires 
its agents to articulate the inseparability of emotion from thought, writing: 
The response to the dismissal of feminists as emotional should not then 
be to claim that feminism is rational rather than emotional.  Such a claim 
would be misguided as it would accept the very opposition between 
emotions and rational thought that is crucial to the subordination of 
femininity as well as feminism.  Instead, we need to contest this 
understanding of emotion as 'the unthought', just as we need to contest 
the assumption that 'rational thought' is unemotional, or that it does not 
involve being moved by others.56   
 
The feeling of thought, and the way it ‘moves’ others (and is the result of being 
moved by others) are certainly subjects for studies of affect. However, I also think 
there are movements and reactions and feelings involved in expertise that are 
not necessarily directly connected to knowing or learning or thinking. I emphasise 
this in my third and fourth chapter, where I look at performance examples that 
use the outer trappings of expertise to produce and consider various forms of 
nonknowledge. Even more generally, I think that delivering the impression of 
knowing has consequences beyond knowing and not-knowing. Affect, and its 
relation to impressions and exchanges, helps to think this through.    
 Another reason affect theory is useful for this project is that it has often 
been deployed as a way to circumvent stubborn binaries (mind/body, 
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knowledge/emotion among a host of others). As Rebecca Schneider states: 
Thinking through affective engagement offers a radical shift in thinking 
about our mobilities in dealings with the binaries landscape of social plots 
(such as gender, such as race), undoing the solidity of binaries in favour of 
mining the slip and slide of affect as negotiation. As such, affects […] are 
often described via words that indicate viscosity, tactility, or a certain 
mobility in the way one is moved.57  
 
This movement Schneider emphasises has also come up above. Affect feels 
exciting because it calls to mind dynamism, and seems to offers ways around 
sedimented ideas and entrenched positions. At the same time, I am grateful for 
the way Schneider also attends to the ‘stickiness’ of affect, drawing on work by 
Heather Love and Elizabeth Freeman on temporal ‘drag’. Affect is not all 
unobstructed movement – sometimes it drags our feet. As Schneider writes: 
…histories of events and historical effects of identity fixing, stick to any 
mobility, dragging (in Elizabeth Freeman's sense) the temporal past into the 
sticky substance of any present. To be stick with the past and the future is 
not to be autonomous, but to be engaged in a freighted, cross-temporal 
mobility.58  
 
This is a welcome reminder that while it is important to slip and slide through rigid 
old frameworks, those frameworks have a way of persisting, sometimes in the 
very acts of attempting to avoid them. We may find that in the face of some 
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 Having discussed knowledge and affect, I will now turn to the specifics of 
expertise. What constitutes expert knowledge or expert ability? How is it 
achieved and how does it function? What are the particular features of expertise 
that need to be problematised and called into question here? Perhaps most 
importantly, why is it urgent to consider questions of expertise now?  
 
 The field of Expert Studies is a growing academic area, with major research 
centered particularly at the Florida State University Department of Psychology 
and Learning Systems Institute. Their Human Performance Research Centre 
includes the research objective of ‘expert performance’ (alongside ‘knowledge 
communities, performance improvement and team cognition’59). One of the major 
contributors to this research objective is K. Anders Ericsson,60 who is also an 
editor of The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. In the 
introduction to this volume, he discusses the possibility of a general field theory 
for Expert Studies. He states that ‘expertise refers to the characteristics, skills, 
and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices and less experienced 
people’.61 I am skeptical of any such field theory, for fear that such tautologies 
(expertise is what experts do) might be inevitable. As with the above definitions of 
knowledge and affect, I will limit this definition to a few key points. 
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 First, just as knowledge has multiple categories with varying criteria, so 
must expertise. In the second chapter of The Cambridge Handbook, Michelen 
T.H. Chi makes a distinction between the expert as an individual or group that 
has access to and can communicate about a large domain of knowledge, and the 
expert who is a skilled performer. A domain is defined as a finite set of facts and 
processes, thematically linked. Domain experts are responsible for knowing what 
exists within this finite set, but also for setting and patrolling the boundaries. A 
skilled performer performs against a metric: he or she is measurably faster, more 
accurate, or has a higher endurance for discrete physical activities than other 
measurable performers.  
 Increasingly, I think the boundary between domain expert and expert as 
skilled performer will break down. Accessing knowledge and communicating it – 
and deciding what is to be included in a delimited domain – are performative 
activities or have performative elements. The performance of meta-domain 
knowledge is becoming increasingly important, and includes mastery of the sets 
of facts and processes aimed at navigating numerous domains. This might be 
called the expertise of management or administration (and has been a subject of 
much interest in contemporary art for some time, as I will show in following 
chapters). It is also highly relevant to the age of the search engine, in which the 
manufacturers of tools like Google, which can guide users through the 
landscapes of information on the Internet, are increasingly more influential than 
producers of information, such a professional news media.  
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 In addition to these distinctions, a range of other distinctions between types 
of expertise that could be made. Expertise might also be identified as a set of 
activity that aids politicians and decision makers. 62  There is also the field, 
particularly relevant to this study, of aesthetic expertise: the connoisseur, the 
curator, the collector or the critic. This area is related to both the domain 
definition, and to meta-domain knowledge. It is not enough to have a large 
knowledge base to be an aesthetic expert, one needs to convince a certain 
audience that it is the correct knowledge base.   
 This type of expertise has been the subject of criticism for generations.  
Gavin Butt, indeed, argues that the deconstructive efforts of postmodernist critics 
of aesthetics have themselves sedimented into a type of expert authority. For 
Butt, ‘criticism today may find itself turning away from some of the established 
procedures of critical practice precisely in order that it remain critical’ (original 
emphasis). Butt’s insistence on the necessity of the paradoxical (not necessarily 
‘in the strict sense of being logically contradictory’), as a way of being ‘para – 
against and/or beside – the doxa of received wisdom’63, calls to mind Lyotard’s 
‘paralogy’ discussed above. However, Butt’s nuance of the paradox as either 
‘against and/or beside’ is particularly useful. Many of the examples I look at do 
not situate themselves utterly or only ‘against’ knowledge or expertise, though 
oppositional politics may be important in many cases.  The possibility of working 
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‘beside’ received wisdom might itself be an interesting new proposition for the 
rules of political intervention through performance.  
 In addition to the multiplicity of types of expertise, my second observation 
about expertise is that it has a complicated relationship to collectivity. On the one 
hand, it is associated with elite and exclusive knowledge, and with the 
competition that structures the attainment of it. In this sense, expertise is a 
problematically individualistic pursuit. It promotes self-fulfillment at the expense of 
others. On the other hand, professional accreditation and the establishment of 
expert knowledge (via, for example, publication in professional journals) are 
processes of peer approval, and require a collective system of verification and 
acceptance. Edward Said argues that this professional collectivity is a tool for 
authoritarian conformity,64 and indeed it may easily be argued that top-down 
structures for legitimisation create conservatism and repression. Nevertheless, it 
may also be too simple to place the creative individual in opposition to the 
deadening collective. We must remember that neoliberal discourse celebrates 
the enterprising individual but fails to provide materially for those individuals 
whose collective identity (developed by virtue of categories of class, race, gender 
or sexuality, for example) results in limited access to the resources necessary for 
successful enterprising behaviours. In what follows, I aim to present performance 
examples where expertise (and active non-expertise) can inform models of 
collectivity that neither exploit, repress nor marginalise individuals, especially 
                                                




those whose bodies do not conform to a normative paradigm.  
 The collectivity of expertise can also be wrapped up in social conventions, 
often unspoken, which allow an expert to navigate interpersonal relationships and 
establish networks of influence. Indeed, an expert may need to master a set of 
institutional vocabularies which allow for communication based on shorthand, 
which can often, from the outside, look like communication based on obscure 
code. This is one of the most potent contemporary functions of the expert, and 
artists have been self-consciously using this theme as a way to understand both 
the social and economic value of the arts, and the way these values reflect wider  
socio-economic structures.   
 The third area of importance in my grappling with the term ‘expert’ is, once 
again, the issue of historicity. Since Plato imagined his Republic ruled by 
philosophers (and emptied of poets and actors) some types of experts have been 
valued over others – and this hierarchy of value has been inextricably linked with 
political power. However, the figure of the expert is linked to complex historical 
movements related to modernity, with its development connected to the rise of 
specialisation through the process of industrialisation and the related and 
ongoing division of the academic disciplines. All of these inform a contemporary 
understanding of what it means to be an expert. Context is crucially important for 
making (some) sense of the complex and often contradictory relationship of  
power and knowledge.   
 The work of Tino Sehgal, for example, might be figured as an argument that 
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administration and networking are the primary valued skill sets in a globalised, 
post-industrial economy, and should thus be the primary material for advanced 
art making in museums. At a talk at Tate Modern in 2009,65 the artist insisted that 
the ability to skillfully manipulate materials in order to produce individual objects 
was the skill most valued by a craft-based economy, and thus painting and 
sculpture were the art forms that were venerated in pre-industrial Europe. For 
Sehgal, modern and postmodern art are functions of the shift in valuing the ability 
to design mass-produced objects over the ability to craft individual objects. In a 
knowledge and service-based economy, then, artists should be coordinating and 
administrating immaterial events and experiences, Sehgal asserted.   
 The project of mapping the relationship between expertise and value in 
historical terms is significant, and close attention must be paid to the types of 
skills that are called expert at different times and in different contexts. Further, I 
argue that performance may be well placed to carry out such mappings with a 
critical perspective. Nicholas Ridout usefully demonstrates how theatre and 
performance are paradigmatic examples of such broader economic trends such 
as the outsourcing of labour, drawing on work by the companies Rimini Protokoll 
and Mammalian Diving Reflex to show that ‘performance reveals itself as 
exemplary commodity (it commodifies action, not just things) and as the site for a 
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critique of its own commodifying practice’ 66  Importantly, Ridout shows how 
performance can be both an example to critique and a site for critique. This 
thesis builds on Ridout’s locating of performance as a fertile ground for critique 
because of its contradictory relationship to the objects of its critique.  
 The definition of expertise that drives this thesis is a contested one. Experts 
are alternately (or even simultaneously) bland, conservative keepers of the status 
quo, and also vanguard players for the future of the development of culture. They 
can be collective participants in the establishment of rigourous public knowledge, 
and they can be gatekeepers who bar public access to knowledge. Their skills 
might represent the values of a particular cultural dynamic, even as those values 
are ever in flux. It is this complexity that I want to account for, both as it exists 
within performance practice and study, and as it is expressed through 
performance practice and study. Throughout this thesis, contradictions 
surrounding expertise and disciplinary boundaries, identity, collectivity, value and 
historicity will be highlighted. The performance examples I gather here do not 
resolve these contradictions, but mine them for their critical potential. 
 By and large, then, I am thinking through how specialism and the power 
associated with it have been treated by contemporary performance practitioners 
who are sensitive to the problems and exclusivities that specialism can produce – 
though who might not necessarily deny the political value of the development of 
specialist skills. In problematising expertise, it is important to strike a balance 
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between an appreciation for the focus and nuance that a specialist disciplinary 
frame might allow for, and an emphasis on the need to understand the cultural 
conventions and assumptions that produce such frames (and which can often go 
unremarked upon with profoundly problematic results).   
 Before moving on from this broad overview of possible significant definitions 
and modes of expertise, I want to address one final important relationship, which 
is that between expertise, the body and identity. 
 
Expertise,	  the	  Body	  and	  Identity	  
 
 While a focus on knowledge and expertise might suggest an emphasis on 
abstraction and cognition, this thesis is very concerned with the myriad ways 
expertise is a question posed about bodies.  In this thesis, this question tends not 
to focus on, say, virtuosic bodily performances, but is more often directed at the 
level of everyday affective and somatic forces and dynamics that imprint the 
relationship between knowledge and power. One consequence of this concern 
with bodies is that this thesis often invokes a re-visitation of the politics of 
identity.  
 Why should identity be a key term for a thesis on expertise? Knowledge, of 
course, is an issue for identity-based politics. From feminist critiques of reason to 
critiques of racialised rhetoric about ‘aptitude’ in, for instance, North American 
debates around affirmative action, there are myriad examples of the politically 
charged relationship between identity and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that 
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problematising knowledge production has can help make for more interesting and 
potent identity-based politics. It allows, I argue, for a politics that is based on an 
understanding of identity as complex, dynamic and contingent, rather than fixed.   
 Ann Cvetkovich’s work on the public circulation of ‘categories of experience 
typically assigned to the private sphere’67 helps explain what I mean. Cvetkovich 
acknowledges the work of such critics of identity politics as Wendy Brown, who 
has shown how activism which relies on the bringing of grievances to judicial 
institutions under the banner of group identity can limit itself through the 
acceptance of the terms of engagement set by these dominant institutions.68 
Nevertheless, Cvetkovich shows how engaging with categories of identity as they 
circulate publicly can also be to unravel these categories, or to de-stablise the 
oppressive power they may wield. She calls for ‘a reconsideration of conventional 
distinctions between political and emotional life’,69 drawing on the category of 
trauma to demonstrate how this distinction is already disrupted in the everyday 
experiences of those who suffer trauma, and those who inflict it.  
 Cvetkovich’s engagement with ideas of the public has directly influenced my 
understanding of the development of the figure of the expert as a public entity 
who also produces and engages in affective dynamics that might typically be 
seen as operating at the level of private experience. As well, her method of 
                                                
67 Ann Cvetkovich, An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality and Lesbian Public Culture  
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 10.  
 
68 See, for example Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).  
 
69 Cvetkovich, p. 10. 
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disrupting categories by concentrating on how the contradictory and the 
paradoxical reside in their definitions has also had an impact on the development 
of my interest in the contradictory and paradoxical elements that operate in 
definitions and engagements with expertise.  
 
METHODOLOGY	  
I have gathered the set of examples and constructed the critical framework of this 
thesis through a methodology that involves multiple types of encounters with 
performance work, and an interdisciplinary engagement with critical texts.   
Above, I have detailed the fields I have addressed in the thesis, made provisional 
definitions of my (highly contested) key terms, and discussed the rationale behind 
the decisions I have made in order to clear a space for investigation. Below I will 
briefly discuss some of the practical modes and methods that have structured 
this investigation, and tease out a few issues with their application.   
 
The	  Live	  	  
 First of all, my methodology has involved seeing things live. Living and 
working in London, I have participated in the performance ‘scene’ that inhabits 
this city’s venues and institutions, both permanent and established as well as 
temporary and makeshift. I have also had access to performance circuits and 
networks throughout the United Kingdom, and in Europe, where practices often 
overlap as relatively small groups of people seek to access increasingly smaller 
sets of resources and funding. I am interested to think through what it means to 
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be part of a scene. There is the privilege this assumes. To be part of a 
performance or Live Art scene in London there are multiple privileges that are in 
operation, both financial and cultural: being able to receive funding from 
institutions to pay for tickets, for instance, and having the time to devote to going 
to festivals, and conferences.   
 At the same time, I am not ready to dismiss the significance of presence, 
not understood as a transcendent good (‘you just had to be there’), but for the 
valuable insight into the ad hoc and the anecdotal currency of any cultural 
movement. The context around this thesis includes performances I have 
witnessed and the material and institutional politics of these performances. It also 
includes bars and foyers I have lingered in, club nights I have stayed too late at, 
gossip that has circulated around me. All of these structure knowledge of 
performance. This type of knowledge has been written about by, for example, 
Gavin Butt, who argues in his book Between You and Me that forms of 
communication like gossip both inform and shape the lives and practices of 
artists, but also contribute to how we know art history.70 In an interview with 
Matthias Danholt, Butt discusses, as well, his notion of ‘flirtation’ in scholarly 
writing as a way to problematise ‘seriousness’ as the received mode of thinking 
importance or significance. Flirtatious writing, Butt states, ‘is a way of entertaining 
seriousness, but without being committed to it: Entering into a relationship with it, 
                                                
70 Gavin Butt, Between You and Me: Queer Disclosures in the New York Art World, 1948-1963  
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but without being made subject to it’.71 Butt’s work on ‘seriousness’ has been 
particularly influential on my thinking about the expert, and his development of 
the possibility of modes of writing that operate not strictly or solely in opposition 
to seriousness has had an important – even serious – impact on my thinking 
through my methodological approach to this thesis.  
  
The	  Documents	  	  
 While a live ‘scene’ is very much present in this thesis, at the same time, I 
have relied for significant parts of this thesis on documentation. This has involved 
interacting with archives of performance, both on site and online. In my final 
chapter, I consider specifically how my analysis of Rimini Protokoll’s work is 
affected through accessing it solely via documentation. Here, I want to give a 
general overview of the types of documentation I have looked at, and a few of the 
critical resources that I have drawn on to think about documentation as such.   
 The Live Art Development Agency has been one of the most valuable 
resources for this documentation. Importantly, the Agency avoids the term 
‘archive’ altogether, preferring ‘collection’. This evokes both idiosyncrasy – calling 
to mind the personal collection – and intentional inclusivity, without the remit of 
the archive to select based on standards of relevance and the use-value of each 
object as the bearer of information. I have also worked in the Bristol Live Art 
Archive, which is part of the University of Bristol Theatre Collection. The Theatre 
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Collection is certified as an archive, a museum and a library, and thus, unlike the 
Live Art Development Agency collection, has explicit institutional imperatives: the 
materials should yield publications and research grants for the university, for 
instance, and they should be accessible in certain ways and preserved  
rigourously. I have also drawn heavily on online resources (such as the Franklin  
Furnace archive, ubuweb, Arnolfini's a database, among many other listed in my 
bibliography) both in order to write about work directly in this thesis or to situate 
the work I write about in a broader context. All of these examples of physical and 
virtual (and both) resources deal concretely with issues around the archiving and 
historicising of performance that are being staged theoretical throughout the 
academy.  
 Performance and its documents particularly are a source of much current 
scholarly work.  Some major research areas include the potential of 
documentation replace or commodify the live event. There is also work being 
done to develop curatorial strategies for the display and circulation of 
performance documentation. Questions around these areas are being staged in, 
for instance, the University of Bristol’s Performing Documents project (for which I 
am currently employed as a Research Assistant). Rather than attempting a 
general field position around performance and documentation, throughout the 
thesis, I have been attentive to issues of documentation that arise with each 
example I draw on.  
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The	  Context	  	  
 Having discussed seeing things live and seeing things recorded, I will briefly 
discuss how I have been seeing things in context. What are the critical 
frameworks I use? What are the genres and genealogies of work I am 
responding to and what fields of knowledge am I contributing to? 
 To begin with the performance work, as I have already discussed, I am 
responding to practices that have developed within a number of different genres 
and which have a number of genealogies. The ‘educational turn’ tends to refer to 
work in the visual arts that has roots in Conceptual Art and various traditions of 
Institutional Critique (in Chapter Three, which deals specifically with institutions, I 
detail more closely how I understand genealogies of Institutional Critique to be 
operating in this project). I have discussed above how ‘research’ has long been a 
mode associated with these practices, and I have also clarified that I am 
interested in looking as well at ‘research’ as a concern for those working as 
Tactical Media practitioners, and those working on the borders of this and, for 
instance, ‘bio-art’ or other engagements between art practice and the life 
sciences.  
 I have also looked at work that is more explicitly within a theatre and 
performance context. While Live Art may not wholly describe the context any of 
the artists I am looking at, many of these artists are connected by their 
participation in festivals of Live Art or publications that consider Live Art as a 
strategy. Again, I have considered above how Live Art offers particular questions 
about the relationship between performance and expertise that are useful for this 
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project. 
 In terms of academic frameworks and traditions that this thesis draws on 
and hopefully contributes to, this project is most firmly situated within a 
performance studies context. I have drawn heavily on work by performance 
studies scholars Rebecca Schneider, Shannon Jackson and Nicholas Ridout, 
among numerous others. Further, I believe that this thesis contributes original 
knowledge about expertise and its relation to a range of concerns within a 
performance studies context, including time and duration, the body, audience and 
theatricality.  
 In addition to performance studies, as I have indicated through my 
definitions of key terms, this project is indebted to traditions of postmodern theory 
and poststructuralist analyses of knowledge. I have cited Foucault and Lyotard 
heavily, and Foucault in particular threads through this thesis consistently. More 
recent developments in affect theory are also incredibly important to this project, 
particularly strands developed in a feminist and queer mode. I am very aware 
that there are other strands that receive less attention in this thesis, that could 
have been relevant to this undertaking. I do not, for example, look at Deleuze, or 
the connecting threads with later theorists like Massumi, which of course could 
have offered a range of possibilities for theorizing affect, knowledge and 
performance. I am indebted to David Harvey’s definitions of postmodern labour 
conditions and his analyses of neoliberalism, but I do not delve into the possibly 
complementary work from the Italian left on the ‘knowledge economy’ and 
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immaterialism associated with, for instance, Paulo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato or 
Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi. Given the impossibly large and shifting field of possible 
resources to choose from, there are no doubt a large number of similar 
omissions. I hope, however, that the range of resources I have selected form a 
useful scaffold for the observations I want to make about performance and the 
politics of expertise.  
 
CHAPTER	  BREAKDOWN	  
 All of the performance examples I identify and analyse draw on components 
that de-stabilise expert knowledge and the figure of the expert, in complex though 
certainly not always combative ways. These components include the figure of the 
amateur, whose modes of knowledge production challenge the professional 
codes and standards that structure the development of expertise. They also 
include judicious applications of non-knowledge within a performative or 
theatrical frame of expertise, unsettling expectations and producing new affective 
dynamics in various audiences. Finally, the performance examples I have 
gathered in this thesis have sometimes over-identified expertise, turning over its 
seemingly fundamental hierarchies by finding it in unexpected places, or simply 
applying the term ‘expert’ with radical inclusivity.  
 As a way of focusing my investigation, I have chosen to structure the 
chapters of this thesis around these three destabilising components. Chapters 
one and two are investigations of non-expertise, further delimited by a 
consideration of non- expertise used as a tool by performance practitioners 
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working with, around and sometimes against the sciences and scientific 
institutions. Chapter one looks at the figure of the amateur as a performative tool 
for activist intervention. Chapter two looks at the use of ‘play’ and the figure of the 
‘hobbyist’ in recent work of performance artist Kira O’Reilly which deals with and 
draws from cellular biology. 
 Chapters three and four are considerations of artists who use performative 
forms of expertise, here the use of theatrical forms to create alternative 
institutions and the use of the lecture performance, to produce experiences of 
non-knowledge. I use chapter three to consider how non-knowledge is used in 
the theatricalisation of institutional spaces, and the consequences for the politics 
of expertise.  I use chapter four to consider how multiple specific affective 
dynamics are produced through experiences of non-knowledge, and how these 
dynamics position non- knowledge not directly against knowledge, but in complex 
and often de-stabilising relationships with knowledge.  
 Finally, my fifth and sixth chapters shift from these considerations of the 
negative outlines of expertise to looking at artists who engage in excessively 
positive declarations that ‘everyone is an expert’. These last chapters consider 
how the performance of radical inclusivity is a subtle but powerful way of critically 
engaging with the problems of knowledge and hierarchy. I look at artists who 
investigate a variety of contexts including, immigration, domestic labour and 
globalised economies. Using forms of radical inclusivity, these artists are critical 
while maintaining an appreciation for the possibilities of specialised skills and 
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personal knowledge.   
 
I	  KNOW	  SOMETHING	  YOU	  DON’T	  KNOW	  
 
 Before I begin the following enquiry, a brief word about the title of this 
thesis. I have chosen the taunting phrase ‘I know something you don’t know’ for 
several reasons. First, it illustrates the power embedded in the expert/non-expert 
relationship. Second, it evokes the attraction of those who know what others do 
not. Finally, I am keen to have a title to this thesis that is somehow ‘in character’, 
as a way to gesture to the particular purchase that performance has on the 
politics of expertise. Through the course of researching this thesis, I have come 
to understand expertise as key to optimisms and anxieties of our time. From 
navigating ‘information overload’ to perpetuating narratives of threat and terror, 
from pharmaceutical industries who influence what we put into our bodies to 
immigration policies which determine where certain bodies are allowed to be, 
there are profound political ramification to knowing what others do not – and 
delivering the impression of that knowledge. While performance is not sufficient 
to overturn the politics of expertise, I have found that it is a particularly interesting 
way to think through how they operate. 
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Chapter	  One:	  Activist/Amateurs	  
 
INTRODUCTION	  
 In this chapter, I question how non-expertise is both a problem to be 
addressed by activist artists, and a mode of addressing a host of other political 
issues. I show how performative forms have been adopted as a means to 
challenge and deploy non-expertise. I use two examples from the United States: 
the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) and the Critical Art Ensemble 
(CAE), both of which are explicitly political groups which combine arts practice 
with interventionist tactics. ACT UP is fundamentally a political movement around 
which a host of arts and cultural production has taken place. CAE is perhaps best 
known an arts and cultural production body, but its members insist that they use 
‘culture’ as a mechanism for pedagogical and interventionist politics. I have 
paired these examples because both have explicitly questioned the politics of 
expertise, and have utilised forms of non-expertise as activist tools. Further, both 
have addressed non-expertise in the context of scientific discourse and the 
institutions of science as politically charged spaces. Science is a particularly 
powerful realm of expertise to explore, as the claims on knowledge by scientific 
institutions are deeply ingrained. Both ACT UP and CAE have complex 
engagements with science, neither denying the value of scientific inquiry nor 
shying away from confrontations with some of the more intractable borders 
surrounding some institutions of science. 
 Both of these examples, then, address the dynamic between expert and 
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non-expert for activist purposes, and both intervene in scientific institutions as 
crucial political sites. It is important to note that both also originated in the late 
1980s – indeed, members of CAE were co-founders of the Florida chapter of 
ACT UP, and initial CAE projects were created in collaboration with ACT UP 
affiliated art collective Gran Fury. The type of activism they have produced is very 
much tied to this moment in US culture, when public services became 
increasingly privatized or abolished, and traditional industries moved out of the 
US to be replaced, and only in part, by service industries, financial industries and 
other so-called ‘knowledge industries’ (e.g. technology). These transitions are 
associated with the rise of ‘postmodern flexibility’, as theorized by David Harvey. 
The conditions of postmodern flexibility are, Harvey argues, ‘dominated by fiction, 
fantasy, the immaterial (particularly of money), fictitious capital, images, 
ephemerality, chance and flexibility in production techniques, labour markets an 
consumptions niches’. 72 While Harvey would argue that there is no strict dividing 
line between modernism and postmodernism, but that both sets of conditions are 
indicative of the broader dynamics of capital accumulation, nevertheless 
‘postmodern flexibility’ is very much connected to forms of activism that 
developed in the 1980s. 
 It is telling that at this time ACT UP and CAE structured their activism 
through a dizzying array of formats and channels, nor that a primary focus for 
concern was the unstable sphere of the expert. As notions of broad, overarching 
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publics and identities were giving way to multiplicity and incompleteness, activism 
was forced to become increasingly targeted and, to use the word CAE uses, 
‘tactical’. The idea of a single culture, or even a single counterculture, was for 
many untenable, and instead, intersectionality, or communication across a range 
of affiliated interests and backgrounds, became urgently important in the face of 
a crisis like AIDS, which cut across identity groups. For CAE, a mode of thought 
and action was developed to seek out microcosms of power to critically respond 
to and ultimately intervene in, and the format of each of their projects was 
developed in response, as opposed to a more traditional practice which would 
seek channels for a particular specialist technique. Finally, as traditional 
boundaries between disciplines and specialisms started to break down, yet with 
economic and political power increasingly concentrated in the spheres of an 
existing elite, the opening to demand more access to privileged knowledge 
production – and the urgent need to do so – arose. 
 In looking at ACT UP, and particularly the New York chapter and the 
associated artist collective Gran Fury, I begin by considering how, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, expert image production was combined with direct action 
to significantly influence both cultural perception of AIDS and policy responses to 
the medical crisis, even as this work received a complicated reception by the 
professional art world. I go on to think about the challenges of vocabulary and 
communication that were faced in the same time period by the non-expert 
members of the group in dealing with institutions like the Federal Drug 
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Administration (FDA). Finally I look at the question of history and legacy, asking 
how a movement that excelled at immediate and spontaneous production and 
organization can also be thought of in a longer, slower timescale. Each of these 
areas is framed as a question of performance, as I argue that ACT UP drew, and 
continues to draw, on time-based media to both challenge and negotiate expert 
and non-expert status in spheres where the stakes continue to be high. 
 The range of issues the CAE focuses on is broader than ACT UP (though I 
think the most useful way to look at ACT UP’s significance is to insist that AIDS is 
an issue that implicates a broad swathe of political structures); they take on the 
pharmaceutical industries, big agriculture, defense industries and a host of other 
institutions that increasingly influence contemporary political life. They are 
especially focused on scientific institutions, and they challenge the barriers to 
access built into many of these institutions, even while drawing on the potential of 
scientific inquiry. The biggest controversy surrounding the group can be framed 
as a problem of non-expertise, namely founding member Steve Kurtz’s 2004 
arrest and subsequent trial for the procurement of a non-threatening bacterial 
agent for use in an art installation. His status as a non-scientist was used as a 
basis for aggressively indicting both Kurtz and his university colleague, Dr. 
Robert Ferrell, the scientist who helped Kurtz procure the bacteria. The story is a 
harrowing example of how the intersection between art, activism and amateur 
science could have alarming consequences in the paranoid early years of the US 
‘war on terror’.   
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 However, I assert that the arguably unforeseeable highlighting of non-
expertise by the US federal government is in many ways only the most superficial 
aspect of the CAE’s complex engagement with amateur science. It is a consistent 
and explicitly intentional element of the CAE’s wider practice, which insists on the 
value of amateur scientific pursuit, both in collaboration with expert technical 
practitioners and as a method for responding tactically, and with nuance and 
complexity, to a multiplicity of political and social situations. Performance is an 
integral part of this practice, as elements of character, set design, and 
dramatization in the form of lecture-performance often structure the sprawling 
and multi-platform projects the CAE create.  
 
ACT	  UP	  
 In his discussion of the confessional mode in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 
I, Foucault formulates the relationship between the patient and the doctor 
(specifically the psychiatrist) as, respectively, the one who speaks and the one 
who listens silently and is supposed to know (and has the right to ask)73. The 
power relationship is structured so that speaking from experience becomes an 
act of submission, and silence is domination. The famous slogan used by ACT  
UP in protest against the willful government neglect of the AIDS crisis in the  
1980s that 'Silence = Death' was a stunning rejection of this expert/non-expert 
power relationship. In this section I consider how ACT UP members struggled 
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with this dynamic, not by refusing to speak from personal experience, but by 
demanding a response. Far from denying the importance of medical research 
and expertise, I argue that ACT UP were radical in insisting that this expertise 
must be made dramatically accessible to the public. 
 Formed in 1987, ACT UP pioneered direct action and organisational 
techniques to fight the AIDS crisis in the United States.  It particularly targeted 
the blatantly homophobic, racist and sexist AIDS policies (and lack thereof) of US 
political administrations, beginning with the violent neglect of marginalised 
peoples by the Ronald Reagan administration. ACT UP has been influential both 
for the impact of their actions and for initiating a model of grass-roots political  
organisation. In doing so, they have directly addressed the concentrations of 
power in the pharmaceutical industry and in public health policy.  
 One of the ways ACT UP members combated the silence of experts was 
through the skillful and performative development and deployment of images. In  
Douglas Crimp’s book AIDS Demo Graphics the art historian and activist 
documents the many iconic images that arose during the height of ACT UP’s 
activism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly those of the New York 
chapter. He argues that the speed and effectiveness of the movement’s image 
production and dissemination was a major factor in the successful organisation of 
direct action, and the subsequent influence of ACT UP on AIDS policy in the  
United States.   
 I suggest that there is an important performance strategy at work in this 
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process.  The time-based nature of this image production and dissemination is 
crucial to discuss, alongside the technical and aesthetic skill that allowed for the 
production of images that could circulate widely and effectively. I argue that a 
significant component of the impact of ACT UP lies in various attentions paid to 
the importance of time for the production of both urgency and commitment. This 
extends from the quick and responsive organisation of direct actions to the 
ongoing process of documentation that some ACT UP members have committed 
to in recent years. This nuanced understanding of the importance of time-based 
strategies helped gain ACT UP access to previously barred discourses around 
public health policy. I argue, then, that performance as a frame for understanding 
time-based practices is a particularly important mode for understanding the 
varied forms of activism produced by ACT UP, and the complex relation this 
activism has to expertise.  
 From their earliest actions, members of ACT UP showed a canny 
understanding of the symbolic spread of images and information as crucial to 
successful intervention into policy.  Considering ACT UP, one finds the medical 
realities of HIV/AIDS interacting with the specific politics surrounding the 
infection, but also the metaphorically infective properties of images: the way they 
circulate and attack, and the way counter-images might be used to ‘vaccinate’ 
against insidious hatreds and violence. Crimp provides a useful account of some 
of the major actions of the New York chapter of ACT UP from the first few years 
of its founding, through the lens of an analysis of the graphics and designs 
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produced and disseminated by the organisation.  A member of ACT UP himself, 
Crimp narrates over a dozen large-scale demonstrations, occupations and other 
direct actions staged by the organization. The larger actions he describes 
include: marches on Wall Street and City Hall; targeted campaigns against 
misinformation that had been spread by Cosmopolitan magazine and the 
shocking neglect of the issue by the New York Times; an attempt to seize control 
of the Food and Drug Administration (whose favouring of corporate 
pharmaceutical interests and foot- dragging around clinical trials of experimental 
drugs caused countless needless deaths); and protests against conservative 
Cardinal of the Catholic church John O’Connor.   
 Crimp is also careful to refer to the numerous smaller, ad-hoc actions, or 
‘zaps’ organized as quick reactions to opportunities. He describes ‘zaps’ as 
‘those small protests organised on the spur of the moment to respond to an 
emergency situation of a tip-off’. ACT UP did not invent such immediate action 
tactics, but they were particularly adept at producing high-quality graphics on- 
demand for such actions. ‘ACT UP’s innovation is to get the wheels of 
mechanical reproduction turning on equally short notice’, Crimp writes.74 It is this 
combination of skilful image production with sensitivity to the value of time-based 
strategies that I am particularly interested in. The ability to arrive on a scene 
prepared with striking and effective visuals already prepared lends an aura of 
anticipation, and subtly shifts the power dynamic from protestors simply reacting 
to more powerful institutions, to an organisation that appears to be a step ahead.  
                                                
74 Douglas Crimp, AIDS Demo-graphics (Seattle: Bay Press, 1990), p. 22. 
 80 
 This combination of sensitivity to time with skillful manipulation of visual 
form also relates to another component that performance discourse has a stake 
in developing: audience. Crimp begins his analysis of the graphic dimension of  
ACT UP by narrating the development of the famous Silence=Death logo referred 
to above. He describes the layered semiotic codes that make this logo legible to 
different groups – a historically informed reading would understand that the pink 
triangle was used by Nazis to identify gay men and women, but the equation of 
AIDS policy with concentration camps would also be refracted through the 
knowledge of previous appropriation of the symbol by earlier gay and lesbian 
rights activism. At the same time, without this reference base, Silence=Death 
operates as a simple and striking design that is easily read as a logo, and that 
prompts curiosity for a less knowledgeable audience. ACT UP’s ability to use 
graphics to swiftly and deftly represent its position across audience groups may 
be seen, then, as one of the organisation’s key tactical advantages.   
 While attention to audience and time contributed to ACT UP’s effectiveness 
as a protest movement, these performative strategies also made for a complex 
relationship to professionalism and expertise. This can be seen, for example, in 
the relationship ACT UP has had with professional, mainstream arts institutions. 
While many members of the New York chapter were versed in contemporary 
visual art and aesthetic theory, ACT UP encountered resistance from established 
art institutions when it came to displaying their graphic work in an art context. For 
instance, when the Museum of Modern Art staged an exhibition on protest 
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aesthetics in 1988, the exhibition curator chose not to include any visual work 
connected to AIDS activism, prompting a number of groups affiliated with ACT 
UP to protest outside the museum.75 The questions of time and audience here 
are key. For MoMA, AIDS activism was too immediate to count as aesthetically 
important, or for ACT UP members to be seen as professional artists when 
producing activist materials. Only distance allowed the established art audience 
to see imagery associated with protest as appropriate for the reflective or 
contemplative modes museums such as MoMA foster. For ACT UP, on the other 
hand, it was precisely an aesthetic image’s ability to operate in the present, with 
urgent performativity, that made it valuable. In this framework, defining reflection 
and contemplation as divorced from presence and action weakens the image’s 
effects.   
 Many of ACT UP’s image-makers were very aware of the complicated 
position they occupied as activists attempting to use the art world instrumentally. 
Members of Gran Fury, a collective of artists and designers that arose from ACT 
UP activism, describe themselves as ‘a collective of AIDS activists opposing 
governments and social institutions that make those living with AIDS invisible'.76 
Importantly, this description focuses on visibility not from the position of making 
visible those who are currently invisible, but from the imperative to challenge 
those systems which make invisible those living with AIDS. There is necessarily 
an antagonism to the work of Gran Fury, and yet, in the same presentation, they 
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also acknowledge that 'in fact we are part of an institution, we do function 
institutionally, and we use art to speak about these issues, whatever art is'.77 
 Indeed, Gran Fury’s inaugurating project came at the invitation of an 
institution, when Bill Olander, then director of the New Museum of Contemporary 
Art in New York gave ACT UP a public storefront window to produce a project 
titled Let the Record Show… The result was a series of cardboard cutouts of 
public figures, accompanied by captions with problematic quotations attributed to 
each of these figures. This project demonstrates the complicated nexus of 
institutionality, expertise and power that Gran Fury both drew from and fought 
against. Richard Meyer reads this as a question of visibility, but specifically as an 
act of making visible not the sensationalised victim of AIDS, but figures of power 
who, in this rendering, are figured as the real threat in the AIDS crisis. So, for 
instance, a cutout of William F. Buckley is accompanied by a New York Times 
editorial in which he called for everyone diagnosed with AIDS to be tattooed. In 
putting that quotation in a conspicuous public place, 'ACT UP challenged 
Buckley's regulatory scheme by forcing the regulator - rather than his targets - 
into visibility'.78 In other words, Buckley, then a prominent public intellectual, 
proposed a making visible of people with AIDS that simultaneously erased their 
visibility as anything other than victim and threat. ACT UP’s response was to use 
the institutional inroads at their disposal to challenge, performatively, this public 
figure – this expert in rhetoric and persuasion – by casting his regulatory schema 
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as an object for antagonism. 
 Gran Fury narrate the making of Let the Record Show… as a bringing 
together of grassroots expertise. Member Tom Kalin describes how this worked, 
and how the project then led to the gradual formation of Gran Fury, writing: 
Upward of fifty people worked on that window. There were big workshop 
sessions, like the one where the slabs of concrete were made by cutting 
rubber stencils. All the labor-intensive work was being done in someone's 
studio with fifteen or twenty people there at a time. Various people came in 
for specific tasks. I came in myself because I knew how to do mural 
photography. Other people came with their own abilities - the person who 
made the neon and so on. After the window happened people didn't meet 
as a group for a month. Then we had a potluck dinner. Various people, 
many of whom are here now, called each other up and started to meet and 
talk about making posters.79 (Discourses,196)   
 
Through the next several years, Gran Fury would work together to produce a 
series of highly charged and widely circulated images that both galvanized 
demonstrators during public actions and brought the message of ACT UP into 
spaces that demonstrators could never reach. Member Michael Nesline 
describes this second function as a co-opting of professional art world channels 
by non-expert activists, but he also maintains a wariness about the motivations of 
the professional art world. He writes: 
As a nonartist [sic] who is a member of an art collective, the thing that is 
most interesting to me about being part of the art world is the power that is 
granted to artists. Mark put it eloquently in the past when he remarked that 
an artist is one of the few people in our society who can say, "I want to do 
my piece in the middle of the airport" and actually be permitted to do it. ACT 
UP cannot have a demonstration in an airport, and that is why it's valuable 
to me to participate in this artistic endeavour. I'm perfectly willing to exploit 
                                                
79 Gran Fury and David Deitcher, ‘Gran Fury: Interview by David Deitcher’ in Discourses: 
Conversations in Postmodern Art and Culture ed. by Russell Ferguson, William Olander, Marcia 
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the power of the art world if it will allow us to do what we want to do where 
we want to do it. But I absolutely cringe at the idea that because AIDS is 
this year's hot art world topics, that next year AIDS is passé.80  
 
The advantage of time-based media, in this case, is access and impact, but there 
is also the danger that as presence yields to a new present, urgency fades and 
histories are lost. 
 I want to consider this danger in more detail, but first I want to look at a final 
example of a particular graphic image that helps illustrate the complex 
institutional configurations Gran Fury navigated, demonstrating a commitment to 
visibility through a mode of performativity. Crimp describes a graphic text with the 
word ‘Riot’ at the centre, surrounded by the words ‘Stonewall ‘69’ and ‘AIDS ‘89’. 
The image recalls Robert Indiana’s 1960s pop art graphic of the word LOVE – an 
internationally well- known piece. However, the Gran Fury image also recalls 
another group, the Canadian collective General Idea. This group had created a 
well-known appropriation of the LOVE graphic, replacing LOVE with AIDS. This 
was very much an art world piece – it required previous knowledge of the pop art 
context, and its message was oblique, and potentially problematic (‘Did sixties’ 
love lead inexorably to eighties’ AIDS?’ Crimp questions 81 ). Gran Fury’s 
appropriation was also initially developed for an art-world context – it was 
submitted to an exhibition in Berlin in which the General Idea graphic was also 
included. However, with its clear and targeted message – homophobic 
oppression demands immediate action – the graphic could then be re-recycled 
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for activist purposes. The insider art world reference, while both available and 
sophisticated, was ultimately less important than the visually compelling layout 
which allowed the graphic to operate with urgency. As Crimps says ‘it if works, 
we use it’.82  It is this commitment to ‘working’ that emphasizes the performative 
at the foundation of Gran Fury’s work. 
 While this sensitivity to the performativity of images incorporated significant 
skills with complex relationships to professionalism and expertise, another axis of 
duration is equally important. How does ACT UP and AIDS activism fit into a 
longer time frame? How do they participate in history and memory? At the 
beginning of this section, I recalled Foucault’s formulation of the doctor and 
patient relationship as one of dominance and submission structured by voices 
and silence. I suggested that ACT UP could be seen as re- working this 
relationship, but not by adopting silence about personal experience with 
HIV/AIDS. Rather, these experiences were amplified and turned into a demand 
for a response. Having touched on the topic of visibility with regard to protest 
action, it may also be important to consider the question of history and memory in 
relation to the category of voice.  
 Voice, and the question of whose voice is being heard, is a recurrent 
problem for grassroots political action. It is important to note that from its 
beginning, AIDS activism has often been framed as a special interest, not 
affecting the mainstream. This violent rhetorical marginalization allowed (and 
allows) vulnerable people to disappear both from public discourse and public 
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service. Decades later, however, AIDS activism in the United States risks being 
viewed as a special interest service for another group – namely an educated 
white male population. To what degree is this a legitimate criticism of the 
movement, and to what degree is this a result of problematic historicising after 
the fact? One resource which works to address the complicated question of voice 
in AIDS activism into the writing of history is the ACT UP Oral History Project, a 
collection of more than one hundred interviews by members of ACT UP. 83 
Extracts from the videos can be seen online, where they are arranged 
alphabetically by name, chronologically by date of interview, and labelled with a 
short title or description. The project has been featured as part of a recent 
exhibition on ACT UP, initially shown at the Carpenter Center at Harvard 
University,84 and later touring to White Columns gallery in New York. 85 
 Initiated by Sarah Schulman and Jim Hubbard, the Oral History Project 
shows how the labour of documentation plays a role in sustaining tactical direct 
action. While I hope that I have shown the importance of urgency and immediacy, 
at the same time, longer-term time-based strategies are required to intervene in 
broader historical narratives. In her statement about the project, Schulman notes 
her anger as the narrative of AIDS policy in the US began to be told as a story of 
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the mainstream choosing to pay attention after a regrettable delay.  She argues 
that:  
Actually, what really took place was this: thousands of people, over many 
years, dedicated their lives to achieving a cultural and scientific 
transformation. In other words, a nation that had always hated and 
humiliated and violated gay people, was forced—against their will—to 
behave differently than they wished to, because activists intervened and 
took control of a terrible situation, thereby changing it.86   
 
Schulman insists that the cultural work of changing the behaviour of a nation or 
society is necessarily a long-term, active and collective labour. The oral history 
project is not a transparent document, then, but is an activist tool. It promotes the 
claim that direct action can and does have an effect, while also insisting on 
identifying the participants in successful direct action. Because the participants in  
ACT UP have come from a wide variety of groups, many of them marginalised, 
this very act of insisting on identity has its own politics. The complexity of voice 
and identity is put into high relief here – it is important to point out how identifying 
labels have been used as components of oppression or structural violence, but it 
is just as important to insist that the activism of people from marginalised groups 
is written into history.   
 Another archival project also uses oral history as a way to address voices 
that are missing from dominant histories of AIDS activism. Ann Cvetkovich has 
documented stories from lesbians who were involved in the New York chapter of 
ACT UP, using the oral history form to both seek alternatives to mainstream 
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narratives, and to think reflexively about the complexities of historiography. The 
questions Cvetokovich asks about the shifting meanings of images and acts as 
different time-scales take hold are relevant here, and I want to take some of my 
own time, now, to consider her approach. 
 The choice to specifically document the voices of lesbians involved with 
ACT UP enacts both a very particular political purpose and a type of mourning 
that has everything to do with differential time-scales. First, focusing on the 
experiences of lesbians combats the problem that ‘with the passage of time, ACT 
UP is in danger of being remembered as a group of privileged gay white men 
without strong political sensibility, and sometimes critiqued on those grounds’. 87 
While the women Cvetkovich speaks to were very aware of issues of race and 
class present in the movement – which did not always comfortably resolve – still, 
listening to their voices complicates any notion of a homogenous profile for ACT 
UP. Second, these women are now in a position where ‘they have a legacy; they 
have the privilege of moving on because they have remained alive’.88 Cvetkovich 
is careful not to imply that women are immune from HIV/AIDS, or not directly 
affected by its medical realities, but she also attends to the role of the caretaker 
that has fallen to many queer women (including Cvetkovich herself), and to the 
different sense of urgency and responsibility to history this position might evoke. 
 This second point is related to the politics of mourning, and is developed 
especially in reference to Crimp’s ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, a much-cited 
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polemic that insists both that militancy has an emotional dimension, which 
shouldn’t be thought separately from the personal, and that mourning has public 
ramifications and does not exclude (indeed can be the impetus for) action and 
activism. Cvetkovich frames the Crimp’s argument in relation to her own interest 
in the axis points where public and private connect, writing: 
Adding new resonance to the term intimate public sphere, these practices 
[of militant mourning] counter the invisibility of and indifference to feelings of 
loss by making them extravagantly public as well as building collective 
cultural practices that can acknowledge and showcase them.89  
 
The refusal to go along with the time-scales that are understood by the 
mainstream as appropriate for grief or public expressions of loss is part of a 
larger mode of political action that also includes taking mourning into 
unsanctioned spaces, and insisting that mourning can occur for losses that 
dominant society doesn’t recognize. Crimp, for instance, insists that after AIDS, a 
loss of ease around unprotected or promiscuous sex is something to be 
mourned, and something that has a political edge.  
 For Cvetkovich, in addition to mourning individual lives lost, she also 
mourns the loss of political urgency that AIDS activism helped catalyze in the late 
1980s and ‘90s. Reflecting on the slogan ‘The AIDS crisis is not over’, which ACT 
UP used in its early days, Cvetkovich wonders how the same slogan resonates 
ten (and now twenty) years later. She writes: 
What kind of memorial would be appropriate for a movement that while not 
exactly dead, since ACT UP/NY and other chapters, for example, continue 
to meet, is dramatically changed? When is it important to move on and 
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when is it useful, if painful, to return to the past? I ask these questions about 
ACT UP in particular because in the process where AIDS activism was the 
catalyst for what has now become mainstream gay politics and consumer 
visibility, something got lost along the way, and I'm mourning that loss along 
with the loss of so many lives.90  
 
An oral history project is one answer that Cvetkovich lands on, to activate this 
mourning for a political movement not based on adhering to a consumer capitalist 
norm. Documentation, then, is not just about preservation, or rather, preservation 
can have an activist function. Documentation is a political issue because in 
preserving a voice, 'its preservation makes the claim that it mattered, that it made 
a difference'.91  
 There is absolutely a question of expertise here – who has the authority to 
make claims about what matters? Cvetkovich assumes this authority as a 
political act, noting that the archive of ACT UP is not the mainstream archive of 
the AIDS crisis. The sentimentality of the film Philadelphia or even the interesting 
yet certainly not antagonistic AIDS Memorial Quilt are the kinds of works that 
occupy the popular imagination of cultural responses to AIDS. Insisting on the 
greater complexity and more vigorously oppositional makeup of AIDS activism is 
itself an important intervention. However, Cvetkovich also brings a reflexivity to 
the project of making an oral history, and an awareness that no document will 
ever be a transparent record of the past. She uses this tension between a 
responsibility to the past and the needs and desires of the present, noting that:  
…one of the great, and often misunderstood, lessons of deconstruction is 
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that far from undermining the grounds for inquiry, it is at its most interesting 
when applied to concrete decisions such as those demanded by the 
practice of oral history'.92  
 
The concrete decisions Cvetkovich makes are to focus on relationships, on the 
social, on the complicated intertwining of activism and 'real life', rather than 
developing an overarching chronology of the movement through the voices of 
some who participated. The excerpts of interviews she shares are contextualised 
by Cvetkovich’s analysis of, for instance, the way individual friendships often 
became the point of entry to ACT UP, or the way political expertise is 
transferrable between movements. She notes how many of the lesbian members 
of ACT UP were able to make significant impact because of previous organizing 
experience with feminist causes.  
 Cvetkovich also discusses the difficulty of writing about conflicts in the 
movement, choosing not to takes sides, but trying, rather, to parse the emotional 
undercurrents that accompany narratives of breakdown or schism. The vocal 
record that arises is fundamentally incomplete – much goes unsaid or is 
assumed to go without saying. She attends to these silences, as well. Ultimately, 
the archive she creates is both an intervention that insists on the political value of 
memorialising ACT UP, but also a reflection on the emotional, even traumatic, 
experiences that surround political action. She writes: 
While an archive of ACT UP constitutes as record of its accomplishments, it 
is a tool for exploring political difficulties and challenges as well. As such, 
oral history is itself a complex tool, sometimes revealing these issues only 
through gaps and silences within the interviews and conflicts between 
                                                




Cvetkovich’s archive of feeling, then, is a complex set of documents that not only 
deals with the authority of voices, but also with the information of silence.    
 I have tried to show above how sensitivity to time, audience and voice are 
all performative strategies used by ACT UP in complicated relationship to 
expertise. The activism of ACT UP precisely targeted the structures which bar 
access to decision-making around public health and pharmaceutical research. 
The graphical savvy associated with ACT UP was an important component in 
shifting public opinion around prioritising AIDS research, thus directly affecting 
those decision-making processes. The ongoing effort to document the history of 
ACT UP targets a drift in the mainstream narrative that would deny the 
interventionist action that took place, and would re-assign the responsibility for 
addressing the AIDS crisis back to mainstream institutions. However, these 
strategies operate alongside even more direct interventions by non-experts into 
professional realms of the expert, particularly at the level of public health policy.    
 In an article titled ‘AIDS Activists and People with AIDS: A Movement to  
Revolutionise Research for Universal Access to Treatment’, Mark Harrington, the 
co-founder and Executive Director of the Treatment Action Group (TAG) (an 
organisation with roots in ACT UP, which later splintered off to become an 
independent entity) narrates his experiences lobbying with the Federal Drug 
Administration, the government organisation that approves drugs to be released 
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for sale in the United States.94 In developing what Harrington and others refer to 
as treatment activism, members had to develop sophisticated technical 
understanding both of the science underlying pharmaceutical development and of 
the bureaucratic processes and dynamics of influence that set pharmaceutical 
research agendas. 
 The development of this knowledge was coupled with and a result of 
outspoken direct action. In 1988 ‘Seize Control of the FDA’ was organised and 
implemented. Activists from around the United States surrounded the FDA 
building in Washington D.C. and attempted direct entry, alongside performative 
actions outside (banners, costumes, a ‘die-in’ at the doors of the building – many 
of the performative image-making tactics discussed above were in full force). The 
demonstration took place several days after a meeting between representatives 
of the FDA and ACT UP met for the first time to discuss the activists’ demands.  
The meeting was disappointing. As Harrington writes, ‘Activists and bureaucrats 
were speaking different languages. We did not yet have a common vocabulary in 
which to negotiate’.95 Learning this language and forging this relationship had 
direct consequences. Harrington details gains reached in 1989, the year after the 
1988 ‘Seize Control of the FDA’ march:  
When the year opened, just one drug had been approved by the FDA to be 
sold for treating AIDS – AZT – and no drugs had been approved specifically 
to treat the AIDS-related opportunistic infections. After six months of 
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relentless activist pressure, in June the FDA would approve the first two 
drugs for AIDS-related opportunistic infections, aerosolized pentamidine to 
prevent Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), which afflicted 60-80 
percent of PWAs, and DPHG (ganciclovir) for cytomegalovirus (CMV) 
retinitis, a viral disease which causes blindness.96 
  
These concrete advances bolstered the commitment of Harrington and others to 
a specific form of treatment activism that went on to have a profound influence 
worldwide. In a 1998 speech, Harrington outlined four principles of a strategy that 
a Hong Kong-based activist developed in response to Treatment Action Group 
activism, the first of which is ‘Knowledge. Learn the language of the experts and 
appropriate it -- subvert it if necessary -- for your own ends’.97 At the core of 
treatment activism, then, is this insistence that activists can both absorb and 
influence expert knowledge. 
 The success of ACT UP in terms of focusing pressure, learning how to 
influence powerful institutions, and achieving concrete results is one of the most 
clear examples of the power of non-experts intervening in the life sciences. As 
austerity politics in this country and globally threaten provision of health care to 
vulnerable people, it is increasingly important that those affected by health policy 
are able to participate in its development, and that their interests are taken as the 
first priority, as a matter of course. Equally, as new challenges for organising 
oppositional politics arise, it may be crucial to look to the expertise developed by 
earlier movements – and the emotional, personal and otherwise felt experiences 
                                                
96 Harrington, p. 338 
 
97 ‘Talk About a Revolution’, < http://www.treatmentactiongroup.org/tagline/1998/december/talk-
about-revolution> [accessed 23 March, 2013] 
 95 
that attend public intervention. Looking to the mix of performative media 
manipulation, activist archiving practices and direct non-expert intervention 
engaged in by ACT UP provides a significant framework for thinking through the 
political possibilities of active encounters with expertise. 
 
CRITICAL	  ART	  ENSEMBLE	  
  
 The example of the Critical Art Ensemble is perhaps an even more overtly 
articulated instance of the necessity for thinking through how activism and 
expertise intertwine. In this next section, I will show how the Critical Art Ensemble 
(CAE) have adopted a radical version of the amateur position in order to 
challenge and problematise a broad set of specific, material issues, as well as 
critiquing the more general lack of access to knowledge about and decision-
making input for non-specialists in arenas where power that influences and 
affects the general public accrues.   
 CAE’s practice is based on tactical interventions, in which specific 
concentrations of power (around industrial agriculture or biological weaponry, for 
example) are targeted for analysis and different media employed to suit each 
particular instance. This tactical format is significant as a model for crossing 
disciplinary and institutional boundaries, as research and action are carried out in 
response to a wide variety of situations requiring a wide number of methods and 
practices. The model of the amateur is a useful way for thinking about this variety 
of subjects and responses, considering the amateur’s position outside 
 96 
professional imperatives, and ability to focus attention based on interest.  
 A brief moment to attend to the term Tactical Media, an umbrella term that 
refers to the type of politically motivated cultural work with which CAE was 
associated around the time of its emergence as a collective. Beatriz da Costa 
and Kavita Philip give an overview of the development of Tactical Media, as well 
as some of the activities associated with it in their introduction to Tactical 
Biopolitics, a book which builds on many of the convictions associated with 
Tactical Media as they have been worked through in more recent practices. They 
write: 
Tactical Media practices and their associated conceptual framings emerged 
within the political climate of post-Cold War Europe. The sudden availability 
of cheap 'do-it-yourself' media, public access to the Internet, and reports 
about tactics of underground information exchanges formerly employed in 
communist Eastern Europe provoked intellectual and experiential 
exchanges between programmers, artists, activists, and theorists in search 
for new approaches to media activism.98    
 
Tactical Media was from the beginning a movement that drew on a heavily 
politicised amateurism, which was important because of the independence that 
'doing-it-yourself' created, but also because of the way it allowed for 
communication and exchange across borders and other obstacles. Importantly, 
while Tactical Media was understood as ‘a cultural, decentralised, non-
institutionalised formation’, it never had a directly anti-institutional stance. Rather, 
‘it has also found creative ways to explore temporary alliances and funding 
sources within institutionalised academic and public contexts’. Indeed, an 
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emphasis on the provisional is what marks it as ‘tactical’. The activist potential for 
an amateurism exploited for its interventionist potential, and not just its exemption 
from professional oversight, is what I want to explore in CAE’s work.  
 I want to discuss an example of CAE’s recent work, in order to trace how 
their ‘tactical’ approach works, and to look at the way amateurism operates as 
part of this. In 2008, I traveled to Liverpool to visit the sk-interface exhibit at the 
FACT Gallery, a cultural centre devoted to intersections between the arts and 
technology.99 sk-interface, as the title announces, was an exhibition focused on 
skin as both a material and a metaphor. Projects addressed this thin membrane 
that is both barrier and point of contact, and which is never as impermeable an  
armour as we might like it to be.   
 I wandered past exhibits of projects like Harlequin Coat by the ORLAN, 
which displayed Petri dishes embedded in brightly-coloured squares in which 
skin cells were growing, and hymNEXT by Julia Reodica, sculptures composed 
of ‘replacement hymens’ cultured from human and marsupial cells. At the top of a 
set of stairs, I encountered a two-channel video installation.  Images of a 
chemical fire alternated with images of the disintegration of human cells. A 
caption underneath the television set told me that both sets of images 
represented the effects of incendiary weapons. This blunt, minimally composed 
installation was a project of the CAE titled Immolation, and it is the part of sk- 
interfaces that has most remained with me. The dizzying shifts in scale from 
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micro to macro gripped my attention, and the sober, matter-of-fact text (‘Healthy 
human tissue cells’, ‘Disintegrating human tissue cells’) drove me to search for 
more information. A video interview with CAE member Steve Kurtz told me that 
the project was a protest against the failure of the United States to sign treaties 
banning the use of incendiary weapons against civilians. This was directly in 
response to such weapons ‘being used on a regular basis in the Middle East’.100  
 The CAE reiterate both their political position and their methodological 
commitments in an essay that accompanied the Immolation installation. 
Addressing the motivation behind the project, they assert that ‘if one was 
selective in examining the many microcosms of war and warfare one could create 
compelling points of cultural resistance rather than duplicating generic stop-the- 
war campaigns’.101 The ability to identify and move between microcosms is the 
privilege of the amateur – a privilege the CAE exploits heartily.   
 It is useful to examine how CAE defines its specific targets of critique.   
Immolation focuses on two of these ‘microcosms of war and warfare’. First, it 
addresses the barbarity of the use of incendiary weapons against civilians. They 
argue for the importance of this topic for critical examination in part because 
these weapons receive less public attention than nuclear weapons, for example, 
but wreak terrible havoc both in lives lost and in the spectacular fear that 
firepower produces in a targeted population. Second, it addresses the problem of 
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cultural ideology around the representation of war. CAE describe the 
manipulative rhetoric this way: [mainstream cultural productions] represent the 
war as horrible and unjust, and the troops as flawed people just trying to survive 
a terrifying ordeal by any means they can. But once this confession is made, 
[such productions] reverse the rhetoric and say that, in fact, for doing this, they 
are heroes, and that in order to support them, war must be tolerated and/or 
perpetuated and any culpability for horror must be indefinitely deferred.102  
The CAE resists the temptation to cast horror as humanity and to ask an 
audience to identify with a flawed hero rather than seeing, and rejecting, 
massive-scale violence. In choosing not to show recognizable human bodies that 
an audience might identify with, they stood against this problematic trope in war 
films.   
 However, CAE still needed to convey – and denounce – human devastation 
caused by incendiary weapons.  The images of chemical fires used in the 
installation came from archival footage, according to the interview with  
Kurtz. They drew from three historical sites of destruction: fire-bombing of Tokyo 
during World War II, of Vietnam in the 1970s and of Fallujah during the second  
Iraq war. This far-reaching historical perspective leant a dimension of abstraction 
to the project, as did the actual viewpoint of the cameras – far above the burning 
ground. Nevertheless, the use of archival footage maintained the concrete 
connection to actual suffering. The images of human tissue cells disintegrating 
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were created during a residency at SymbioticA, a laboratory connected to the 
University of Western Australia which provides instruments and support for artists 
wishing to create work using scientific processes (I will discuss SymbioticA in 
more detail in my next chapter). The use of these images created an experience 
of identification in Immolation – the human cells are, in some sense, ‘us’. 
However, this identification was not with a fictionalised and ideologically 
manipulative personality, but with the human body – the body of the viewer.   
 The combined use of the microscopic lens and the historical overview in  
Immolation created an experience for this viewer that stretched the conventional 
experience of war representation. Typically the viewer’s heart goes out for the 
suffering or loss of a single individual, conveniently excluding both the large-scale 
political mechanisms of destruction and the physical consequences for the 
human body. Here, the viewer’s outrage and understanding were evoked instead.  
In order to create these images, the CAE had to collaborate with professional 
scientists and archivists. The CAE do not reject expertise or specialisation 
outright, they simply refuse to accept that issues affecting the general public 
should be solely left to the experts.  
 The work of CAE is not wilfully eclectic, then, even while it coordinates 
multiple skill sets and addresses problems arising from a wide variety of fields 
and disciplines. They focus these interdisciplinary crossings through targeted 
examinations of surprising or overlooked ‘microcosms’ in which formations are 
produced. Cultural production and the skills and methodologies associated with it 
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are overtly instrumentalised with the direct and stated aims of identifying these 
microcosms and, where possible, resisting or subverting them. Projects like 
Immolation, which may seem simple at first glance, require the coordination of a 
wide set of collaborators, including scientific experts who helped produce the 
images of skin cells deteriorating, archivists who made available the existing 
footage, as well as the conceptual and critical research and development done 
by the members of CAE themselves. It is this combination of targeted critique 
and deft coordination that makes the case for the politically committed, 
interventionist version of the amateur that CAE model.  
 Probably the most notorious series of events in the CAE history points to 
how disruptive this model can be. The story is fairly familiar, having received 
national and international press. In May of 2004, Steve Kurtz woke one morning 
to find his wife and fellow CAE member Hope Kurtz unconscious.  When the 
paramedics came to the house, they noted the presence of lab equipment in the 
Kurtz’s home and notified the FBI. The Joint Terrorism Task Force descended, 
and materials, computers and Kurtz’s passport were confiscated. Kurtz was 
apparently being investigated under a statute related to biological warfare, which 
had been expanded with the introduction of the USA Patriot Act. This would likely 
have been due to the presence of harmless bacteria in the Kurtz home, which 
was going to be used for a later project dealing with US biological warfare, for the 
group exhibition The Interventionists, at the Massachusetts Museum of 
Contemporary Art.  However, NYC Commissioner of Public Health reported no 
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hazardous materials were found, and the initial bio-terrorism charges were soon 
dropped.103 
 Of course, in the period around 2004, anxieties were high around the threat 
of terrorist attacks – and especially anthrax and other biological weapons attacks 
– and the Patriot Act had recently been enacted.  The initial overreaction by 
authorities might then perhaps have been chalked up to an atmosphere of over-
caution, however problematic and politically charged such over-caution certainly 
was. However, after the bioterrorism charges were dropped, Kurtz and a 
colleague from the University of Pittsburgh were brought up on charges of mail 
fraud.  The colleague, Dr. Robert Ferrell, former head of the Department of 
Genetics, had procured the harmless bacteria for Kurtz in a transaction that both 
insisted was common in the university culture – claims which a number of 
colleagues supported.104  For four years, Kurtz and Ferrell underwent exhausting 
investigation, incurring over a hundred thousand dollars in legal expenses. Many 
in the art and academic worlds came to their support, holding an art auction to 
raise legal fees, and speaking out publicly against what looked undeniably liked 
politically motivated witch-hunting.105 
 The indictment against Kurtz was eventually dropped in 2008. Ferrell, who 
was in ill health at the start of the ordeal and suffered several strokes during the 
investigation, submitted to a plea deal. The importance on the part of United  
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States law enforcement of policing the disciplinary barriers between expert and 
amateur, science and culture, private and public interest, was clearly 
communicated at the expense of the personal life and well-being of several 
people who attempted to bring those territories closer together. Yet while this is a 
particularly clear instance of the perceived disrupting force of amateur activists, 
an ethos of non-expertise has been a defining factor in for CAE for much longer. 
 According to a timeline published in TDR, CAE began as a collaboration 
between Steve Kurtz and Steve Barnes in 1986 but by 1987 had expanded to 
include six core members.106 The name Critical Art Ensemble also served to 
acknowledge the multiple other people who contributed to the projects, initially in 
lo-tech video, and later in a wide range of other media. As befits their ‘tactical’ 
approach, the outputs CAE produces are wildly varied in form. There are some 
distinct categories of output, however. There are book projects, which range from 
books of plagiarized poetry to extensively researched polemics on subjects such 
as technology and civil disobedience or biological warfare. (Many of these 
projects are published by Autonomedia, and available to download for free).107 
They also produce biotech-related projects (often with a performance/installation 
output).  An example is Molecular Invasion (2000), an intervention related to a 
genetically engineered product of Monsanto, the multi-national agricultural 
company, or Flesh Machine (1997-98) which suggested a relationship between 
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fertility treatment and eugenics (I will refer to Flesh Machine in more detail 
below). These works in particular often spark outcry or censorship – Monsanto 
issued cease-and-desist orders against Molecular Invasion, in spite of the fact 
that the project was produced by amateurs for a cultural institution, the Corcoran 
Gallery in Washington DC. For these projects, the group often dons lab coats, 
and presents lectures on the topics. Particularly early on in their work, CAE also 
produces media interventions, where the group’s media outputs, such as videos, 
pamphlets and radio and print ads, are inserted into public spaces.  One such 
coordinated effort was Exit Culture (1992), where the public spaces included 
areas off of Florida highways, such as rest stops and shopping malls.  
 As Rebecca Schneider points out, the group also differentiates between 
direct action and pedagogical work. Paradoxically, maybe, their understanding of 
direct action is as something that ‘necessitates, today, invisibility and non-
locatability’. 108  This understanding comes from the groups early work with 
electronic civil disobedience, which developed as a way to fight the diffusion and 
naturalization of capital in the digital age by deftly blocking seemingly smooth 
channels of communication, thereby both revealing the constructed and 
manipulative nature of these channels, and directly frustrating the flows of 
information that support late capitalist structures. Schneider writes of the way, 
‘CAE argues that the state has given people the streets (as a kind of “false 
public” space) because power has itself gone nomadic through electronic 
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networks’[original emphasis].109 Schneider notes how, for CAE, traditional civil 
disobedience – taking to the streets to demand change – is no longer effective 
direct action when power is no longer centralized in physical institutions.110    
 The pedagogical strand of the group’s work, Schneider argues, is the strand 
that deals with presence and visibility. While all of CAE’s work deals to some 
degree with politics of the body, it is only in this pedagogical strand that the 
presence of bodies plays a role in the actual production of the work. As well, in 
the direct action category of practice, representation is avoided in favour of 
perforrmative action (actions which make something happen). In their 
pedagogical work, however, representation plays a role, as the figure of the 
scientist in the white lab coat becomes a character in the group’s performance 
lecture practice, and where fiction (in the form of, for instance, a fake corporation 
called GenTech) can be developed. A sort of Brechtian theatricality, where 
representation is used to expose the mechanisms of representation, is at play 
here.  
 All of the group’s projects target specific instances of manipulative, 
oppressive or violent practices by business and state institutions.  Their use of 
media and scientific processes responds directly to the disproportionate influence 
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and destructive effects of the institutional manifestations of these same 
processes, particularly by the pharmaceutical industry, the proponents of 
genetically engineered agriculture, and the forces that administrate and 
perpetuate warfare.  The CAE’s position is then structurally marginal, as they 
produce loud and insistent critiques that are profoundly uncomfortable for the 
institutions at which they are directed. At the same time, they are also reliant on 
the expertise of professional members of these institutions, as direct 
appropriation of scientific methods is a fundamental part of their practice.   
Founding member Steve Kurtz describes their position thus:  
…without the asset of a territory to work from, strategy is off the table, and 
we are left only with the choice of flying under the radar, responding to 
specific situations’.111  
 
This position explains the many different forms the CAE’s practice takes – each 
project is a reaction to a specific situation, and the outputs are crafted so as most 
effectively to deliver a message or intervention. They work with a shifting set of 
sympathetic allies within institutions to carry out targeted missions, rather than 
focusing on overarching conceptual or aesthetic approaches. (This is not to say 
that stylistic patterns do not emerge from the work. However, a detailed 
discussion of the relationship between politics and form in the work of CAE is 
outside the scope of this particular chapter). 
 I want to focus for a moment, now, on the figure of the amateur in broader 
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terms, in order to think more closely how CAE have developed their own use of 
amateurism.  I want to think, particularly, about the ways collectivity and 
individualism are both expressed in the amateur. The relationship between the 
amateur and the expert in the sciences in particular has a textured political 
history. Morris Berman gives a sociological analysis of the historical conditions 
that surround the work of British scientists in the 19th century, using Antonio 
Gramsci’s work on ‘hegemony’112 – or the disproportionate influence of one group 
over others – to tease out the political dimension of this. Berman discusses how 
class influenced the development of scientific inquiry, so that in Britain it 
remained associated with the aristocracy long after the professionalisation of 
scientific institutions (and the attendant rise of the bourgeoisie) was underway in 
France and Germany. Even as technical skills were acquired by a burgeoning 
middle class, the standardisation of the profession of the scientist, and the 
subsequent conditions that produce the figure of the expert, was not adopted in 
Britain until much later than its continental neighbours.  
One knock-on effect of this was to enforce the idea of science in Britain as 
the arena for spectacular individuals, rather than a collective pursuit. Berman 
writes that, in Britain, ‘the lack of scientific organization in the nineteenth century 
was paralleled by a series of discoveries that were almost pathologically 
individualistic’. He lists 'Hutton, Wollaston, Young, Davy, Dalton, Herschel, 
                                                
112 As articulated in, for example Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Selections, 2nd edn., trans. 
and ed. by Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 
 
 108 
Faraday, Maxwell, Kelvin, Joule, Tyndall, Crookes, Lyell, Darwin, Huxley, 
Rutherford and others' as men (gender-specific) who occupied space outside of 
professional pressures, yet with the resources to accomplish sustained and self-
directed work, and accomplish startlingly innovative results. The institutions of 
expertise that developed in the 19th century, on the other hand, were 
characterized by collective discipline and transferable standards which were 
devoted to the demands of industrial capitalism, and commercial goals. As 
Berman writes, ‘if aristocratic hegemony retarded the development of scientific 
organization, it simultaneously inhibited the growth of the (conservative) cult of 
expertise upon which professionalism is based, a judgment network that serves 
to determine the success, if not the livelihood, of its practitioners’.113 If the choice 
is between liberated individual and deadening collective, it is hard to argue for the 
collective. 
This notion of the amateur as a liberating counterpoint to oppressive, 
homogenising expert institutions remains resonant in more recent cultural 
imaginings. Edward Said, for example, champions the amateur position as the 
proper place for radical intellectualism. Said distinguishes specialisation as such 
from the professional expert, writing that ‘to be an expert you have to be certified 
by the proper authorities; they instruct you in speaking the right language, citing 
the right authorities, holding the right territory’.114 In other words, expertise is as 
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much about social behaviour as it is knowledge or ability. For Said, the individual, 
dissenting voice of the intellectual is a precious thing which must be protected 
from the socialising force of expertise. He writes: 
The fact is that the intellectual ought neither to be so uncontroversial and 
safe a figure as to be just a friendly technician nor should the intellectual 
try to be a full-time Cassandra, who was not only righteously unpleasant 
but also unheard.115 
For Said, then, the figure of the amateur represents an ideal balance – a voice 
not so disconnected from the world as to shut out an audience, but still outside 
the spheres of power that demand conformity and compromise. Also, 
fundamentally, this is the voice of an individual, set apart yet participating from 
afar. 
 Where the aristocratic amateur scientist maintains freedom from 
professional constrictions through his privileged class position, and Said’s 
amateur intellectual holds himself above the fray of suppressive authority, the 
CAE insists on the practice of amateurism as a way of getting inside spaces that 
might otherwise be closed to the non-professional. While not dismissing the value 
of specialisation, the group asserts that interdisciplinarity and exchange make for 
better public knowledge.  They propose amateurism as an opportunity to be 
responsibly informed about things that affect public life, but are often kept strictly 
private, either by repressive governments or corporations driven by competition. 
Importantly, in the CAE version of the amateur, this figure does not operate 
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outside of professional spaces, but attempts to enter those spaces.   
 Schneider interviewed the members of CAE about their laboratory work, 
interested to find out to what degree they do ‘real’ science, and to what degree 
they are mimicking scientific procedures in a representational field. Her questions 
were in relationship to a project called Flesh Machine, which combined a 
performance lecture on contemporary eugenics (complete with performative 
skits), with a participatory, hands-on section, where audience members could 
provide tissue samples, which are tested for ‘suitability’ in genetic engineering. 
When asked about the work that went into setting up this lab section, CAE 
responded: 
We didn’t study “seriously.” We are amateurs. However, to get to the 
political economy of this situation, and the sociological impact of these 
goings-on, you don’t have to get a degree. We simply read lots of books 
and journals; spent a semester in cell biology lab (more like a participatory 
researcher in anthropology); spent two weeks living with a couple going 
through IVF; did numerous interviews with molecular biologists; had 
biologists (experts) check our work, and generally act as consultants. When 
we did Flesh Machine in Vienna, a team of biologists from the local 
university came to the event to check our work, and show we were a fraud. 
They did not find one thing they could dispute, and were quite 
congratulatory about it too—although they were never too keen on our 
politics.116  
 
CAE’s engagement with science insists that the physical processes that 
constitute much of the labour of the lab are not outside the capability of most 
people to grasp. They are adamant that understanding and participating in 
science could be vastly more accessible, and that taking an informed, 
oppositional stance to some of the more troubling ideological structures in the 
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biological industries is not something that should be left to the experts.   
 The Critical Art Ensemble’s celebration of the amateur, like Said’s 
discussed above, asserts the importance of refiguring constricting definitions of 
expertise, but does not celebrate the individual as the defining weapon against 
such constricting definitions. Rather, CAE’s works are unsigned by individuals, 
producing a collective, semi-anonymous yet still accountable pseudo-authorship 
for the work. Schneider argues that CAE’s use of anonymity is precisely a refusal 
of privatization, writing:  
Their anonymity serves as a mark of their resistance to privatization—as 
does their collectivity. They are not secretive about their names. They 
simply do not use their names as signatures relative to their work.117  
 
This refusal to play into the power of the signature is also a refusal of the artist as 
a heightened individual, and a critique of the art world system of obscuring 
privilege in the celebration of the individual. She writes: 
Rather than struggle to name the unnamed, CAE names the operation of 
naming, struggling to expose the fact that the named artist (the “star” 
individual) has long been circulated as a name to support a broader 
anonymous (unmarked) collective of (white patriarchal) privilege that 
reproduces its foundations by structurally facilitating institutional support for 
the cult of the individual artist'.118  
 
Collective, anonymous and amateur, CAE challenge the basis of the relationship 
privatisation, capital and knowledge – a relationship that necessarily includes 
scientific institutions. They do so not by denying the importance of scientific 
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inquiry – on the contrary, they insist that it is so important, it cannot be left solely 
to the experts. 
 
CONCLUSION	  
ACT UP and CAE are examples of committed activists who use 
performance strategies to insist on the participation of non-experts in the 
development of scientific knowledge and the development of political policies that 
draw on this knowledge. The results of this activism are practical (e.g. at the level 
of concrete changes to policy), cultural (e.g. at the level shifting how images are 
used, who they represent, and how histories are told), and structural (e.g. at the 
level of struggling against the individualism and privatisation that often determine 
how the aims of science are structured institutionally – even if this does not 
always characterise how science is practiced). By insisting on the participation of 
non-experts in the lab, both groups have made lasting contributions to re-thinking 
the politics of expertise. 
In my next chapter, I look more closely at one artist’s development of a 
non-expert practice in the lab. I consider how the labour of the artist (or at least 
the labour of this artist) poses real challenges to the labour of the lab, even as it 
offers possibilities for rich and varied forms of communication between 
specialties. I also show how Kira O’Reilly’s work with and around scientists is not 
separate from her other body-based practice, but is part of a continuum of 
practice that connects materiality and the imagination, and desire, play and the 




Chapter	  Two:	  Serious	  Play	  
 
INTRODUCTION	  
 The last chapter was about artists using non-expertise in an explicitly 
activist mode, which necessarily involved a degree of antagonism – not 
necessarily against individual ‘experts’ or against specialist knowledge per se, 
but against structures of exclusion which attend some institutions of expertise. 
This chapter also focuses on an artist using non-expertise to engage with 
institutions of expertise, and while I want to preserve the possibilities of 
opposition and antagonism, the mode of engagement I will explore here is 
playful. I argue, however, that this play has serious stakes and complications, 
and it might not always be ‘fun’. 
ART	  AND	  TECHNOSCIENCE	  
 In 2007, I attended a seminar with the artist Kira O’Reilly at Queen Mary, 
University of London. Previously, I had only been familiar with her solo 
performance work, but at this seminar she spoke as well about her recent 
residency in the School of Biosciences at the University of Birmingham. I was 
struck by her engagement with the technical processes of cell cultures and how 
she managed not to elevate or even absolutely separate these processes from 
her more associative performance-making process. She expressed respect for 
the labour of those she had worked with, and she was self-deprecating, without 
diminishing the value of her engagement. In answer to a question about the 
residency and her work in the lab, she laughed and talked about the limits of her 
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technical skills. She said that her own lab skills were like cooking, just following a 
recipe, where the professionals she worked with were on a different level.119 
Nevertheless, O’Reilly’s projects to come out of that residency are far from rote 
or routine. Rather, they offer a compelling lens to consider how the labour of the 
lab maps on to other labours of love. 
 In her blog from 2007 onwards, O’Reilly writes about her residency, and her 
enthusiasm for technical processes and their connection to her processes 
outside of the laboratory as well.120 She narrates her practical work with cell 
cultures: in a post on 7 July, 2007 she details her ‘attempts to convince theHaCat 
[sic] cells to grow in some areas and not in others’, describing the materials and 
sequences she employed to carry out these attempts. She is also attentive to 
social exchanges within the lab, particularly highlighting instances of the 
imaginative among the professionals she worked with. One of the post-doctoral 
students suggested that O’Reilly should ‘talk to [her] cells and get to know them’. 
She goes on to write that ‘most people I’ve spoken to who work with culturing 
cells admit quite happily to conversations down the microscope’. 121  This 
microscopic/anthropomorphic playfulness works against notions of 
humourlessness or the overly literal that might be associated with ideas of a 
professional laboratory. 
 This mix of narration with observation, and of the technical with the social, 
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creates an engaging document of O’Reilly’s experience. Her position as a non- 
scientist encourages this mix – the artist-in-residence is expected to pick up on 
relatable details and express them to a broad range of audiences. However,  
O’Reilly is also attuned to the ways her position as an outsider can lead to 
anxieties and miscommunications. She describes working in various labs, where 
‘the principles are the same but the interpretations of them and behaviours 
around practices of containment, sterility and exclusion are very different’.122 This 
variety of interpretations is particularly difficult for the beginner, for someone who 
has neither the experience nor the authority to sense the nuances of 
communication in the lab nor to assert her own interpretations. O’Reilly describes 
an instance of getting the timing on a process wrong, because ‘for some reasons 
[she] didn’t get the bit of information that expalined th [sic] time scale of the cells 
[sic] tubule information and came back too late’.123 In her desire not to appear 
slow and not to impinge too much on the time of the professionals she works 
with, information is lost and assumptions about existing knowledge go 
uncorrected.   
 However, O’Reilly repeatedly professes her love for the work of 
biosciences. ‘I love tissue cultures’, she writes. ‘I have a complete fascination 
with the manipulation and cultivation of these microscopic modules, isolated, 
grown and disseminated into multiple scenarios and possibilities’. 124  This 
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foregrounding of emotion is one reason I initially identified O’Reilly’s engagement 
with science not only as non-scientist but as that of the classic passionate 
amateur, doing it for love, as the etymology of the term suggests. Moreover, the 
reasons she gives for this love, the way it allows for thinking about multiplicity 
and potential, call to mind the spirit of adventure associated particularly with the  
19th-century scientist, working as the possibilities of industrial technology were 
beginning to be developed and exploited, but before the professional disciplines 
had sedimented into later configurations (see my discussion of the historical 
politics of the amateur scientist in the Chapter 1).  This positive amateur position 
also expresses itself in O’Reilly’s openness to the unexpected, both the 
unexpected outcome and the unexpected connection, and an insistence on 
deferral of ‘anything fixed, resolved or finite’.125  
 When I spoke with O’Reilly in 2011, though, she was hesitant to assume the 
label ‘amateur’, preferring ‘hobbyist’ or ‘tinkerer’. 126  The grandness of the 
amateur was replaced by something less substantial, finer or more miniature. 
This was emphasised by the fact that much of O’Reilly’s work in Birmingham was 
with spider silk, a substance both metaphorically and materially fragile and 
gossamer. There is also a different quality to the enthusiasm of the hobbyist from 
that of the amateur. Where the etymology of the term amateur comes from 
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love,127 which calls to mind overwhelming passions, the hobbyist comes from the 
child’s toy hobby horse,128 evoking both play and something that can be set 
aside. There is modesty in O’Reilly’s use of ‘hobbyist’, but I also think that it 
expresses a commitment to the combination of materiality and the unfixed and 
unresolved, perhaps more than the rather broader strokes of the amateur. Even 
more usefully for this current study, O’Reilly’s distinction makes it clear that the 
non- expert can be thought of in various shades, and that the failures and 
contradictions of the non-expert may be as important to consider as those of the 
expert.  
 In what follows, I will consider a set of projects that resulted from O’Reilly’s 
residency at the University of Birmingham, and a previous residency at the 
Australian laboratory SymbioticA, which pairs artists with scientists and gives 
these artists access to laboratory space and equipment to create new work. I 
think in greater depth about how O’Reilly frames her relationship to the sciences 
as a ‘hobbyist’. I will also consider these projects alongside her better known 
body-based and one-to-one performance work, as existing on a continuum of 
practice with similar aims. I argue that generally her work picks up on various 
valences of ‘play’, both as an open-ended, self-determined response to existing 
materials (or toys, perhaps) and also as a highly charged, and not always ‘fun’, 
play of desire and intimacy. I argue that in the context of the laboratory, this 
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serious play results in work that responds to the complexity of scientific labour. 
Here, exchanges between materiality and imagination connect both scientific and 
performance practice. Further, I argue that O’Reilly’s work pays special attention 
to mistakes and failures, not in order to recuperate them easily into a vague 
notion of ‘process’, but to highlight how the specific processes in the biology labs 
she has been working in rely on highly attuned communication and immaterial or 
affective knowledge alongside highly technical skills. Finally, I look at the ways 
O’Reilly’s labour in the lab combines with her focus on intimacy to produce a very 
particular understanding of the play of transformation and change.  
	  
PLAYING	  AT	  WORK	  IN	  THE	  LAB	  
 In 2003, O’Reilly began her residency at SymbioticA. I have already 
mentioned SymbioticA in my discussion of the Critical Art Ensemble – now I will 
take a moment to consider this institution in a bit more depth. Introduced in the 
publication New Art/Science Affinities as ‘the gold standard for the integration of 
artists inside science laboratories’, SymbioticA is a research laboratory based at 
the University of Western Australia. Artists and thinkers working in the humanities 
and other fields outside the life sciences are given the opportunity to engage 
directly with the technical processes and professional discourses of the life 
sciences. There is the sense that this benefits the scientists as well – that the 
relationship is indeed symbiotic and not parasitic. The benefit of the non-scientist 
in the lab is described as the possibility for a more general openness, or the 
creation of an environment of inquiry that is not necessarily geared to the 
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instrumental pressures that researchers might feel in more traditional research 
contexts. For the non-scientists, the projects they undertake must adhere to 
professional standards and regulations. The editors of New Art/Science Affinities 
argue that in fact, this produces more opportunities than it curtails. They write: 
This rule-abiding approach makes their work all the more powerful and 
gives the artists more freedom to create and exhibit their work without the 
fear of being censored or excluded from the larger departmental 
discourse.129  
Playing by the rules is what allows artists to properly play the game. 
 SymbioticA was founded in 2002 by cell biologist Professor Miranda 
Grounds, neuroscientist Professor Stuart Bunt and artist Oron Catts (who is also 
the director of the centre).130 The spirit of collaboration between disciplines has 
been in place since the centre’s beginning and a sense of open-endedness 
infuses the centre’s self-descriptions. The website states that, ‘our research is 
speculative in nature. We strive to support non-utilitarian, curiosity based and 
philosophically motivated research’.131  In short, SymbioticA appears to be a 
unique and hugely valuable organisation for rethinking not only how artists might 
engage with science but how scientific inquiry might be constructed in the most 
dynamic ways possible. 
 The residency at SymbioticA was O’Reilly’s first foray into the practical use 
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of scientific instruments, though her practice had always concerned technologies 
of the body. The project she first worked on was to attempt to create a synthetic 
lace made from tissue cultures from her own skin. In preparing for this work, 
O’Reilly worked to learn procedures of tissue culturing using skin cells from pigs 
which were killed for medical research purposes. The outcomes of this residency 
were varied, both in medium and structure, including performance, video and 
text. From SymbioticA, a space specifically geared to artists, O’Reilly went on to 
the University of Birmingham, where she was very much an outsider, and had a 
different set of challenges to navigate. 
 In 2011, I had a conversation with O’Reilly about her residencies at 
Birmingham and SymbioticA. Here, I want to highlight a few of the key points that 
O’Reilly brought up in this discussion, to set the stage for a further investigation 
of the ‘hobby’ in the context of O’Reilly’s work. O’Reilly usefully describes the 
difference between working at SymbioticA and working at Birmingham. At 
SymbioticA, there are a range of people from the humanities with overlapping 
vocabularies, bringing these vocabularies into technical spaces and navigating 
this movement en masse. I will quote O’Reilly at length, on this point: 
…what’s very interesting about it is you’re in your SymbioticA pod, so the 
primary conversations are with the people around you, who are practicing 
artists, or people who work in the art world or philosophers, etc.  And then 
there’s kind of moving into space where I would do stuff, like tissue culture, 
which would be shared spaces between scientists and artists but primarily 
scientist spaces. So it creates very different ambiences and flavours just 
because of the different patterns and really mundane things like using of 
spaces and booking of spaces. The regular protocols you do when you’re 
trying to work with living materials, whatever your background discipline is. 
But I did find that my primary references and people I would talk to were 
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artists who had some idea of my background, where I was coming from.  
We shared some kind of language.  Although there were huge differences 
because people come from very different places and worlds, and you get 
this amazing mixture in SymbioticA.132 
 
At Birmingham, on the other hand, O’Reilly was one of a few artists-in-residence, 
but for the most part she interacted in a day-to-day capacity with the scientists 
and technicians in the lab. In this environment, the conversations she had were 
necessarily very different from the conversations at SymbioticA, though no less 
compelling.  
 These conversations dealt more often with materialities and the practical 
possibilities of working with living materials. ‘I found it really challenging and also 
really exciting’, she told me ‘to be forced to find ways of putting ideas and 
approaches into language that people from another discipline could get’.  Two 
things helped facilitate communication in this context. First, the PhD and post-
doctoral students she often worked with were also very involved with teaching 
undergraduates. This meant that they were skilled at pitching their explanations 
at a non- (or not yet-)specialist audience. Second, the senior scientist in the lab, 
Dr. Janet Smith, while not a professional artist, was deeply invested in the arts 
and interested in the practice of making art and the discourse surrounding the 
reception of art. Both of these mediating points involved generous negotiations of 
specialism and status, both on the part of the laboratory professionals and the 
arts professional. 
 O’Reilly discussed how she has had to embrace the fact that what looks like 
                                                
132 This and other quotes from O’Reilly are from an interview I conducted in 2011. 
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methodology in an art studio can look haphazard in the laboratory, and not to try 
and make her methodology fit the very different procedures and time scales of 
the lab. When I asked her about her way of working in the lab, she emphasised a 
specific mode of playfulness, which is nevertheless a serious part of her practice. 
She gave me an extended example, which is worth quoting at length: 
…it took me years to realise this – that when I go into a lab my big mistake 
is to try and be a trainee scientist because, you know, it’s not my strength, 
it’s not what I’m good at. I’m good at being, at making other kinds of 
connections. So there was a situation where I was working with some cells 
that were from a very early stage chicken embryo. And I found this very 
powerful and disturbing to work with this kind of material. And at one stage 
– I’d cut up a precursor tube – it’s not yet a heart but still the cells twitch so 
it has this appearance of beating. And when you chop that up into smaller – 
when you create cell culture, the cells still twitch, they still syncopate. And at 
the time my research was growing cells on spider silk. So I chopped up a bit 
of heart and put it on a bit of spider silk. Which was very random, very 
crude, very rough, very – the kind of thing I would do in a studio, where I 
would just put two objects beside each other to see what happens – you 
know what I mean? Let’s do something fast and see if it... And those are the 
kind of things that I would dismiss – it didn’t have the kind of care and 
considered-ness that would come from a genuine experiment but it had a bit 
of the kind of audacity of getting something and doing it anyway even if it 
was a bit rough and ready… But it’s not been informed by really how to do it 
properly. And that was something I would get really hung up on, was how to 
do it properly, and then I didn’t really, I don’t think, appreciate that that 
wasn’t my job. That my job was just to do it. And if I wanted to refine it 
maybe ask for help. But actually I could go a long way in just being quite 
playful, for want of a better word. And by playful I don’t mean trivial, I mean 
just quite open about taking little risks with things. 
 
O’Reilly has got to a point where she treats microscopic materials the way she 
would treat any other materials in her studio. However, there is a tension that I 
think may also be productive when the studio is replaced by the necessarily more 
regulated space of the lab. The playfulness and risk-taking that are encouraged 
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in various ways in the development of artists – from early training on through later 
stages in a career – are completely different to the skills that are developed by 
trainee scientists. 
 I am deeply interested in the way O’Reilly frames it as her ‘job’ to be playful, 
to be non-expert in the sense of achieving a technical mastery. This is not to say, 
however, that she doesn’t admire the very different time scales and practices of 
focus that go into achieving this mastery. We spent some time discussing 
scientists who spend a career studying one tiny area of specialism that yields rich 
and significant results, and talking through the satisfaction of this idea. O’Reilly 
was also careful to describe how the scientist she worked with – Dr. Janet Smith 
– took an interest in the slightly random actions O’Reilly performed. While Smith 
was a particularly sympathetic colleague, O’Reilly also pointed out that there is a 
more general notion of seizing opportunities, so that: 
…if your artist in residence or your PhD student does something a bit 
random you seize on that and you look at it, and you look at the outcomes, 
and then maybe you do the refining experiments that establish the 
knowledge, you know that scientific knowledge, and the paper and so on. 
 
For O’Reilly, then, this speaks to a broader intellectual ‘opportunism’ – in the best 
sense of the word, denoting an ethos of curiosity.  
 Nevertheless, the labour of the artist – or the labour of this artist – is not to 
develop refining experiments or to establish verifiable knowledge. O’Reilly’s 
practice is characterised by openness, association and a roughness which is also 
what makes it compelling. I want to think more about how this labour that is also 
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play operates.  
 
Play,	  Work	  and	  Free	  Time	  
 
 It’s important, then, to take a moment to think specifically about ‘hobbies’ 
and the ‘hobbyist’ in relation to labour. As Theodor Adorno points out, the hobby 
is a product of the rise of ‘free’ or ‘spare’ time – concepts that are historically 
specific and in contrast with an older idea of ‘leisure’, which ‘denoted the privilege 
of an unconstrained, comfortable lifestyle'.133 While leisure can be a lifestyle of its 
own (‘a life of leisure’), ‘free time’ is necessarily ‘shackled to its opposite’ – 
work.134 Free time exists in order to reproduce labour power – the point of free 
time is that workers return from it better able to work – and thus the kinds of 
activities that can take place during ‘free time’ are as proscribed as those which 
happen at work. For Adorno, then hobbies are compulsory activities that exist to 
fill this paradoxically constrained ‘free time’. In order to signify that this time is 
non-work time, hobbies must look as little like work as possible. ‘Hence’, Adorno 
writes, ‘the inanity of so many leisure activities’.135  On the other hand, because 
free time is so forcefully a product of the compulsion to work, freedom is rarely to 
be found in free time.  
 Adorno, then, is actively repelled by the notion of hobbies. He insists that he 
himself had no hobbies. 'As far as my activities beyond the bounds of my 
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recognised profession are concerned’, he writes, ‘I take them all, without 
exception, very seriously'. This is in contradistinction to hobbies, which are 
'preoccupations with which [people] become infatuated in order to kill time'. This 
state of affairs is possible because he 'has had the rare opportunity to follow the 
path of his own intentions and fashion his work accordingly'. 136 He is in a highly 
privileged position of approximating a liberated autonomy that consumer 
capitalism aims to erode.  
 Whether we agree with Adorno that individual autonomy is the liberated 
solution to capitalistic coercion, one thing to note about his declarations is that 
they assert the possibility of a way out of the ‘completely mediated, total system’ 
that late capitalism aims towards. Indeed, near the end of his essay on free time, 
Adorno admits that this compromised notion nevertheless offers some useful 
outlets. He proposes that free time, while fundamentally co-opted to labour and 
capitalism, still contains a liberating contradiction.  He draws on the example of a 
royal wedding broadcast in Germany, public reactions to which were studied by 
the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Those interviewed spoke about the 
event in the terms by which it was broadcast to them, unique and special. Yet 
these same people at different moments were also able to be critical about its 
ultimately flimsy social and political importance, demonstrating what Adorno 
refers to as 'split consciousness'. Reflecting on the evidence that not everyone 
always thinks what they are told to think, he writes:  
It is obvious that the integration of consciousness and free time has not yet 
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completely succeeded. The real interests of individuals are still strong 
enough to resist, within certain limits, total inclusions. That would coincide 
with the social prediction that a society, whose inherent contradictions 
persist undiminished, cannot be totally integrated even in consciousness. 
Society cannot have it all its own way, especially not in free time, which 
does indeed lay claim to people, but by its very nature still cannot totally 
claim them without putting them over the edge.137   
 
So free time is valuable to capitalist structures, and yet what makes it valuable for 
capitalism – that it is space for workers to re-charge so they can come back as 
better workers – also provides a glimpse of space outside of the totalizing 
impulse of capitalism. If it is possible to make free time truly free, and not 
subordinated to work, that would be a radical proposition indeed. 
 Rebecca Schneider has a rather different take on hobbies, one which gives 
more credit to the hobbyist for complex engagement. She is also particularly 
attuned to the compromises of her own position as a scholar. In Performing 
Remains, Schneider studies the phenomenon of United States Civil War 
reenactors. She argues that the Civil War reenactors she speaks with have a 
nuanced understanding that attends their passionate involvement in the re-
creation of the past. She writes: 
In the course of attending Civil War reenactments, I repeatedly betrayed my 
own biases in that I was continually surprised by the complexities involved 
in the (re)actions I witnessed. Problems of ambivalence, simultaneous 
temporal registers, anachronism, and the everywhere of error were not lost 
on any of the reenactors with whom I spoke, despite their common depiction 
as, by and large, simple or naive 'enthusiasts'. In affective engagement, 
many of them find reenactment to be, if not the thing itself (the past), 
somehow also not not the thing (the past), as it passes across their bodies 
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in space-time'.138  
 
Schneider was surprised by the capacity the re-enactors had for processing 
complex and sometimes contradictory ideas about temporality and for thinking 
about history as something that is produced in the body as much as it is 
produced in the mind or on the page. This is in contrast with (some) professional 
historians Schneider discusses, who view historical reenactment as a threat to 
proper historiography, fearing that ‘history can be overrun by the error-ridden 
embarrassment of the live body’.139  The hobbyists, through their very bodily 
enthusiasm, pose a threat to the stability of the past. 
 I wonder if this anxiety about the stability of history is also an anxiety about 
the stability of work. The ‘enthusiasts’ appear excessive in their commitment to 
an activity that has no professional reward and yet demands an intense degree of 
identification akin to that demanded by a job. And while Adorno can safely 
categorise the non-professional interests he invests with utter seriousness – 
music and literature – as proper to the life of the mind, Schneider’s hobbyists are 
all messy bodies and unpredictable emotions. If hobbies can be figured as 
excessive, bodily disruptions to dominating models of work, they start to look like 
attractive components for a liberatory artistic methodology. 
 However, the hobby becomes even more complicated in the context of arts 
production. As Kathy Weeks argues, in post-industrial economies, the ‘work ethic’ 
                                                
138 Rebecca Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Re-enactment 
(London: Routledge, 2011), p. 8. 
139 Schneider, Performing Remains, p. 35. 
 129 
that fuels capitalistic development has shifted so that the rewards of work include 
work itself – or life filled with meaningful and fulfilling productive labour, so that 
‘postindustrial labour employs workers’ hearts and minds as well as their 
hands’.140 In this model, the hobby would become obsolete, because all activity 
could potentially be subsumed by productivity, and the need to reproduce labour 
power could happen through labour, rather than outside labour. Time could stop 
selling for free once and for all. 
 Artistic labour is perhaps the closest thing to this ideal of perpetual 
productivity. This is labour that is supposed to be all reward. Creative work 
should renew the self even as self-expression is material for productive creative 
labour. The economic and social precarity of the artist can be rationalized by the 
privileges the work itself provides, even if in reality this means that increasingly 
only the already privileged will be able to pursue artistic careers. Performance, 
the most immaterial and socially located of artistic practices, may be the best 
example of creative work that produces all of its own reward. And yet, perhaps 
because of its proximity to a neoliberal ideal, it is all the more important to 
consider how performance can be used to critically examine, and hopefully 
challenge, this ideal. 
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Playing	  vs.	  ‘Doing’	  Science	  
Clearly hobbies, and the figure of the hobbyist, have a complicated 
position in the world of work, professionalism and the labour of the artist. In the 
previous section, I was speaking generally, but this is especially true in the 
specific arena of the sciences. In order to think more clearly about the kinds of 
work – and non-work – O’Reilly is doing in the lab, I want to look more closely at 
the position of the non-expert, and here particularly the artist, in relationship to 
scientific inquiry.  
How can artists interested in thinking about and working with science 
access the materials and information necessary to bring the work past the point 
of simply reflecting dominant discourses as they are articulated through 
popularised accounts of science’s achievements? Artist and theorist Beatriz da 
Costa has written about the difficulties of participating in science as a layperson. 
She shows how these difficulties directly affect artists who are interested in 
participating or intervening in the sciences.  
Da Costa illustrates these difficulties by exploring the different challenges 
facing artists who engage with information technology versus those who engage 
with the life sciences (even while many artists may engage with both). Many 
artists who use programming in their work, even if they are not professionally 
trained in computer science or engineering, find that the skills they develop are 
relevant to other fields. These artists are able to exert influence or reap rewards 
in industries and markets other than the art world. This is because, as da Costa 
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argues, the practice of coding is both flexible and transferable across a 
multiplicity of contexts. Once the machinery and instruments that are necessary 
for coding (e.g. personal computers, the Internet, mobile phones, etc.) became 
available to a wide set of people, both intervention into existing code-based 
arenas and development of new tools became widespread outside of a strictly 
circumscribed professional setting. Da Costa uses the example of Wikipedia to 
illustrate how access to participation in the development of information 
technology and its applications, while not universal, has certainly become 
prevalent.  
For artists who wish to participate in the life sciences, access is far more 
limited. If artists wish to do science, rather than represent its outcomes or mimic 
its procedures, access to the instruments of science is not enough. The 
contemporary production of scientific fact is a collective process performed by 
trained participants whose grasp of a particular reference base of previously 
established facts is key to their successful intervention in the process of assertion 
and verification of new facts. Da Costa uses her own experience as an artist 
working with scientific procedures of data collection to demonstrate how 
participation in scientific discourse is a complex and often fraught process for an 
outsider.  
The project PigeonBlog is described by da Costa as ‘a collaborative 
endeavor between homing pigeons, artist, engineers, and pigeon fanciers 
engaged in a grass-roots scientific data-gathering initiative designed to collect 
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and distribute information about air quality conditions to the general public.’141 
The project was designed so that pigeons were put to use as a sort of local traffic 
report team, observing and sending information about air pollution rather than 
traffic congestion. They were equipped with sensors which transmitted data 
directly online, and this data was automatically represented on Google maps. A 
real-time stream of information on local air pollution levels was thus made 
publicly available for the duration of the project.  
While PigeonBlog was specifically framed as an activist-art project, it 
ended up functioning in ways beyond the attention-raising function such a frame 
might imply. As new technology was developed to create the air pollution sensors 
which were strapped to the pigeons, da Costa received interested inquiries from 
biologists, veterinarians and technophiles interested in the engineering dimension 
of the work. As well, the project was positioned to test and challenge existing 
procedures for measuring air pollution. Pigeons are uniquely suited to measure 
air quality at heights that have proved difficult to reach through other means, and, 
unlike the fixed monitoring stations currently used by air quality agencies, the 
pigeons are mobile. However, because PigeonBlog was not designed with 
scientific research protocols in mind (in terms of statistically relevant sample 
sizes, for example) the animal rights organisation PETA (People for the Ethical 
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Treatment of Animals) raised objections about the use of the pigeons for the 
project.  
All of these responses caused da Costa to question her relationship to the 
project and to consider the project’s future. In order for the results of PigeonBlog 
to appear in a specialised scientific journal where this information would enter the 
verification process toward the production of scientific fact, rather than in an art 
context where it would not, large amounts of money would be required to gather 
data in amounts large enough to adhere to scientific standards. Even if the 
resources were made available, da Costa also feared that the consequence of 
publishing in a scientific journal would be that the information might thus become 
less accessible or accessible only to other specialised researchers. Without fully 
resolving this dilemma, nevertheless da Costa points to the direction she would 
prefer the project, and her own involvement with technoscientific art projects, to 
take.142 She was invited by Cornell University to take part in a ‘citizen science’ 
project called Urban Bird Gardens. Under this initiative, non-experts participate in 
research projects, and the data they collect is actually integrated into the 
Ornithology Lab’s studies. For da Costa, this is a position, ‘between the academy 
and non-expert participants’,143 that she hopes to develop. The appeal here is 
that the ‘citizens’ are not simply the targets of ‘outreach’ activities, but are 
actually ‘doing’ the science. For da Costa, then, the potential for the artist working 
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with life sciences is to refigure the disciplinary boundaries that structure the 
processes that currently exist for creating scientific knowledge.  
Da Costa argues, then, that one method for non-expertise to become 
performative in the context of science (in other words, for non-experts to do 
science) is to aggregate the activities of non-experts and integrate them with the 
activities of experts. This model of citizen science has much to offer an 
understanding of the benefits of permeable boundaries for both experts and non-
experts alike. This model differs, however, from O’Reilly’s approach, which is not 
necessarily geared at contributing to aggregate data. Rather, I aruge, O’Reilly 
uses the lab as an extension of the artist studio, and tissue culture is not 
separate from the other types of body-based work that she does. There is a 
certain kind of playfulness that she brings to all of these practices, and which 
provides a connecting thread to some seemingly disparate ideas. 
 
PLAYING	  (WELL)	  WITH	  OTHERS	  
 Having looked at O’Reilly’s work in the lab in relation to ‘the hobby’, I want 
to look at connections between this work and some other modes of her 
performance work. There is a different kind of play operating in her one-to-one 
work, and much of her other body-based performance work, which centers on 
intimacy, proximity and boundaries. These categories are certainly not separate 
from economies or labour, but the focus is somewhat different. In the following, I 
argue that this work constitutes a form of play that produces a complex 
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understanding of intimacy, of a type which may be joyful and nourishing, but also 
sometimes uncomfortable and disorientating. 
 Kira O’Reilly’s performance work was some of the first ‘Live Art’ I was 
exposed to, my encounter with her work being more or less simultaneous with my 
introduction to the term. Attending the Performance Studies international (PSi) 
conference at Brown University in 2005, I was gripped by Rachel Zerihan’s 
account of her participation in O’Reilly’s Untitled Action for Bomb Shelter, a piece 
which O’Reilly has performed in various forms in numerous spaces. In this piece,  
O’Reilly invites audience members into a room with her and offers them the 
opportunity to make a small cut on her body with a razor. Zerihan chose not to 
make the cut – other audience members choose otherwise. O’Reilly then asks 
the audience member to hold her naked body in a pietà-style pose. The entire 
action is carried out under video cameras. This work emphasises interaction and 
the not always comfortable dimensions of intimacy.   
 The Live Art Development Agency holds documentation of this action  
being performed in several locations. It is the moment of holding that is captured.  
Watching the different reactions of the different audience members – some 
solemn and still, some grinning, many on the verge of embarrassment – I am 
aware of O’Reilly’s attention to the person holding her. I am aware of the 
deliberate construction of a situation in which power can be exposed, toyed with, 
refigured and documented under O’Reilly’s watchful eyes, the product of her 
sensitive reactions to each individual.  It is interesting, however, to consider the 
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way that the production or investigation of intimacy in a piece like Untitled Action 
for Bomb Shelter is structured like a game, with rules and instructions and an 
element of the dare. O’Reilly plays with the participants in her action, and like any 
game, some players have more fun than others.  
 Through much of her career, O’Reilly has been working on the feelings and 
intimacies that operate as an exchange between bodies. Much of the writing on 
O’Reilly’s work has usefully focused on its relation to intimacy, and the 
complicated and sometimes messy dimensions that this relation contains. 
Zerihan, for instance, connects O’Reilly’s one-to-one work with ideas of 
‘catharsis’ understood not as an Aristotelian eruption that returns the action to an 
earlier stable state, but rather as a more profound disruption of patriarchal ways 
of seeing.144  Branislava Kuborovic looks at O’Reilly’s piece Stair Falling as 
fundamentally an encounter between artist and ‘audience/wit(h)nesses’145 but 
uses ‘trauma’ as a theoretical tool to trace a variety of temporal dynamics and 
idiosyncratic logics that are dislodged by O’Reilly’s performance strategies. Both 
demonstrate how O’Reilly’s approach to intimacy is always complex and never 
simply convivial. This is what I also hope to be showing in my investigation of 
‘play’ in O’Reilly’s work.  
 Importantly, neither Zerihan nor Kuborovic suggest that O’Reilly builds a 
lasting intimacy with the people who participate in her actions, or that the 
experience is automatically a positive encounter or therapeutically cathartic 
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exchange.  Dominic Johnson usefully suggests that this complex and not always 
positive experience may in fact be a better way of thinking about intimacy itself. 
Johnson suggests that where intimacy is often viewed as an outcome of an 
encounter, in fact all the uncomfortable closeness that attends an encounter 
needs to be considered as structuring intimacy as well. Discussing a one to one 
piece of his own, he writes:  
The tendency, I think, would be to read this encounter in terms of intimacy. 
The encounter is partly boring, partly threatening, possibly embarrassing or 
uncomfortable, and then the difficulties resolve themselves into an 
experience of beauty or wonder, however slight. This sounds, to me, like a 
neat description of intimacy itself, as a situation that aims (to varying 
extents) at pleasure, but necessarily involves less pleasurable 
eventualities.146 
 
Intimacy is not a single emotional state, but encompasses all of the affective 
dynamics that attend proximity, many of which will be less pleasurable, and may 
result in less psychological or material support and comfort, than we might often 
imagine.   
 Similarly, ‘play’ does not have to be understood as some romantic or 
nostalgic evocation of childhood, nor as part of the bland vocabulary of neoliberal 
corporate management. In O’Reilly’s work there are no illusions of innocence, 
and no shrinking away from the complexities of desire. As Franko B suggests, 
the one to one form, with which O’Reilly is often associated, has at least partial 
origins in a semi-public play of desire, stemming from ‘a culture of encounter in 
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fetish clubs’.147  The pleasure of the encounters O’Reilly stages has to do with 
public display and more private exchange, as well as the forging of improbable 
connections. The coordination of these pleasures must also, as Johnson 
suggests, inevitably include less pleasurable outcomes. In the context of 
O’Reilly’s work, by expanding the definition of intimacy to include these 
complexities, I also want to suggest that her relationship to play and the hobby 
might be just as complex.  
 
PLAY	  AND	  TRANSFORMATION	  
 
 Above, I have looked at the ways O’Reilly’s work plays with labour and with 
intimacy. Both of these modes deal fundamentally with boundaries, a concept 
that I want to expand on here. In this final section, I will now consider one of her 
driving metaphors and materials, the skin, and look at the ways this 
preoccupation of O’Reilly’s constitutes an in depth investigation of the 
possibilities, and technologies, of transformation. This investigation has as much 
to do with play as the above examples, and results in just as complex and 
ambivalent knowledges. Once again, the idea of boundaries underlies this work – 
here the boundary between self and other can also be figured as the boundary 
that must be crossed in order to become another. This is a classic mode of play, 
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but the make believe of a child, or an actor, in O’Reilly’s work takes on a very 
material dimension. Here, her non-expert work in the laboratory allows her to 
attempt stubbornly literal acts of transformation, even as mistakes, gaps in 
knowledge and associative leaps in logic lead to less than straightforward results.  
 It is appropriate that O’Reilly’s forays into the biosciences should be 
focused on the micro-materialities of skin. Much of O’Reilly’s practice has 
focused in detail on the skin. Many of her most well-known performance works 
involve the small, methodical incisions of the skin I described in the discussion of 
her Untitled Action above. These actions are wrought with metaphors of barriers, 
permeable or not, as her audiences are asked to cross lines of normative 
behaviour and intimacy while also being given the opportunity to remain on their 
own side of the border.  The material function of the skin as a barrier lends focus 
to these less tangible, if no less effective, boundaries. I am interested in how 
O’Reilly plays with both metaphor and materiality, and the different types of 
boundary crossings this play allows her. These crossings, I argue, often result in 
strange combinations – combinations of skills and conventions, images and 
materials. I argue, as well, that this practice of combining is a form of play, 
though the play might have serious results.  
  Petra Kuppers writes about the associative properties of skin, comparing 
them with those of the scar. Both ‘mediate[] between the outside and inside’, she 
writes. For Kuppers, however, the scar has a more dynamic theoretical potential.  
It is the site of difference and change – ‘the copy isn’t quite right, crooked lines 
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sneak over smooth surfaces’. In contrast, ‘skin renews itself constantly, 
producing the same in repetition’.148 Repetition is fundamental to both the scar 
and skin, but for Kuppers, the scar disrupts repetition, prevents us from playing 
the same old game. 
 Certainly O’Reilly’s work draws on the complex and sometimes fraught 
associative network of the scar – the interaction of trauma with healing, and the 
political strength of locating art practice in spaces of difference. However, I argue 
that O’Reilly also plays with the repetitive dimension of the skin – its self-
reproduction – in her own disruptive ways. To intervene in that repetition and to 
create a new skin, as O’Reilly has literally attempted, is to tap into the 
mechanisms of transformation. Like a complicated form of dress-up game, 
transformation threads through O’Reilly’s work, in ways that are more 
complicated than, for instance, the self-help rhetoric of transformation with its 
unrelenting message of positivity. In O’Reilly’s work, transformation can be 
uncomfortable and disorientating, but it can also do the work of rejecting 
conservative assignations of identity and humanity.   
 One of the outcomes of the residency at SymbioticA is ‘Marsyas – Beside  
Myself’, a ‘performative text’, 149  which was included in the publication sk- 
interfaces: Exploding Borders – Creating Membranes in Art, Technology and  
Society. (This publication accompanied the sk-interface exhibition at FACT  
Gallery referred to in my above discussion of the Critical Art Ensemble). In the  
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text, O’Reilly outlines nine actions. These are descriptions of performance works  
created by O’Reilly, most of which include a generic description of the space in  
which they were performed (‘Art gallery’, ‘A very large room during a very hot  
night’, ‘A disused bomb shelter’).150  
 At first glance, the final action does not include a description of the 
performance space, but begins with the line, ‘The pig is called Kill no. 000053’. In 
fact, the pig’s carcass is the performance space in this particular example. The 
performance is titled inthewrongplaceness and in it, Kira slow-dances with a pig 
carcass, inviting audience members to enter the room for ten minutes at a time, 
and, if they like, to touch either human or non- human animal. In the sk-interface 
publication, O’Reilly describes how the space inside the animal’s dead body 
became a performance space:  
  Her skin draping around me.  
  Her unrelenting flesh and weight.  
  Wearable space.  
  Corporal pocket.151 
 
inthewrongplaceness contrasts, perhaps on purpose, with ‘inbetweenness’, a 
term invoked by Jens Hauser, curator of the sk-interface exhibition and editor of 
the publication. For Hauser an interest in skin is fundamentally an identification 
with liminality. Skin may separate, but to engage the skin is to assert the 
possibility of dynamic and ongoing transformation. Hauser celebrates the virtues 
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of ‘ambiguity, openness and disorientating indeterminacy’, 152 virtues of play, I 
would argue, that I have indicated O’Reilly is also interested in. For Hauser, 
‘inbetweenness’ is the word that sums up these virtues, that creates the 
vocabulary for a politics of permeable membranes, indeed, for a politics of 
playfulness.      
  
 O’Reilly’s use of ‘inthewrongplaceness’ suggests an affinity with the 
‘ambiguity, openness and disorienting indeterminacy’ of ‘inbetweenness’. And yet 
it also connotes a somewhat more measured, even less optimistic, approach to 
this playfulness. There is such a thing as a ‘wrong’ place, or there is at least such 
a thing as feeling like you’re in the wrong place. And what if the wrong place is 
inside one’s own skin? O’Reilly may be invoking a desire to return from the 
liminal itself, a need to get out of the in-between and go back into the either/or. 
This is not to say that O’Reilly’s work inadvertently advocates for categorical 
stability. Rather, O’Reilly’s work is about movement, about going between more 
than it is about resting in a potentially static inbetweenness. Drawing on 
Zerihan’s re-working of catharsis, I argue that here, metamorphosis is not 
structured here as stability interrupted by chaos and returned to stability. Rather, 
it is the result of a meeting with difference.  It is the difference between Kira’s skin 
and the pig’s, the wrongness, that makes something new.   
 Interestingly, the difference between these bodies is heightened by how 
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incremental it is. The Live Art Development Agency holds documentation of the 
performance of inthewrongplaceness at the HOME Gallery in London. This 
documentation consists of still photographs taken during the performance 
alternating with microscopic videos from the tissue cultures O’Reilly produced at  
SymbioticA. In one particular photograph, O’Reilly’s curved spine takes up most 
of the space in the right-hand side of the image. In the left hand space, the spine 
of the pig curves in a perfect reproduction of O’Reilly’s shape. The colour of both 
sets of skin is nearly identical – pale with only the slightest suggestion of pink.  
This almost-sameness is jarring as the identification slips apart, and O’Reilly’s 
alive, human body becomes impossibly separate from the inert flesh of the pig 
carcass. It is this flicker between difference and sameness, never resting in 
between, but constantly moving from one to the other, that makes this serious 
play.  
 Returning to the text of ‘Marsyas – Beside Myself’, O’Reilly describes 
another wrong place. There are five short sections of text devoted to the part of 
the SymbioticA residency, after O’Reilly has practiced culturing cells from pig 
carcasses, when she is ready to get a biopsy to begin the process of making lace 
from her own skin. There is a section that reproduces her consent form, where 
she agrees that the procedure has been explained and that she understands 
what risks might be involved. There is a section of only a few lines where she 
describes preparing for the 11.20am appointment. ‘Everything is ready’, she 
writes. There is an eleven-point list describing the ‘protocol for obtaining 
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epidermal keratinocytes from skin biopsy’. 153  Then there are a few lines 
describing the trip to the clinic:  
  
  Leave lab at 11.05 to drive short distance to clinic for 11.20am  
  appointment.  
  
  We turn left.  
  And left, and the wrong left and the wrong right.  
  We get lost.  
  
  I phone.  
                                              
  Too late.  
  Can’t reschedule.154  
  
Describing what must have been a crushing disappointment – her literal 
wrongplaceness or failure to be in the right place – in the same tone as the 
description of preparations and procedures, O’Reilly uses the analytic voice to 
incorporate the reality of mistakes into her practice. Movement can mean making 
the wrong turn and transformation can fall apart. Particularly when one is a non-
expert, mistakes will certainly be made. These hazards of play need to be noticed 
and cared for as much as the fortuitous discoveries and the successful 
executions of plans. One result of this care is that what-might-have- been has a 
presence alongside what happened. In the next section of the  
Marsyas text, an email to a friend about her ‘non biopsy of myself’, O’Reilly 
writes:   
This stuff moves all the time, between actual, imagined, lived, living, 
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daydreams and other dreams, all other living things that I have planted in 
tissue culturing flasks in dark warm spaces.155  
  
O’Reilly uses processes from the biology lab, but imagined realities are ‘planted 
in tissue culturing flasks’ alongside other types of reality. The metaphors of the 
skin are not separate from its materialities. This does not mean collapsing 
difference into sameness – it is the care and attention to mistakes and  
wrongnesses, and ultimately difference, that can connect the imaginary to the 




 In this chapter, I have looked at Kira O’Reilly as a serious non-expert, 
whose work uses modes of play that stage questions about labour, intimacy and 
transformation. O’Reilly brings methods of openness and indeterminacy from her 
studio to the lab, offering a type of hybrid practice that is not limited by discipline, 
even as she respects the rigours and potentialities of disciplinary commitments. 
In connecting the various strands of her practice, O’Reilly makes an implicit 
argument for the connection of materiality and imagination in her practice as a 
whole. Finally, all of this makes the case for ‘play’ as a complex form of 
engagement with materiality and imagination, that need not be co-opted by 
dominant logics of labour. Taken together, then, I argue that O’Reilly’s non-
expertise contributes to my understanding of performance and the politics of 
                                                








Chapter	  Three:	  Institutes	  of	  Non-­‐Knowledge	  
 
INTRODUCTION	  
 I have thus far focused on projects that are about oppositional politics 
challenging experts in order to contest limitations of access to ostensibly public 
knowledges, or about (sometimes (dangerously) playful) communication between 
areas of expertise and non-experts. In the next two chapters, I will shift the focus 
away from the expert/non-expert interplay that has structured the past two 
chapters. In these next chapters, I will be thinking about institutions and practices 
of expertise that may not produce knowledge at all. I have already suggested that 
experiences of knowledge are constituted by all sorts of emotional dynamics and 
felt experiences that expand how we might think about what knowledge is. But 
what about dynamics and experiences that are related to confusion, or curiousity, 
or other ways of explicitly not knowing? I argue that expertise is absolutely 
wrapped up with these modes, as well, and that a politics of expertise needs to 
account for them. Further, I assert that artists have already started to account for 
dynamics of non-knowledge in expertise, and that performance has been a 
particularly fertile mode for these practices.  
 In chapter four, I will consider how the form of the lecture performance has 
been used to tease out specific categories of non-knowledge. In this chapter, I 
will look at two projects that have developed institutions of expertise that are 
seriously concerned with non-knowledge: the Museum of Jurassic Technology in 
Los Angeles, and the Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Nonknowledge, a 
 148 
traveling project produced by the Berlin-based Mobile Academy. Where in 
previous chapters the performance strategies I have analysed have operated in a 
variety of interdisciplinary forms, I argue that the strategies of these two 
institutions (or ‘institutions’, perhaps) use explicitly theatrical strategies, even if 
the spaces they occupy are not traditional theatres. Indeed, theatricality is, I 
argue, a significant mode of disrupting or teasing the edges of modes of 
knowledge production.  
THE	  INSTITUTION	  
 Before turning to my examples, and their theatrical mechanisms, I first want 
to take a moment to think about institutions. In recent years a number of cultural 
projects have been created that combine performance and performative modes 
with institutional structures and processes. While certainly indebted to earlier 
generations of artists associated with waves of institutional critique in the 1960s 
and 70s (e.g. Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren or Michael Asher) and in the 1990s 
(e.g. Andrea Fraser), more recent instances of art-as-institution differ in the 
emphasis on the creation of new models, rather than critiquing existing 
institutions (though I argue that the most successful of these projects maintain a 
critical edge). Jonas Ekberg argues that this is at least in part down to traditional 
institutions taking a more open approach to the forms and functions that non-
traditional, artist-created institutions might take. He refers to a set of cultural 
institutions, ‘all of whom seem to be adopting, or at least experimenting with, the 
working methods of contemporary artists and their micro or temporary 
institutions, especially their flexible, temporal and processual ways of working’, 
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citing the Rooseum in Malmö, Palais de Tokyo in Paris, the Platform Garanti 
Contemporary Art Center in Istanbul, and the Bergen Kunsthalle.156 It is, I argue, 
important to maintain some degree of critical reflection about whose needs are 
served by this openness. To what degree does institutional encouragement of the 
‘flexible, temporal and processual’ map on to the ongoing precaritisation of 
cultural work? On the other hand, it is crucial, I believe, to look for ways that 
institutions can and do lend structure and support to practices that offer 
untraditional ways of organising both knowledge and expertise.  
 For Julia Bryan-Wilson, the institution remains an important place for 
critique and action because of its relationship to a broader dynamic in society. 
She writes that institutional critique remains relevant and potent:  
…because it continues to offer up suggestions for way to rethink 
connections between corporate state power and individual subject-
formation, and the ways these are mediated by institutions’.157  
 
Institutions in this formulation are the spaces where the subjects of power are 
disciplined but where they might also work against these disciplinary 
mechanisms. Bryan-Wilson is working to create a ‘curriculum’ for institutional 
critique that promotes an active, indeed activist, understanding of what might be 
possible for institutions. She writes: 
Any curriculum for institutional critique will need to keep alive this activist, 
even utopian, component.  It will need to understand that the “institution” in 
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question is still just as broadly defined as its earliest practitioners 
imagined: not merely a physical set of walls and rooms, but the 
labyrinthine procedures of capitalism itself.  As such, these institutions are 
contradictory – bound with corporate interests, fraught with ideological 
agendas, but also vibrant with real moments of pleasure, knowledge, and 
resistance.158  
 
This is a balance that I, too, hope to strike – a critical awareness of the interests 
and ideologies that align institutions with corporate capitalism and repressive 
state powers, but also an energetic embrace of the potential for making 
something new that the structure of institutions, under the broadest and most 
generous definitions, can offer.  
 The ‘educational turn’ is certainly associated with many new works that use 
institutional structures and processes as materials. Since the mid-2000s there 
has been a proliferation of schools and other educational institutions that are 
located in an art context – both physically (as in housed at a museum or gallery, 
as in the New Museum’s Night School in New York or the Wide Open School 
show at the Hayward Gallery in London) and conceptually (as in a self-conscious 
positioning of education not about art but as art). I have already discussed in my 
introduction how this ‘turning’ toward education as an artistic and curatorial 
strategy has both useful and problematic political dimensions. 
 These projects might also be seen as the practical component of a broader 
debate around criticism, creativity and institutions in the production of knowledge. 
A number of recent works, such as Gavin Butt’s edited collection After Criticism, 
build on the worry that there is something wrong with the state of the critic as ‘a 
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discriminating authority on matters of art and culture’ – something wrong, indeed, 
with the state of the critic as an expert. Many of these suggest the alternative of 
‘repositioning academic inquiry as a kind of cultural participation in its own 
right’.159 One dimension of the concern prompting this debate is the fear that 
theory as a process of demystification, as touched on above, might have ossified 
into a paralysing cycle which makes progress impossible.  If the critic is forever 
engaged in the banishment of non-knowledge, how can anything creative ever be 
done? If, in the process of analysing cultural constructs, these constructs begin to 
appear immutable, how can anything change?  
 Irit Rogoff, whose work I also discussed in my introduction, suggests a 
solution that incorporates a particular type of non-knowledge. She states that 
there is an ‘ever-growing perception of knowledge as an extended wander 
through fields of intertextual subjectivities’.160  She argues from the perspective of 
an art historian and visual culture theorist that the critique of institutions by artists 
in the past was a necessary step that, now taken, has opened the field for a new 
set of both liberatory and collective actions and reflections. She proposes non- 
knowledge as a tool for activating this new field, a process she terms ‘looking 
away’. She writes:   
It is precisely because... we have been through such a long and protracted 
phase of institutional critique of spaces and strategies of display, that we 
can affect such a bold step of “looking away” from inside those discourses 
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and those spaces.    
 
 In other words, Rogoff exhorts us to expand the field of our consideration, 
even our critical consideration, beyond what we have already considered as part 
of legitimate knowledge. Rogoff suggests that we are now standing in a field of 
debris created by decades of deconstruction, and rather than continuing to rip 
down the same old institutions, we can ‘look away’ and consider the new shapes 
formed by fragments.  In doing this, she writes:    
We produce for ourselves an alternative mode of taking part in culture in 
which we affect a creative bricolage of art works and spaces, and modalities 
of attention and subjectivities, that break down the dichotomies of objects 
and viewers and allow for a dynamic manifestation of the lived cultural 
moment.161    
  
Rogoff suggests, then, that reading and viewing are creative acts, that when we 
go to a museum or read a text, we are making something. What we are making is 
not an object, however, but an experience or a dynamic. In the ideal 
circumstance, the non-knowledge produced by looking away would refer to a not- 
before-experienced way of being together in which oppressive barriers have 
shifted or dissolved. Rogoff seems to suggest that one way of beginning to bring 
about this type of non-knowledge is in the very act of looking away, of seeing that 
there is an abundance of possibility that exceeds the narrow strictures afforded 
by the grid-like divisions which separate spaces and produce hierarchical power 
relations.  
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 It is no coincidence that Rogoff is involved in many of the new pedagogy- 
as-art projects from recent years (e.g. A.c.a.d.e.m.y. – Learning and Teaching   
(Vanabbemuseum NL 2006) and Summit – Non Aligned Initiatives in Education  
Culture (Berlin 2007)).  She admirably puts into practice her theoretical position 
on the creative possibilities of viewership, and the need to dissolve the 
separation between objects and viewers. The idea of the cultural critic as active 
participant in the cultural field is appealing, and even more, the idea of creative 
interventions into restrictions and cultural hierarchies which aim not only to reveal 
but also to change.  Nevertheless, as with my hesitation about abandoning 
identity politics for a politics that prioritises movement and change, I think it is still 
important to maintain a keen sensitivity to the restrictions and hierarchies which 
do limit access and which do unevenly distribute power. This sensitivity is not 
mutually exclusive with a commitment to creative change, but the balance is 
crucial to articulate.   
 Both of the examples in this chapter create institutions in order to 
encourage a sort of ‘looking away’ from official forms of knowledge. Both also 
reward critical attention, even if the politics they generate may be less direct or 
activist orientated than previous examples. Theatricality weaves through both the 
Museum of Jurassic Technology and the Blackmarket, heightening or displacing 
other institutional modes, sometimes creating distance, sometimes disorientation 
and often playing on the affects of attraction and control.  
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MUSEUM	  OF	  JURASSIC	  TECHNOLOGY	  
 
 I found a parking place only a few blocks away from 9341 Venice Boulevard 
in Culver City, Los Angeles. The air conditioning turned off along with the car, 
and I opened the door to a blast of heat familiar from my years of living in 
Southern California. The rows of one-story buildings lining the wide sidewalk, and 
the too-bright light were equally familiar. It was all the more disorientating, then, 
to enter the Museum of Jurassic Technology’s tiny, dark foyer and to begin 
wandering through the exhibits. Modeled after the exhibit techniques of any 
natural history museum in any city, with information panels and audio guides, 
nevertheless the content of each individual exhibit, and overall atmosphere of this 
rather cramped space, are crucially different.  
 The Museum of Jurassic Technology (MJT) occupies a storefront space  
on Venice Boulevard.  According to Susan A. Crane, in ‘Curious Cabinets and 
Imaginary Museums’, the MJT was founded in 1989 by David Wilson, ‘a special 
effects expert in the film industry and a life-long habitué of natural history 
museums’. 162   Originally housed in a single room on the first floor of this 
nondescript building, the museum has slowly expanded to include several rooms 
on the ground floor, an upstairs screening space and tea room, and a gift shop 
and reception area. The roof has been converted into a terrace garden, with 
Roman and Greek statue reproductions, and at least a dozen white doves 
perching, kept in the space by an overhead net. Two doors down the road is the 
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Center for Land Use Interpretation, whose presence creates a mini-district of de-
stabilising exhibition projects on this small block.   
 According to the MJT statement (‘The Museum of Jurassic Technology – 
and You!’), the Museum ‘is an educational institution dedicated to the 
advancement of knowledge and public appreciation of the Lower Jurassic’.163 In 
his book Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet of Wonders, Lawrence Weschler amusingly 
narrates his research process as he attempts to track down a definition of the 
Lower Jurassic.  He details many of the exhibits, which feature a range of 
oddities including a human horn, the development cycle of the Cameroonian stink 
ant, the deprong mori (a bat that can fly through solid walls), and the story of the 
amnesiac opera singer Madelena Deloni.  Weschler guides the reader as he 
tracks the veracity of these exhibits (the deprong mori and the Madelena Deloni 
story are fictional constructions, the horn and the stink ant are at least based in 
fact).  He emphasizes Wilson’s un-winking delivery of incredible stories, and 
highlights the pleasure he experiences in the game Wilson sets up.164  
 For me, the need to debunk some of the seemingly fantastical facts and 
displays feels less urgent. It is true that some of the displays do seem to 
purposefully strain credibility. The story of Madelena Deloni, opera singer whose 
purity of tone and depth of emotion is attributed to her profound short-term 
memory loss, can seem both too elaborate to be true, but also too detailed not to 
be. The display also describes the experiences a neurophysiologist named 
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Geoffrey Sonnabend who hears Deloni sing near Igassu Falls, Argentina, where 
he is convalescing after a nervous breakdown brought on by, among other things 
‘an exhaustive and largely inconclusive research project into the memory 
pathways of carp’.165 After the concert, he has a sleepless night, and as he 
wanders near the falls, he is struck by the outline of a theory that becomes his 
life’s work. Based on the image of a ‘cone of obliscence’, Sonnabend’s models 
the decay of experience which underlies the human construction of memory. The 
story posits non-knowledge, figured as ‘forgetting’, as the norm of human 
experience, with knowledge, or memory, as temporary blips on the radar. 
 While the heightened language and elaborate characterisation that are 
used in the Deloni/Sonnabend Halls of the MJT evoke a kind of novelistic fiction 
which prompts curiousity about its basis in fact, other exhibits rely less on the 
playfulness of the hoax to consider non-knowledge. ‘We May Never Have This 
Same Knowledge Again’ is a collection of letters sent to the Mount Wilson 
Observatory in Pasadena between 1915-1935; ‘Tell the Bees: Belief, Knowledge 
and Hypersymbolic Cognition’ is a collection of ‘vulgar remedies’ or folk cures 
displayed alongside reflections on the connection between these instances of 
collective wisdom and the scientific procedures of establishing fact; and ‘Lives of 
Perfect Creatures: Dogs of the Soviet Space Program’ is a series of portrait 
paintings showing each dog that was launched in Soviet rockets in the early 
years of space exploration. The relative ‘truth’ of these exhibits is less important 
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than the way each evokes a specific proposition for a nuanced intertwining of 
knowledge and non-knowledge. 
 But perhaps my blasé attitude to MJT’s slippery fictions are because my 
investments in the museum as a space for the production of reliable historical 
knowledge are not as strong as some others. Crane, for instance, describes a 
feeling of intense disappointment when she goes to the UCLA library to track 
down Sonnabend’s three-volume work on obliscence, using a pamphlet which 
MJT founder David Wilson has personally given her which cites this publication 
and claims that it came out in 1946 from Northwestern University Press. On 
determining that no such volume had ever been published, by Northwestern or 
anyone else, Crane has an intense emotional reaction. She writes: 
I wanted Sonnabend to be real. I was intensely disappointed to find that 
Sonnabend did not exist: I would have preferred to feel that Wilson had let 
me in on a discovery, that I had become privy to knowledge about an 
obscure theorist. Instead, I was embarrassed. I had been duped.166 
 
This reaction is wrapped up with the complicated effect MJT has had on her 
understanding of her professional expertise about the museum as such (Crane is 
a professor at the University of Arizona, focusing on the history of the museum). 
She describes her interaction with Wilson, his unrelentingly straight-faced 
performance and the ‘earnest sincerity’ with which he presents Sonnabend’s 
work as if it is historical fact. In response, Crane writes:  
I am wary: desirous of being savvy, wanting to have my hard-won expertise 
intact, and yet professionally sceptical of that expertise and willing to be 
                                                




All of the anxieties of the professional expert are in play: the desire to have one’s 
intellectual labour be respected and to have that labour pay off when it counts are 
in tension with the desire for surprise and wonder which are generally understood 
to motivate intellectual labour in the first place. Wilson’s refusal to play fair puts 
this tension out of balance, and, moreover, results in ‘an uncomfortable bending 
or blending of categories’.168 History, even if it is understood as produced or 
constructed, cannot be a wholesale fiction, Crane argues. I do have some 
sympathy with this concern. It is perhaps because the writing of history can never 
be neutral that the stakes are high when it comes to historical truth. 
 For Crane, in order to stabilize the categories that Wilson unbalances, ‘the 
Museum of Jurassic Technology has to be relegated to the realm of art, 
specifically “performance art”’.169 She notes that though Wilson’s background 
comes from outside the genealogies of conceptual art, nevertheless, 'the current 
fascination in the art world with deconstructing the museal space and its 
exhibition techniques opened the mode of artistic production of museums to 
aficionados of the curious such as David Wilson'.170 Though working in response 
to his own obsessions and preoccupations, these map onto a larger zeitgeist 
concerning the institution that I have traced above.   
 Yet Crane seems unsatisfied with the relegation of MJT to the unstable 
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realm of ‘performance art’, at least without a fight. She works, instead, to place 
MJT in conversations with the history of ‘curiosity’, both as an intellectual mode 
and as a strategy for display. She shows how the collection and exhibition of 
objects in the Renaissance and Early Modern period contributed to a sense of 
the term ‘curiosity’ as foundational in the production of knowledge. The ‘cabinet 
of curiousities’ developed along with a particular idea of the relationship between 
objects and intellectual activity. For the Early Moderns, objects that inspired 
curiousity prompted a mode of consciousness 'that awakens reflection, reflection 
in turn produces discerned truths, and these show a previously unknown and 
diverse usefulness of the things'. 171  Encounters with objects can trigger a 
process of learning, even as these encounters might also constitute an 
experience of the unknown.  
 However, drawing on Foucault, Crane shows how the 18th century saw a 
fundamental shift in the structures of knowledge production, visible in the shift 
towards exhibition ordered by classification based on principles like ‘authenticity’, 
and ‘History’ figured as a unified whole.  Items that were once ‘curiosities’ 
became, in the 18th century, ‘historical objects’. Along with this came a 
differentiation between those who are ‘merely curious’, and prone to 
acquisitiveness and vanity, and the true connoisseur, who is skillful and studies 
deeply and systematically. Non-knowledge begins to emerge as that which is not 
properly classified, or those processes which do not proceed according to a 
particular form of systematic rationality. 
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 According to Crane, the MJT participates in a further re-working of the 
historical object, using ‘curiosity’ as a method.  She suggests that the MJT, by 
demonstrating the porosity of systems of classification, shows that the historical 
object ‘does not necessarily face a secure future’ itself.172 I suggest, however, 
that it is precisely by employing performance strategies that MJT casts doubt on 
the security of historical objects. With elaborate set design and deadpan delivery, 
MJT might be frustrating in its refusal to break character, but it stimulates a type 
of wonder that has everything to do with ‘wonder’ as itself a historical category.   
 Here, Stephen Greenblatt’s discussion of ‘resonance’ and ‘wonder’, while 
problematic becomes useful. Greenblatt develops ‘resonance’ and ‘wonder’ as 
two modes of experience particularly affected by institutional decisions by 
museums. His New Historicist approach conditions him to privilege resonance, 
which would, he writes: 
…attempt to reduce the isolation of individual “masterpieces”, to illuminate 
the condition of their making, to disclose the history of their appropriation 
and the circumstances in which they come to be displayed, to restore the 
tangibility, the openness, the permeability of boundaries that that enabled 
the objects to come into being in the first place.173 
The art museum is a particularly challenging and rich place for this approach, as 
much is invested, both practically and conceptually, in maintaining this ‘isolation 
of individual “masterpieces”’. 174  Greenblatt works to show how this very 
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investment has a historical basis and a process of development. This work he 
describes as the evocation of ‘resonance’. He writes:  
…by resonance I mean the power of the displayed object to reach out 
beyond its formal boundaries to a larger world, to evoke in the viewer the 
complex, dynamic cultural forces from which it emerged and for which it 
may be taken by a viewer to stand’.175  
In other words, an object resonates insofar as it is seen to be part of a network of 
other objects, influences and activities in which each node partly determines and 
is partly determined by all the other nodes connected to it. The New Historicist 
approach exists precisely to illuminate these connections, to make objects 
resonate. 
In contrast, Greenblatt states, ‘by wonder I mean the power of the 
displayed object to stop the viewer in his or her tracks, to convey an arresting 
sense of uniqueness, to evoke exalted attention’. 176  Wonder precludes 
resonance, by shining a light on an object so brightly that other connecting 
objects and forces are obscured. Greenblatt shows how the modern museum 
literally produces this effect, describing how the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York, for instance, relies on ‘boutique lighting’ to isolate its works in the attention 
of the viewer. 
Greenblatt goes on to conduct a New Historicist analysis of the production 
of wonder, to show how it is, in itself, an experience with a historical basis and 
process of development which exists in a network of other concerns, investments 
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and forces. For instance, the collections of curiosities (the German 
wunderkammer literally translates as wonder-cabinet) that began to develop 
among the upper classes from the Early Modern period initially connected the 
experience of wonder with an impulse for possession. This impulse remains in 
the curiosity display’s contemporary cousin – the museum – today: that ‘boutique 
lighting’ obviously refers to commerce and commodity. Now, however, when 
possession of the objects on display in museums is strictly out of reach for the 
vast majority of visitors, these institutions ‘at once evoke the dream of 
possession and evacuate it’.177 Only the almost unimaginably wealthy consider 
museum objects as realistically consumer objects. For the rest, the museum 
functions something like the perfect consumerist machine, always producing 
desire, but simultaneously holding the objects of desire out of reach. 
Greenblatt indicates that the history of the development of wonder 
includes a drastic re-framing of the position and power of the object of wonder. 
For Greenblatt, in spite of the undeniable commercial value of art works, and the 
status accrued by the collector of these pieces, nowadays the point of collection 
is to display the object, not simply to own it. During the Renaissance, any one 
item in a respected collection generated marvel in part because of the vast 
number of hidden, un-displayed objects that it signified. The modern museum, 
Greenblatt asserts, exist for objects to be marveled at in their singularity. This 
change in status of the ‘treasured object’ entails a new positioning of the source 
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of wonder, and a new figure associated with its origin: 
The treasured object exists not principally to be owned but to be viewed. 
Even the fantasy of possession is no longer central to the museum’s gaze, 
or rather has been inverted, so that the object in its essence seems not to 
be a possession but rather to be itself the possessor of what is most 
valuable and enduring. What the work possesses is the power to arouse 
wonder, and that power, in the dominant aesthetic ideology of the West, 
has been infused into it by the creative genius of the artist.178 
The experience of wonder promoted by a museum such as the MoMA thus relies 
on the relatively new development of the concept of the creative genius. This 
creator, who has the capacity to imbue an object with ‘the power to arouse 
wonder’ is similarly imbued, by association. For Greenblatt, this is not necessarily 
a bad thing. The ability to appreciate the creative genius of another, Greenblatt 
argues, is a component of Western aesthetic ideology he wishes to preserve. He 
asserts that the type of gaze he has associated with wonder ‘does not have a 
necessary or inherent politics, either radical or imperialist’, but goes on to state 
that ‘it derives at least in part from respect and admiration of the ingenia of 
others. This respect is a response worth cherishing and enhancing’.179 
In a sense, then, Greenblatt wants it two ways. His theoretical 
commitments require him to associate the development of ‘wonder’ with the 
concept of ‘creative genius’ and to describe how both are historically contingent 
configurations, related to the rise of consumer capitalism. However, he wishes to 
maintain these configurations. He insists that for all the individualism associated 
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with the concept of the genius, the dimension of the appreciation of the genius of 
others is a charitable, even generous act. I am not so sure that I accept this 
interpretation of the generosity of genius. I am afraid that the cult of individuality 
broadly – and the specifically gender, race and class histories that attend the 
‘genius’ – are more problematic than Greenblatt allows. In the next chapter, I will 
look to some work that proposes a different, more critical, approach to wonder. 
Here, however, I want to look at the way MJT complicates the relationship of 
resonance and wonder, and the specifically theatrical techniques it uses to do so. 
 The MJT relies on the practice of ‘resonance’ to produce ‘wonder’, I argue. 
In other words, it uses the strategies some modern museums use to open an 
object up to a broader historical context – informative text panels, audio guides, 
collections of large groups of related items grouped so their connections are 
foregrounded rather than their inherent, singular value.  However, the MJT finds 
this practice itself to be a source of wonder, particularly as it relates to the 
broader history of the display of curiosities. The MJT wonders at the development 
of the museum itself, and it performs this wonder in such a way that it 
disorientates the visitor with its almost – but crucially not quite – familiar 
techniques of display. The MJT uses wonder to question the ways that we look at 
museum objects, and to wonder how these ways came to be.  
 Not only does MJT perform the de-stabilisation of museum display, I argue 
that the project also creates an explicitly theatrical space. An exhibit from 2004 
helps underline how deeply MJT draws on strategies of theatricality. At the back 
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of the ground floor of MJT, in the hallway leading to the staircase, there is an 
exhibit titled Miracles and Disasters in Renaissance and Baroque Theatre 
Mechanisms. Guest curated by Los Angeles-based artist Rachel Mayeri, this 
exhibit shows how special effects developed in European theatres to create, as 
Mayeri calls it, ‘a vocabulary for the marvelous’. 180 There is a display devoted to 
ingegni and intermezzi, dazzling inventions and interruption that acted as 
‘palatable diversions from protracted comedies or interminable feasts’. There are 
wall texts that describe how 16th and 17th century aristocrats funded the 
development of ‘mechanical devices to capture, reflect and radiate their 
magnificenses’. The exhibit describes technical innovations (e.g. periakloi, or 
three-sided scenery which allowed for smooth, almost magical scene changes) 
and luminous personalities (e.g. the Baroque set designer Giacomo Torelli, 
known as ‘the great sorcerer’.) Expertise is everywhere, with a quote from the 
Italian Baroque architect and theatre designer Nicola Sabbattini giving a sort of 
manifesto of expertise as he describes the designer examining a performance 
space:  
He will show confidence in all, give good words to all, yet put complete trust in 
no on, for often one is cheated by the malignity of enemies or the ignorance of 
the incompetent. 181 
 
The heightened experience and its mechanical production get equal stage time in 
this modest, tucked-away display. 
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 When I encountered Miracles and Disasters, it struck me that with its focus 
on the mechanics of illusion and on the period of European history where the 
modern and contemporary borders of official knowledge were not yet set, but 
where they find their origins, this exhibition is an oblique declaration of the 
museum’s reigning interests. I wanted to write a few notes, but found myself 
without a pen or pencil. Instead, I took out my mobile phone and started to type. 
The invigilator of the space came up to me, and pointed out the sign forbidding 
the use of mobile phones in the space. I tried to politely assure him that I would 
not talk on it – I was just using it to take notes. He told me that the rule was not 
about noise, it was about light. The lighting has been designed so specifically that 
use of illuminating gadgets throws off the experience. I put my phone away and 
asked to borrow a pencil, which he kindly provided. 
 I looked around the dim space to contemplate the lighting design, which 
was idiosyncratic, at least. The museum used the directional ‘boutique’ lighting 
that Greenblatt describes above, but if I had not been assured that each lighting 
decision was minutely considered – and if I had not been conditioned to suspect 
that every seeming mistake or accident in the MJT could be planned – I might 
have thought the design was incompetent.  Lights in the MJT tend to obscure as 
much as illuminate. Lights fall on only part of a text or image, or they miss a text 
altogether, so the viewer must come nearly nose to the wall in order to read it. 
This lighting strategy corresponds with other instances of planned failures. There 
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is a glass display case with a sign that promising that the smashed glass slide 
within would be repaired – neither the sign nor the smashed glass have changed 
in the (at least) half-dozen times I have visited MJT over the course of ten years. 
1980s-style telephone receivers are attached to display walls, and most of these 
when lifted from their cradles produce authoritative and affectless (thus highly 
affected) narrative voices explaining the adjacent display, but a noticeable 
percentage of these phones simply produce silence, no matter what one does to 
them.  
 The way MJT evokes the perpetually underfunded, well meaning but 
overstretched community museum can only be described, I think, as ‘stagey’. 
The ‘museum’ is almost as much a character here as the historical and pseudo-
historical personages constructed through the displays, or the narrator voices 
described above. The layers of artifice which structure MJT are subtly signaled 
by these constructed failures, which tease visitors with the sensation that some 
kind of game is being played, but certainly do not give the game away. What 
makes MJT disorientating, and what makes it effective as an institute of non-
knowledge, is not that it commits historical hoaxes, but that it stages the 
possibility of overcoming the artifice, occasionally letting the mask appear to slip, 
but never properly coming clean.  
 
THE	  BLACKMARKET	  OF	  USEFUL	  KNOWLEDGE	  AND	  NON-­‐KNOWLEDGE	  
  
 My next example of a performative institution of non-knowledge explores 
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the relationship between knowledge and non- knowledge in communication and 
relationships. It explores this idea through the charged detachments that thread 
through communication, in which intensity is inflected with scepticism or doubt. 
To do so, it uses subtle conversational techniques and broad theatrical 
conventions to stage highly structured and yet, at many levels, unpredictable 
interactions.  
 I visited the Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Nonknowledge in 2008, 
in its tenth iteration, where it was staged as part of the Weiner Festwochen in 
Vienna, a city-wide festival of performance. The subtitle of the event was ‘Who 
Will Have Been to Blame’, and on offer were individualized lectures on the law, 
banking, dystopia, ‘exchange and guilt’, corruption, shame and forgiveness, but 
also on ‘future scenarios’ and ‘future past’. The Blackmarket was housed at the 
baroque Odeon Theatre, a grand space in a slightly less grand part of town. 
There were two main event spaces. The foyer of the theatre was used to sell the 
above-mentioned lectures. Hostesses with elaborate, vaguely 1940s or 50s-style 
hair styles and plain uniforms in a shade of hospital-blue stood behind a counter 
on a raised platform. Behind them, a black wall was covered with precisely 
spaced notecards indicating the different ‘rounds’ which structure the event, and 
showing which lectures were still available to buy. Long queues formed, snaking 
through the foyer space, and occasionally, impromptu ‘auctions’ would break out, 
as punters competed for more desirable lectures.  
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 Past the foyer, there was a large theatre space, with raked seating 
platforms on the north and south edges of the space, facing each other. On the 
east and west edges there were large projector screens, and taking up the 
majority of the space between these edges, rows of tables were lined up with a 
chair on either side and an exposed filament light bulb hanging directly above. 
This was the lecture space, where the official business of the Blackmarket took 
place. Every half hour, the chairs would fill with clients and experts, a gong would 
sound, and the sounds of dozens of one-to-one conversations filled the space. 
After the half hour was up, the gong would sound again, and all would disperse, 
to start the process over again. Anyone who was not able to successfully 
purchase a lecture – or who was overwhelmed by the process and need some 
time out – could sit in the seats, and watch the faces of expert/client pairs blown 
up and projected onto the screens, or listen in on conversations, selections of 
which were broadcast via shortwave radio to mobile receivers with headphones 
(available in the foyer). As well, underneath the seating platforms, there was 
messy tent set up, where purveyors of ‘secondhand knowledge’ were available to 
strike a deal and pass on rumours and other unverified tidbits. The event as a 
whole teetered between the highly structured and the gleefully shambolic, as a 
party atmosphere became the backdrop for an intense engagement with the 
social dynamics surrounding knowledge exchange, and the pleasures and 
anxieties of not-knowing. 
 The Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Non-knowledge is an event, a 
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formula and a performance. It was created by German dramaturge Hannah  
Hurtzig, under the auspices of the Mobile Academy. The Mobile Academy began 
as a summer school gathering of cultural workers to discuss ‘The Future of Work’ 
in 1999, and has become the umbrella for a range of activities produced by 
Hurtzig on the borders of theatre, exhibition, pedagogy and a range of 
specialisms in contemporary cultural studies. The tag line for the Mobile 
Academy is ‘The Mobile Academy always changes location, time and theme, 
maintaining a consistent intensity and a growing sense of doubt’.182 This pairing 
of intensity with doubt indicates a form of non-knowledge Hurtzig’s projects 
commit to – a mix of highly focused process and ever elusive conclusion 
prompting ongoing activity rarely shaped by decisive end result. 
 The Blackmarket has been presented in Hamburg, Berlin, Warsaw, 
Istanbul, Graz, Vienna, Liverpool, Jaffa, Dresden, Turku, Plovdiv and Bern.  In 
Mannheim, in 2009, the Blackmarket was licensed to the Nationaltheatre 
Mannheim for the 15th International Schillertage (an annual festival dedicated to 
Friedrich Schiller).  There have also been ‘Copyleft’ versions of the model 
produced in Graz and Freiburg.  While these various franchising models do have 
an ironic or critical edge, they also in fact serve the conventional franchise 
formula developed by a central but absent figure, Hurtzig in this case.    
 
 The content of each Blackmarket differs radically with each production.   
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However, the Blackmarket is able to tour widely and franchise itself because its 
structure is essentially unchanging.  Hurtzig and her collaborators bring together 
up to 100 different ‘experts’ to speak on a particular, generally site-specific 
theme. ‘Experts’ is contained in quotation marks not because the recruited 
speakers do not have some kind of knowledge to share, but because the range 
of knowledge is so diverse that a standard definition of expertise would be 
difficult to arrive at. Audience members are able to purchase a 30-minute lecture 
with one of these experts, for the symbolic fee of one euro (or pound, or dollar 
etc., depending on national currency).  The lectures take place together in one 
room, and if an audience member is not directly involved, she can observe the 
action from rows of seats surrounding the arena (or agora as Hurtzig calls it). She 
can also listen in, as five lectures in every round are broadcast on shortwave 
radio.    
 The size of this operation and the complexity of the bureaucracy – 
transparently highlighted within the event – suggest and also produce a familiar 
type of detachment: alienation. While Hurtzig is clearly in charge of the meta-
working of The Blackmarket, nevertheless no one person has a clear sense of 
the totality of its operation. Indeed, when I entered The Blackmarket at its staging 
in Vienna, I looked around, rather bewildered, and caught the eye of a young 
man handing out programmes. ‘I don’t know what’s going on!’ I told him. ‘Nobody 
does!’ he responded, gleefully. 
 Audience members (‘clients’), experts, and managers/administrators 
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willingly contribute to the event without ever fully seeing the product of their 
labour, as the product is the event itself. It might be argued that the Blackmarket 
simply reproduces, albeit on a micro scale, relations of capitalism. Is critique 
possible when nobody knows what is going on?  The same might be said for the 
‘franchise’ model, which could also be critiqued under Rick Knowles’ 
problematizing of the globalization of the performance festival ‘circuit’ which the 
Blackmarket certainly participates in. For Knowles, this cosmopolitan market 
often results in work that ignores the material conditions of the audiences for 
which it is produced, in favour of the simultaneously more flexible yet more 
politically limited conditions of the global cultural market itself.183 (I will consider 
Knowles’ argument around materiality in more depth in my final chapter). 
However, I think the Blackmarket is more interesting to think about in terms of the 
staged intensities it produces, the opportunities it provides to view these 
intensities from a variety of perspectives, and the ways it insists both that the 
distribution of knowledge is wrapped up with the exchange of intensities in social 
interaction, and that knowledge is never the only thing that is being exchanged. 
 The above might be explicated in more depth by looking at the way 
‘knowledge’ does play a part in the Blackmarket, and by thinking about the 
‘usefulness’ that is supposed to attend this knowledge.  Alix Rule, writing on the 
Blackmarket for Frieze magazine, suggests that ‘useful knowledge’ might simply 
be a convenient framework for Hurtzig’s deeper interests – that perhaps Hurtzig 
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only uses ‘education’ as a frame because of its currency in the art world.  She 
writes, ‘Cynically, one is tempted to speculate that what interests Hurtzig most is 
really the mysterious dynamics of rules and attraction; but these days in the art 
world, useful knowledge sells’.184 Rule has a point about the difficulty of pinning 
down the usefulness of the knowledge on offer at the Blackmarket, and about 
Hurtzig’s preoccupation with ‘rules and attraction’. Because the range and style 
of the lectures is so diverse, and the possibility of assessing the validity of any 
one set of facts an audience member might receive is so limited, it is difficult to 
say that the Blackmarket is actually invested in teaching, per se. Non-knowledge, 
here figured as the non-verifiability of facts, seems to reign. Given the popularity 
of performative pedagogical project in recent years, it is understandable that Rule 
might see The Blackmarket as potentially cashing in on a trend for useful 
knowledge in order to pass off an entirely different set of concerns.  
 Bojana Cvejik’s assessment differs, however. She claims that the Mobile  
Academy’s development over many years has not been in response to current 
trends, and nor should it be figured as a forerunner.  Rather, she characterizes it 
as an ‘autonomous practice’ whose ‘appearance seems to be amplified at times 
by a current curatorial interest’.185  The work’s relative ‘autonomy’ might be 
contested: the Academy is always institutionally affiliated, though the partners 
shift, and by Hurtzig’s account the Blackmarket developed as a performative  
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final report to funders. 186   However, Cvejik usefully historicizes the Mobile 
Academy events that preceded the Blackmarket.  ‘Even if they are now lumped 
together with other summer schools and academies burgeoning all over’, Cvejik 
writes, ‘they were the first to hybridize (in-)disciplined workshops and lectures, 
cultural fieldwork and political activism in an event that creates its own imaginary 
community’.187 For Cvejik, then, it is precisely the hybrid nature of the event that 
is of value.  Hybridity may always bear the problem of verification: when a variety 
of systems for evaluation blend, it is difficult to maintain a set standard.  
 Rule goes on to suggest a less cynical possibility, as well. She writes, 
‘Rather more generously, knowledge exchange seems to serve as an excellent 
pretext, equally for facilitating the individual encounters – flirtations, problematics, 
momentary bonds – and for the event as a whole’.188  But even in this more 
generous analysis, the Blackmarket’s outward structure of experts exchanging 
knowledge is an – admittedly elaborate – excuse for something quite apart from 
knowledge.  Rule’s insistence that a ‘pretext’ is at work actually says a lot about 
the Blackmarket’s relationship to pretense.   Rule notes that while the 
Blackmarket can be understood in relationship to participatory or relational 
artworks, an analysis must also take into account Hurtzig’s background in theatre 
and performance. She writes:  
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What makes the event distinctive in the art context is that it’s organized 
according to an uncommonly subtle appreciation of how performance 
figures in communication, in social interaction generally. Hurtzig doesn’t so 
much attack the theatrical conventions that mystify actors on stage, as 
manipulate them to redistribute the mystique more equitably.189  
  
Theatre and performance are historically shot through with pretense and illusion.  
As Rule seems to allude to, the German avant-garde theatrical tradition of the 
previous century – which forms part of Hurtzig’s background – was, particularly 
as developed by Bertolt Brecht, committed to the exposure of the mechanisms of 
this illusion as part of a broader political program of demystification.   
 Mystification is a form of non-knowledge that repels knowledge.  It insists 
that there’s nothing to see here folks, by shrouding concrete processes or 
structures in mystery.  It also importantly implies a political benefit to be achieved 
through hiding privilege or power in the shadows. Brecht’s Marxist-influenced 
politics aimed to work against the mystification of power structures, with the belief 
that the revelation of exploitation is the first step to liberation.190  ‘Mystique’, 
which Rule suggests is the currency Hurtzig is using to redistribute in her 
Blackmarket, is subtly different from mystification. It might be thought of as non-
knowledge that attracts knowledge – or at least produces a desire for the 
unknown.  It may hide its object, but it also prompts its viewers to peek behind 
the curtains. Hurtzig’s redistribution of mystique serves a significant function for 
the impact of the event. It makes all of the participants – again, clients, experts 
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and managers/administrators – hyper-aware of the acting that goes on during the 
normal course of communication. This holding back, wondering what the other 
person is thinking, wondering what they are thinking about you, trying to arrange 
your face so that it looks like you’re paying attention – all of these activities are 
par for the course in any number of conversational scenarios. They serve the 
function of managing the attractions – and repulsions – that emerge and maintain 
interaction. This set of attractions might be called a low-level mystique that fuels 
curiosity in another person in any social situation.   
 However, I would argue – perhaps against Rule’s assessment – that the 
knowledge transfer scenario is particularly charged with mystique. This is 
because power differentials are blatantly pronounced, and the stakes of curiosity 
in another person are higher. It matters more to me, or at least matters in a 
particular way, what an expert thinks about me, even if rationally I believe that 
there will be no great consequences. I agree that Hurtzig’s interest does seem 
primarily to lie in ‘rules and attraction’, and in the intensities I discuss above, but I 
suggest that this is not at odds with the stated purpose of The Blackmarket to be 
a space for the exchange of knowledge and non-knowledge. Knowledge and 
non-knowledge – and their mutual interaction – have everything to do with rules 
and, perhaps especially, attraction.   
 In 2008, I met with Hannah Hurtzig in Berlin, to discuss the Blackmarket for 
Useful Knowledge and Non-knowledge. In this conversation, the critical 
dimensions of the project opened up, as Hurtzig addressed theatricality, potent 
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social forms of non- (or semi- or pseudo-)knowledge like rumours or social 
anxiety or management chaos, and the neoliberal ‘knowledge’ economy that is 
everywhere referred to in the Blackmarket, even as non-knowledge constantly 
threatens to unhinge or dissolve the proceedings. Describing the political 
framework for the project, Hurtzig referred to:   
…the model of advanced liberalism... [the] entrepreneurial individual who 
manages himself, grasps himself as capital, voluntarily invests in knowledge 
and skills, and organizes social relationships and networks on his own 
initiative.  Someone who trains self-administration, self-control, and self-
realization... Blackmarket plays with this neoliberal model of the future as a 
set piece.191 
 
The project toys, then, with the growing imperative for individuals to fashion 
themselves as uniquely qualified and connected operators in an increasingly 
complex system which promises to reward self-motivation and self-management 
(without necessarily being able to deliver on that promise). Hurtzig stages 
interactions against a backdrop that insists that everyone must be an expert in 
order to thrive, even where access to the collective resources and structural 
support to develop lucrative expertise are not universally available.  
 Hurtzig claimed that the initial ‘check-in’ when audience members enter the 
Blackmarker is designed to heighten this critique, and to direct this critique 
specifically at the state of educational systems under neoliberal economies. The 
booking-in of lectures is, Hurtzig said, an "unpleasant image of neo-liberalistic 
                                                
191 This and other quotations in this chapter come from an interview with Hannah Hurtzig by 
Johanna Linsley, A Report on the Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Non-knowledge, 
unpublished MA dissertation, Queen Mary, University of London (2008) 
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education forms" which result in "individualistic poverty" – everyone for himself, 
so no one gets what he wants. Not all non-knowledge is cheerfully subversive. 
Barriers of access to privileged centres of knowledge are only getting more 
prevalent as social investment is withdrawn and rhetoric of individual 
responsibility take stronger hold. 
 At the same time, the Blackmarket is also riddled with little cracks, where 
individuals can stage mini-rebellions, or join together to alter the terms of the 
event. There are limits to this, of course. Hurtzig told me the story of one expert – 
a lawyer – who sat down in front of a client who knew he would be part of the 
event, and who tried to get legal advice from him during her half hour lecture. The 
lawyer refused, as his commitment to professional regulations of course trumped 
his commitment to the Blackmarket’s open-ended inquiry. Hurtzig also pointed 
out that the degree to which participants in the Blackmarket feel able to play with 
the terms of the event is conditioned by their backgrounds. In Vienna, the 
proprietors of the Secondhand Knowledge market came from an educated, 
middle-class background, and Hurtzig claimed that they felt too much anxiety to 
charge money for their wares. In Graz, on the other hand, a ‘girl gang’ ran this 
secondary market, and Hurtzig told me that they made a lot of money.   
 The Blackmarket flickers between an over-the-top, lightly dystopian version 
of the commodification of knowledge, and a semi-anarchic refusal of prescribed 
and individualistic consequences of this commodification. Even the use of 
‘Blackmarket’ as a framing device for the event plays into this duality. One the 
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one hand, black markets are extreme examples of the logic of the free market – 
unregulated and governed wholly by the dispassionate laws of supply and 
demand. On the other hand, Hurtzig told me that she chose to call her event a 
black market because it conjures up the image of an entity that reacts quickly to 
change, and that crops up in moments of transition. Under these conditions, 
unexpected reconfigurations can sometimes occur. 
 Hurtzig also discussed a different dimension of the command to expertise 
implied by the project’s critique of neoliberalism. She told me that one premise of 
The Blackmarket is that ‘everyone can be an “expert”, if one only listens to him 
closely enough’.192 Here, rather than referring to the need for the individuals to 
define themselves through their ability to successfully navigate on an economic 
playing field, expertise is a matter of perception. It is up to individuals to discover 
or create expertise not within themselves, but within those they encounter and 
interact with.    
 Hurtzig noted the slightly cringe-worthy aspect of this second type of 
universal expertise when she discussed some of the background of the 
Blackmarket. One influence, she stated, was ‘the little bit romantic, little bit 
pathetic’ declarations by Joseph Beuys that ‘everyone is an artist’.193 In her 
monograph on Beuys, Caroline Tisdall describes the background of this 
declaration thus:  
It means a widened concept of art in which the whole process of living 
[original emphasis] itself is the creative act. On one level it means farewell 
                                                
192 Hurtzig, Interview, unpaginated. 
193 Hurtzig, Interview, unpaginated.  
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to narrow definitions and to the restriction of art to the products of a 
specialized group of professionals. More importantly, it implies an 
intensified feeling for life, for the processes of living, and for the structures 
of society.194 
  
I am interested in this heightening of intensity, and the send of the almost 
magical power of attention to transform personal experience into creation. This 
echoes Hurtzig’s suggestion that attention is what it takes to discover the unique 
expertise in everyone. I am even curious about the possibility of a relationship 
between Beuys’s interest in the shamanistic and my interest in expertise – the 
power of spiritual knowledge as it might relate to other forms of knowledge. I am 
also interested, however, in the way this rhetoric is (in Hurtzig’s words) ‘pathetic’ 
– in the way that, reaching too far, it falls short.   
 In one of the few performance studies articles that directly addresses the 
performance lecture as a specific form, Patricia Milder places Joseph Beuys at 
the origin of the form. She cites his 1965 How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare 
as the forerunner of the myriad conceptually playful and politically focused 
iterations of the lecture as performance by later generations. Milder is critical of  
Beuys, noting ‘the paradox of working against the capitalist system from the 
vantage point of success within it’. 195  She discusses, for example, Beuys 
accepting funding from the West German government for his Free International  
University, which, if successful in its aims, would have challenged and overturned 
                                                
194 Caroline Tisdall, Joseph Beuys (New York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation and Thames  
and Hudson, 1979), p.7. 
195 Patricia Milder, ‘Teaching as Art: The Contemporary Lecture-Performance’, PAJ 97 (2011), p.  
17.  
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the liberal capitalism of Western European nations. For Milder, this working 
against a system from within it is inherently suspect. She finds it ‘difficult to 
believe the hyperbolic statements about the revolutionary potential of this type of 
education, especially when it is government funded’, even as she is willing to 
‘respect the FIU as a work of art’.196   
 I am perhaps less concerned about the problems of hyperbole in mounting 
political opposition to capitalism. I am also not completely convinced of the need 
for, or indeed possibility of, the clear separation between inside and outside of a 
system that Milder calls for. Especially in the context of massive cuts in 
government spending on education in this country, a wholesale dismissal of state 
spending on Beuys’s Free International University rubs the wrong way. More 
troubling for me are possible parallels between Beuys’s expanded definition of art 
and creativity with the more insidious rhetoric of entrepreneurial individualism 
discussed earlier.   
 Angela McRobbie picks up on the use of buzzwords like ‘creativity’ in the 
neoliberal lexicon in her article ‘Everyone Is Creative: artists as new economy 
pioneers?’. She takes her title from a New Labour green paper on the ‘cultural 
economy’, which opened with McRobbie’s title phrase, a quotation from New  
Labour intellectual Charles Leadbetter. More than a decade later, under a 
drastically different government and economic context, the call for ‘further 
expansion of education and training in the arts and cultural fields, for children and 
                                                
196 Milder, p. 18. 
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young people from all social backgrounds’197 outlined in the green paper seems a 
long way off. Nevertheless, the precarity that McRobbie argues underlies the 
decentralized ‘cultural economy’ of New Labour, and other late twentieth-century 
liberal capitalist governments, has only increased. If the ‘New Labour classless 
dream’ consisted of ‘a high-energy band of young people driving the cultural 
economy ahead, but in a totally privatised and non-subsidy-oriented direction’, in 
this era of economic crisis and austerity measures, the privatisation of services 
and the slashing of public investment is having a devastating effect far beyond 
the cultural sector.   
 McRobbie’s vision is not wholly bleak, however. Underlying the 
precaritization of culture work, McRobbie detects a hopeful dynamic, which is ‘the 
potential for turning the desire to make a living in an enjoyable and rewarding 
way into a desire for creating a better society’.198 In other words, all the mobility 
and flexibility of the freelance lifestyle, and the energy this lifestyle demands, 
could, McRobbie argues, be channeled away from neoliberal goals and into 
working for alternative, and crucially collective, models of social equity. The fact 
that this freelance lifestyle is ‘in the long term, utterly unsustainable’199 should be, 
in McRobbie’s analysis, a significant motivator for such a channeling.    
 In my final two chapters, I will look in more depth at the range of 
propositions that might be made with the statement that ‘everyone is an expert’. 
                                                
197 Angela McRobbie, ‘Everyone Is Creative: artists as new economy pioneers?’ openDemocracy,  
2001 http://www.opendemocracy.net [accessed 20 April 2012], p. 2 
198 McRobbie, p. 5. 
199 McRobbie, p. 6. 
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Here, I just want to return to Hurtzig qualification of her assertion that ‘everyone 
is an “expert”, if one only listens to him closely enough’ with the admission that 
this idea may be ‘a little bit romantic, a little bit pathetic’. This is characteristic, I 
think, of Hurtzig’s approach – the matching of intensity with doubt that is also 
found in the description of the Mobile Academy discussed above, and which 
structures, I believe, the Blackmarket specifically.  
 I detected this pairing elsewhere in my interview with Hurtzig, particularly in 
the way she addressed how theatrical artifice paired with moments of the ‘real’, 
or perhaps better, momentary interruptions of the unplanned or the 
uncontrollable. Hurtzig told me that she wanted a performance of hectic, put-
upon service from the hostesses, for example, so she gave them too much work 
to do. Using a task-based directing technique, then, Hurtzig got her performers to 
look like they were working by getting them to work. As an added bonus, the 
excessiveness of the rules actually encouraged disobedience, and the rigorous 
theatrical infrastructure became the occasion for rebellious improvisations or 
even exasperated refusals, outcomes that Hurtzig seemed to find exciting. 
Theatrical conventions also resulted in that most theatrical of mental conditions – 
stage fright – and Hurtzig claimed that it was typically the most eminent of 
experts, used to speaking in front of crowds, who found the intimacy of the one-
to-one conversation, which was nevertheless projected or broadcast or simply 
observed as a theatrical event, the most troubling.  
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 Event Hurtzig’s proposition that ‘if you listen long enough to a person, you 
make an expert’ she qualified by insisting that its value was as a theatrical 
premise. It was an idea, she claimed, but since it was a theatrical idea, it did not 
matter, really, whether it was true. Rather, the premise sparked a process of 
theatrical engineering, resulting in a ‘complicated exchange of roles between the 
expert and the client’. If this supports the claim discussed above that expertise is 
a sort of ruse, nevertheless, I argue that it is not evoked in the place of some 
more genuine interest. Instead, I think that the Blackmarket is an institute of non-
knowledge so committed to doubt that it cannot even believe its own premise, yet 
run by a creator so fascinated by the results that perhaps it does not matter.  
 
CONCLUSION	  
MJT and the Blackmarket have very different genealogies and aims, but I 
have placed them side-by-side because I think they both use surprising theatrical 
strategies to produce non-knowledge as a companion to expertise. Looking at the 
relationship of non-knowledge to expertise uncovers a diverse range of 
investments and detachments. MJT focuses on the fantastic and its connection 
to the trivial, whether it’s the mechanical truth behind the theatrical illusion, the 
wonder of fiction and the banality of the lie, the scientific method and unverified 
collective wisdom, or the scoffed-at crank with visions of the divine. All of these 
dynamics, MJT implicitly suggests, are already to be found in the history of the 
museum, a place we no longer understand as a straightforward repository of 
knowledge, even as it continues to be a powerful influence on how culture is 
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valued. The Blackmarket focuses on the social behaviours that surround the 
transmission of expertise, which are extra to the production of knowledge, and 
may indeed supplant or trouble it. The intensity of proximity and the detachment 
of doubt each play a role in the staging of communication that the Blackmarket 
constructs. 
There is another surprising connection between the Blackmarket and MJT, 
in the form of a Victorian English public initiative called the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The Blackmarket clearly draws on this phrasing. 
Coincidentally, MJT’s publishing wing is called the Society for the Diffusion of 
Useful Information. The re-working both projects give to this phrase helps 
underline the way each also positions itself outside of the production of 
knowledge, even while expertise plays a key role in their structures. The 
Blackmarket emphasises the illicit, the unplanned and the unverified, and unlike 
an official Society, trades in both knowledge and non-knowledge. MJT makes a 
distinction between knowledge and information, and the materials it diffuses may, 
for a variety of reasons, run counter to knowledge categories, not least because 
they may come from unreliable sources or are, indeed, fabricated. Both 
nevertheless insist that their non-knowledges are useful, and I have found them 
to be so, in thinking how expertise produces an array of experiences, sensations 
and dynamics that cannot be categorised as knowledge production. To get even 
deeper into this array, in my next chapter, I will be focusing more particularly on 
how the different feelings of non-knowledge that expertise produces might be 
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understood, and how they contribute to thinking about a broader politics of 
performance and expertise. 
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Chapter	  Four:	  Lectures	  in	  Nonknowledges	  
 
I have looked at institutions that use theatricality to thread non-knowledge 
into familiar modes of expertise. Now I want to think through how explicit 
performances of expertise, using the form of the lecture, both use non-knowledge 
to disrupt expertise and suggest how non-knowledge commonly attends 
performances of expertise. I argue that careful examination of some recent 
performance projects that operate this way can help towards a further articulation 
of non-knowledge as both a contributing factor in the marginalisation of certain 
bodies, and part of a useful method for questioning seemingly fixed structures, 
among other possibilities for non-knowledge. In order to drive home the point that 
non-knowledge is a multiple, shifting set of experiences with a range of 
associations and forces, I will begin now not to refer to non-knowledge, but to 
non-knowledges. Specifically, I want to outline a few culturally recognisable 
categories of experience that highlight the emotional complexity of various 
dimensions of non-knowledges. 
So where to begin? There is a rich strain of performance studies that 
frames failure not as crucial step on the path to success, but as a stumbling block 
that forces us to question and re-evaluate directions. To name just two examples, 
in Sara Jane Bailes’s recent Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure, 
failure is employed by performance artists as a challenge to received ideas about 
virtuosity and other hierarchical understandings of skill, while in Nicholas Ridout’s 
Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems, failure is both a 
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constitutive element of modern theatre, and the key to its critical potential – when 
theatre fails it reveals central problems with capitalistic labour mechanisms.  An 
initial starting point for approaching non-knowledge as an experience might be 
thinking it through as a form of failure – a failure to learn or perhaps a failure to 
teach.   
So how can the failure to learn be described? There is the failure of recall: 
the test-taking moment where carefully – or not-so-carefully – memorised facts 
are suddenly, vertiginously absent. There is the failure of attention: sitting in a 
lecture hall, mimicking the gestures of focus whilst the words fail utterly to 
register. There are the unspoken categories of exclusion from knowledge: having 
the wrong body, the wrong manner, the wrong history. There is the shrug and the 
sheepish smile: I’ll never learn. The same phrase, spoken with a slight difference, 
injects the failure to learn with defiance. I’ll never learn to behave well, to ignore 
those categories of exclusion, to accept that this is it.   
One premise of pedagogy is that the successful outcome of learning is 
knowledge.  At the same time, there is a notion that the risk of failure offers a 
crucial freedom to the student.  Without a safe space to fail, experimentation and 
innovation cannot occur.  As funding for arts education becomes ever scarcer, 
such instrumentalised outcomes will no doubt become even more emphasised. 
However, if failure must automatically lead to success, what happens to critique 
and accountability? Must experimentation dissolve into toothless consensus? If 
there is critical value for performance pedagogy in the freedom to fail, there must 
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be clarity about what failure is and does, and what it produces. We must think 
through the myriad non-knowledges that might be revealed through pedagogy 
and consider how these non-knowledges are performed. We must learn to 
identify those instances when the failure to learn is also a political move or a 
creative act. 
In order to address these questions, I want to twist the perspective 
somewhat, from performance pedagogy to the performance of pedagogy. In 
recent years, a number of performance practitioners have staged pedagogical 
encounters in order to think through precisely these problems. The format of the 
performance lecture in particular has become nearly ubiquitous in festivals and 
symposia, but little has been written to account for the popularity of the form, 
much less the critical, philosophical and political problems these performers are 
working through. Throughout this chapter, I argue that an important impulse for 
many performance practitioners who adopt the lecture form is to critically 
examine and strategically produce non-knowledge.  Further, I argue that non-
knowledge must be thought in multiple categories, with various affective forces. 
When does a failure of knowledge produce exclusion or disenfranchisement, and 
when might it be an advantage not to know? Can non-knowledge feel 
exhilarating, scary, sexy, boring or tender? Can it be critical? Political? Is it ever 
fun? 
 To start answering these questions, I want to create a taxonomy – a 
positively negative taxonomy – showing how non-knowledges, while certainly 
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sometimes indicative of lack or detachment, nevertheless still produce emotion 
and investment. I want to emphasise, however, that this taxonomy is necessarily 
unstable and, at best, provisional. The ‘non-knowledges’ I look at have a tricky 
way of shifting and even sometimes looking more like alternative forms of 
knowledge. Also, and crucially, it is important to emphasise that I do not suggest 
that the performance examples which compel my discussions can be described 
by the terms of non-knowledge I use. I discuss stupidity with reference to one of 
the most brilliant performers I can think of, I evoke paranoia not as a pathology 
but as a way of thinking through the writing of (often traumatic) histories, and I 
return to earlier discussions of wonder to consider how it might be framed as a 
critical tool for fighting against obstacles to access to knowledge. To underline 
how the terms I use are in unstable relationships with my examples (and to 
suggest that the terms may be unstable themselves), I want to take a moment to 
address them directly. 
 Perhaps the most viscerally recognizable category of non-knowledge is 
stupidity.  Its link to knowledge is both intuitively obvious and maddeningly 
difficult to articulate. It is a powerful insult and an effective tool for marginalising 
cultural minorities, but also on occasion a delightful and even liberatory refusal of 
suffocating convention. The emotions associated with the encounter with (and 
performance of) stupidity are perhaps more easy delineate. Exquisite frustration 
may be the most prominent of a list that includes anger, aggression, laughter, 
self-righteousness but also, sometimes, pleasure.   
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 Paranoia has generated enormous critical attention for generations. This 
form of non-knowledge is, of course, characterized by the conviction on the part 
of the subject that s/he does know. Paranoia is not quite positioned against 
knowledge, but in parallel with it – the paths have the same shape, but never 
touch. This form of knowing outside of real knowledge has, at least since Freud, 
been associated with the project of philosophy – of knowing knowledge.    
 If stupidity and paranoia conjure the emotions of frustration and fear that 
can correspond with non-knowledge, a third category is associated with the thrill 
of it.  Wonder is an experience that is celebrated as existing at the beginning of 
knowledge. The physicality of wonder is well codified: gasps, wide eyes, 
speechlessness. It can also be criticised as the fetishisation of non-knowledge – 
an emotion that prompts the endless deferral of understanding – or for giving 
primacy to the shock of the present at the expense of a consideration of context.  
 All of these categories have in common a complicated relationship to 
knowledge – they are not simply opposed to knowledge but might ignore 
knowledge or fear knowledge or put knowledge on a pedestal. Each of these 
categories has been written about critically, but has also infused performance 
practices. Finally, stupidity, paranoia and wonder all have the capacity both to 
contribute to marginalisation and oppression, but also to intervene in and 
penetrate the sometimes seemingly fixed foundations of knowledge production. 
In what follows, I want to trace both of these dimensions within each category, 
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and discuss how performance practitioners have significantly made use of both to 
question, criticise and reconfigure the power of knowledge.    
 
WILLIAM	  POPE.L	  SPEAKS	  KLINGON 	  
 
 The video shows footage from the Tate Modern  in London, in the Starr 
Auditorium. It documents a panel discussion.  Four people sit on chairs placed 
just to the side of the stage, and there is a lectern with a light focused on it. The 
panel topic is ‘Global Subjects’, and the discussion is taking place as part of the 
‘Live Culture’ programme in 2003, curated by Lois Keidan and Daniel Brine of  
the Live Art Development Agency in London and performance academic and 
writer Adrian Heathfield. The four people in the seats are Carol Becker, Ricardo 
Dominguez, Jean Fisher and William Pope.L. All have been invited to reflect on 
the problems and possibilities of performance and globalization at this respected  
museum during this high profile event. The panel employs various strategies of 
performance and presentation. Becker and Fisher give thoughtful presentations 
straight to the audience. Dominguez delivers his inspired polemic regarding the 
Zapatista uprising in the Chiapas in Mexico wearing a balaclava. When Pope.L 
takes his place at the lectern he stands for a moment, then steps away to have a 
sip of water. He returns, and seems to clear his throat. He keeps clearing his 
throat. It slowly becomes obvious that he is not clearing his throat, but 
intentionally producing guttural sounds punctuated with heavy consonants. 
‘FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF’, he intones, and 
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‘SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS SSSS’.200 
 I am struck when the video overlays long shots of a British Sign Language 
interpreter on top of Pope.L’s image – during the other talks a few shots of the 
interpreters had broken up the longer sections of the speaker talking, but had 
been brief. I wonder if the choice to overlay the images has to do with access 
(transforming this  performance into accessible text for the hearing impaired 
would be a challenge) or if it is a choice to emphasize the live predicament this 
unusual presentation poses for the audience. The camera cuts occasionally to 
artist Aaron Williamson sitting in the audience. Williamson (whose work I will 
discuss later in this chapter) is profoundly deaf. In the shot, he is laughing, 
seemingly in response both to Pope.L and to the interpreter’s dilemma. The 
interpreter herself laughs as she attempts to convey what Pope.L is doing – 
valiantly, as it is far from clear what Pope.L is doing. All the while, Pope.L’s 
physical language conveys a very convincing performance of a somewhat harried 
intellectual explaining a complicated concept and attempting to find an 
appropriate vocabulary for an audience that might not be as well-versed in the 
nuances as he is. Aside from the actual content of his speech, he is the perfect 
world-weary pedagogue, tired but still with a spark of passion for his subject.  
 How is this a response to the topic of ‘Global Subjects’? Is Pope.L 
commenting on translation processes that make certain subjects appear 
inarticulate? Is he coupling the physicality and gestural vocabulary of the lecturer 
                                                
200 Tate Modern, ‘Tate Channel: Live Culture: Performance and the Contemporary – Part 4’, 
http://channel.tate.org.uk/media/292141267001/292148769001 [accessed 13 July, 2011]. 
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with incomprehensible sounds in order to critique the baroque theoretical 
language of the humanities scholar, who is able to travel globally and comment 
on anything but is divorced from the realities about which he professes 
expertise? Or is this a more targeted intervention, tailored specifically to this 
context – not a direct critique necessarily but rather a joyful co-optation of a 
conventional format to surprising and poetic ends? I think of other examples of 
structured gibberish in performance, of Kurt Schwitters’s Ursonate or the sound 
poetry of Bob Cobbing. I think of the ways this mode has been used to press 
against the limits of both language and rationality. 
 Pope.L was on stage for approximately ten minutes, after which he simply 
walked out from behind the lectern and returned to his seat. I was prepared to file 
this performance under non-knowledge that meditates on the failure of speech – 
a large subheading with a textured relationship to power and subjectivity. The 
choice on the part of the documentation team at the Tate to emphasize 
Williamson’s reaction seems to line up with this interpretation. Pope.L is using the 
lecture format to expose the embodied dimension of knowledge transfer, and to 
highlight how bodies are implicated when that transfer breaks down.  
 Then a colleague pointed me to a press release that claims that Pope.L’s 
‘Live Culture’ presentation was performed entirely in Klingon, a fictional language 
developed for the science fiction series Star Trek.201 This changed everything. I 
thought: a ten-minute lecture delivered in Klingon is not an example of non-
                                                
201 Rove Gallery, ‘William Pope.L Press Release’, http://www.rovetv.net/wp-press.html, [accessed 
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knowledge at all. It evokes, rather, the obsessive knowledge of fandom. Though 
on reflection, fan knowledge might not be so separate from a certain type of non-
knowledge. What does it mean to develop an expertise in a fictional subject? Fan 
knowledge feels excessive not only because of the intensity of interest in the 
chosen subject but because that interest contributes to the invention of the 
subject itself.   
 On the other hand, fan knowledge is never truly separate from the world, 
even if it arises from an escapist impulse. The Klingon reference may also draw 
on problematic racial associations embedded in pop culture. In the Star Trek 
universe, the Klingon race is dark- skinned as well as being characterized as 
violent and barbaric. Much of Pope.L’s work draws on the way race is 
constructed – and re- constructed – through the circulation of images and 
objects. (As part of his project Black Factory, for instance, participants were 
invited to donate a ‘sample of Blackness’ – an object that meant Blackness to 
them).202 The trope of the violent and inarticulate other is an important target to 
address and deconstruct and one well within Pope.L’s frame of reference.   
 In addition to these associations, I must admit to detecting an element of the 
piss-take in Pope.L’s Star Trek homage. There is something gleefully silly about 
delivering a lecture at a prestigious symposium in a fictional alien language, 
particularly without preamble or postscript. I snorted in approval on learning 
about the Klingon dimension of Pope.L’s performance and said, without thinking 
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but with sincere appreciation: that’s so stupid.  
 Stupidity, in fact, may be an interesting lens with which to consider Pope.L’s 
lecture. It should be clear that I am not suggesting that the lecture itself was 
stupid – much less that Pope.L is stupid. I want to state, unequivocally, that I 
think Pope.L’s lecture performance, as well as his wider practice, are brilliant. I 
also want to suggest that my anxiety in even evoking the word ‘stupid’ says 
something about how potent this form of non-knowledge is. Indeed, one of the 
strange things about the term is how difficult it is to wield. It seems that even an 
examination of the concept becomes infected with its qualities. Yet stupidity as a 
form of non-knowledge is compelling in its ability to be absolutely on the surface 
but also to operate under many guises. Sometimes an invective, sometimes 
armour, and occasionally the source of a compliment, stupidity is a form of non-
knowledge characterized by excess rather than absence. Instinctively, I suspect 
that this combination of surface and excess is what makes me want to think 
about stupidity with reference to Pope.L’s Klingon lecture. Prepared, though 
inadequately, to expose myself to stupidity’s properties, I march on.  
 Stupidity, as discussed by theorist Avital Ronell, has a slippery relationship 
to knowledge, and is never simply its direct other. Stupidity ‘does not allow itself 
to be opposed to knowledge in any simple way, nor is it the other of thought’.203 It 
has a destabilizing power over knowledge-production that pointed critique does 
not have, because it does not rely on the same assumptions or conventions as its 
object. Because it is only edifice, it frustrates interpretation and deflects 
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penetration; ‘one cannot understand a stone or a mountain, or offer a critique or a 
twelve-step program to change their descriptions’. 204  This gives it an odd 
rhetorical power. A calculated use of stupidity (if that is not a contradiction in 
terms) might overcome the difficulties the critic faces, of negotiating one’s 
position at a distance from the critiqued.  
 When Pope.L marches down 125th Street in Harlem wearing a 12-foot 
white cardboard phallus, as he did in 1996 as Member, also known as Schlong 
Journey he is clearly invoking the intersections between race and sexuality that 
infuse the cultural construction of the black man in the United States.205 However, 
he is also adopting the technique of the frustrated or bored young person who 
scrawls a penis onto the surface of a public monument. This technique of 
inserting oneself into, or rather onto, a hostile environment is maddening to the 
(self-)serious protectors of public civility, who might decry such a stupid act of 
petty vandalism. It is also a powerful outlet for a certain kind of liberating 
disregard of the conventions of seriousness. When sober, civic-minded 
intelligence produces hateful and entrenched social prejudice, stupidity can look 
rather attractive.  
 Of course, stupidity as a label is a powerful stand-in for bigotry. Ronell notes 
that:  
In order to do justice to the American uses and behaviours of stupidity, to 
the rhetorical sedimentation of the term, one would have to review the 
consistent naming of the slave as the nonhuman, the ineducable, in terms 
of phantasms of calculable intelligence. What has morphed into seemingly 
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less lacerating assertions of stupidity (‘shallow’, ‘airhead’, ‘bimbo’, ‘brain-
dead’ etc.) belongs to a sinister history, which in part it repeats, of 
destroying an alterity.206 
 
A historicisation of stupidity would have to come to terms with the way aptitude 
and race are dubiously and violently transposed. It would have to note how 
consigning certain subjectivities to dwell at the surface (all of those ‘shallow’ 
idiots unable to discern depth) lends a moral and aesthetic – and deeply 
problematic – superiority to discrimination. As a consequence, an account of 
stupidity might have to dispense with depth altogether.  
 While stupidity as a label is unquestionably problematic, the frustration that 
is generated through encounters with institutional greed, injustice or 
shortsightedness sometimes can only be summarized in one word: stupid. 
Repeat: stupid! Stupid! Stupid! The importance of rage and the necessity of 
outburst are captured by this recitation. Ronell writes,   
On the one hand, the very existence of stupidity can and must be disputed – 
are we not dealing in each case with intricacies of repression, bungled 
action, error, blindness? – and on the other hand stupidity must be 
exposed.207 
 
However much we might deconstruct the causes of stupidity, there is perhaps 
nothing like it for capturing the feeling that however many mitigating, underlying 
circumstances there are, an outcome might be wrong, and its wrongness must be 
announced.  
                                                
206 Ronnell, Stupidity, p. 39.   
207 Avital Ronell, ‘Kathy Acker Goes to Hell: On the Irresolvable Stupidity of Acker’s Death”, Lust 
for Life: On the Writing of Kathy Acker, ed. by Carla Harryman, Avital Ronnell, Amy Scholder 
(London: Verso Books, 2006), p. 20. 
 199 
 
 Ronell writes the above with reference to the work of Kathy Acker, and it is 
worth tracing the permutations stupidity undergoes in Ronell’s reading of both 
Acker’s politics and the political conditions that surround Acker’s life and, as 
Ronell emphasises, her death. Ronell points to the recurrence in Acker’s writing 
of the use of the words ‘stupid’, ‘stupidity’, ‘idiotic’, and ‘dumb’ to capture the 
litany of objectionable experiences that constitute contemporary life. Each word 
captures a different shade of meaning, and resonates with a different political 
tone.  
So many things are dumb – that you have to get a job, get up, go to sleep, 
watch your weight, check your calls, pay your bills, clean your apartment, 
get another degree – all this suggests a level of facticity, whereas stupidity 
implicates its object in a certain way, as if malice were intended, as if there 
were an element of ethical failure.208 
‘Dumb’ is the weight of everything in the world that we have to do even when it’s 
pointless or coercive. (Ronell does not, though one might wish she had, point to 
the problematic use of ‘dumb’ with relationship to physical disability). ‘Stupid’ is 
meaner, more dangerous, but for that, it has potential as a rhetorical weapon. 
Ronell writes:  
Attuned to its several registers of usage and intent, Kathy was appalled by 
stupidity and denounced it wherever it came up, especially in repressive 
politics or with issues of social justice’.209  
If the world is repressive, violent, hierarchical, corrupt and structurally unfair, 
surely the least we can do is call it names? 
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For Acker, the contemporary university was one such repressive system. Ronell 
writes: 
There is something about the institution of learning that has angered Acker 
– something that is associated for her with a studied curriculum of 
stupidity, the wrong side of the memory tracks, heading only for 
memorization techniques and vital depletion ... As far as Kathy was 
concerned – and she was not alone in this – universities have peculiar 
transmission problems: they transmit stupidity.210 
This attitude positioned Acker outside the institution that was potentially most 
suited to support her. This stupidity begat another stupidity, the ‘irresolvable 
stupidity’ in the title of Ronell’s chapter. ‘I will never get over the fact that Acker 
had to suffer the refusal of medical benefits’, Ronell writes, because she 
remained an adjunct and never a fully employed professor.211 It is an irresolvably 
stupid system that links health care to particular forms of employment. Or 
perhaps Acker was just stupid to get breast cancer in the United States in the 
1990s... 
 Acker’s punk and New Narrative aesthetic is, of course, very distinct from 
Pope.L’s conceptual yet politically invested performance work. I have invoked it 
here to establish the dizzying forms stupidity can take. It is the appalling nature of 
social injustice, and it is the angry hiss that rejects what it encounters. It is 
arrogant, and it makes self-awareness impossible. It also produces a profound 
and unsettling insecurity. Am I being stupid? Is it disastrously stupid to try and 
propose stupidity as a performance strategy, to try and suggest that it might pull 
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the rug out from under the expert’s seemingly steady feet? If I can’t wholly 
recuperate stupidity, can I at least propose that its very nauseating variability 
makes it important to consider, without making myself look like a complete idiot?   
 My own insecurities notwithstanding, Pope.L’s work absolutely operates at 
the razor sharp and unsettling edge of the politics of race, authority, knowledge 
and expertise. One of the brilliant things about Pope.L’s work is his ability to 
manipulate and repurpose not just the images or texts that comprise a 
structurally racist society’s visual or literary culture, but also the embodied, 
gestural and performative tropes that make up its affective landscape. He is not a 
satirist, nor directly a commentator. He is too committed to collapsing the 
distance between his body and the world for that. The critical questions I asked 
above regarding the function of Pope.L’s lecture in the context of a panel on 
‘Global Subjects’ are not irrelevant to the piece, but neither are they entirely to 
the point. Part of the power of the pedagogical encounter that he staged at Tate 
is that it undid itself before it could be subjected to a direct critical analysis. 
Pope.L emptied the contents out from the form of the pedagogical encounter, and 
he kept a straight face as he stretched and bent the form until its purpose was 
not longer clearly discernible. What did I learn from his lecture? It is hard to point 
to a clearly identifiable unit of information or verifiable knowledge produced. 
According to the press release referred to above, Pope.L was not even speaking 
good Klingon. Rather, this performance developed a set of associations, feelings 
and predicaments that are not easily resolved, and that are anything but stupid. 
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And yet this illegitimate and unwelcome beast in the shadow of knowledge helps 
me frame a response to this set of unresolved issues that does not rely on 
knowledge’s palliating powers, and that maintains the uncomfortable feelings that 
should be a part of a troubling of expertise’s certainties. 
 
THE	  ATLAS	  GROUP:	  PARANOID	  HISTORIES	  	  
 
 Walid Raad’s voice is calm and clear. As he speaks, I settle in and I am 
ready to listen, which is good because the lecture is an elegantly verbose affair. I 
am at the Kitchen, in Manhattan in 2006, at a performance-lecture connected to 
an exhibition titled The Dead Weight of a Quarrel Hangs: Documents from the 
Atlas Group Archive. Speaking on behalf of the Atlas Group, Raad describes the 
group’s mission ‘to research and document the contemporary history of 
Lebanon’.212  These research projects might document the arcane betting habits 
of Beirut’s Marxist historians during a season at the racetracks, or the 
experiences of the only Arab man held with Americans during the Lebanon 
hostage crisis in the 1980s. The evening I attend the lecture, I am particularly 
taken with a series of videos that claim to be footage taken from security 
cameras on the Comiche, a boardwalk in Beirut. For years, the unknown camera 
operator is said to have turned his camera every evening away from its 
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surveillance duties and towards the sunset. We are shown a long, meditative 
montage, constructed from this (quote-unquote) footage.  
 
The documents that Raad presents fall under three categories. He displays these 
categories on the screen during his neat and clear PowerPoint presentation:  
TYPE A: for files that contain documents that we produced and that we 
attribute to named imaginary individuals or organizations.  
TYPE FD: for files that contain documents that we produced and that we 
attribute to anonymous individuals or organizations.  
TYPE AGP: for files that contain documents that we produce and that we 
attribute to the Atlas Group.213  
 
On one level, these categories help Raad to emphasize that the documents, 
while based in a real historical milieu, are constructed and fictional. The Atlas 
Group is a solo project undertaken by Raad himself, and he takes care to 
communicate that to the audience. However, Raad employs the language of the 
archive to present his constructed ‘documents’, purposefully shifting the 
emphasis of the construction. Raad is not presenting a fake archive but a real 
archive of fake documents. His performances themselves contain deceptions, 
such as audience plants who speak up during the question and answer period 
that inevitably ends each event.214 The archivist is a fake. The archive is real, but 
it is filled with fake documents. It goes on. The multiple layers of fact, fiction, trust 
and deception trigger a sequence of suspicious questions – can I trust Raad 
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now? What about now? This sensation – along with Raad’s endlessly 
proliferating documents and the baroque systems of internal logic devised to 
contain them and relate them to one another – call to mind a particular type of 
non-knowledge: paranoia.  
 Perhaps because this paranoid feeling operates on me, an audience 
member, as a component in the legibility of the performance, I am reminded of 
the well-known debate about paranoia in literary theory spurred by queer theorist 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. For Sedgwick, paranoia began as a useful object of 
criticism, which she later identified as a problematic mode of criticism. In her 
early work, she drew on paranoia as a structural element of systemic 
homophobia. 215  Later, in an essay titled ‘Paranoid reading and reparative 
reading, or You’re so vain, you probably think this introduction is about you’, she 
proposed that paranoia had begun to structure critical analysis in a negative yet 
endemic way.216 She asserted that the process of suspicion and revelation, which 
she dubbed ‘paranoid reading’, was making it all but impossible to read critically 
in any other mode. Once it becomes normative for criticism to operate as a 
process of confirming suspicion, not being suspicious comes to appear 
unforgivably, and dangerously, naïve.  
 Paranoid knowledge has a complicated, and certainly not simply 
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oppositional, relationship with truth-value. David Bell usefully summarises how 
Freud positioned paranoia as ‘a caricature of a philosophical system’.217 Bell 
describes the links thus: 
…both dwell upon fundamental problems of existence, give great attention 
to detail and argument, and are driven to the creation of systems of thought 
through urgent internal concerns.218  
 
It is both through form and content that paranoia resemble philosophy, therefore, 
both in the subject of existence and the systematic way both paranoids and 
philosophers go about addressing them. I can’t help but think of Raad’s highly 
systematic filing systems, which, as André Lepecki points out, are based on an 
equally highly internal logic. ‘What is the difference’, Lepecki asks, ‘between a 
document that the Atlas Group attributes to an “imaginary individual” and one that 
it attributes to itself, given that the Atlas Group is in itself, as we are told, 
“imaginary”?’219 It is not, of course, that I am arguing that Raad is paranoid, but 
rather that he is drawing on a sophisticated understanding of the ways 
knowledge and non-knowledge can operate in parallel. Paranoia is a useful 
mechanism, then, for helping think one framework for these parallels. 
 Indeed paranoia may be partially characterized by the conviction that one 
does know – and the validity of that conviction may sometimes be beside the 
point. Sedgwick writes, 'I am saying that the main reasons for questioning 
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paranoid practices are other than the possibility that their suspicions can be 
delusional'.220 In other words, paranoid critics might be correct in their suspicions, 
but the structure of suspicion-and-exposure is itself a problem. This structure is a 
problem because there is no guarantee, or indeed much evidence, that exposure 
will have an impact on the instances of oppression exposed. This position does 
seem, in some ways, counterintuitive. Surely it is of crucial importance not to 
remain silent in the face of systemic cruelty and violence. However, Sedgwick 
argues that there are multiple ways to speak up, and that, in fact, ‘the 
hermeneutics of suspicion’ that she criticizes in turn are responsible for silencing 
these other modes. She asserts that the monopoly of paranoid theory is a 
problem because it dictates the exclusion of pleasure and reform as modes of 
reading:  
What makes pleasure and amelioration so ‘mere’? Only the exclusiveness 
of paranoia's faith in demystifying exposure: only its cruel and 
contemptuous assumption that the one thing lacking for global revolution, 
explosion of gender roles, or whatever, is people's (that is, other people's) 
having the painful effects of their oppression, poverty or deludedness 
sufficiently exacerbated to make the pain conscious (as if otherwise it 
wouldn't have been) and intolerable (as if intolerable situations were famous 
for generating excellent solutions).221   
 
For Sedgwick, paranoid reading is arrogant in its assumption of a passive, 
deluded readership, which might otherwise labour under the assumption that all 
is well with the world. Among those for whom all is decidedly not well, recitation 
of the conditions of their suffering is neither useful nor is it news.  
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 How does a critique of paranoid reading relate to Raad’s paranoid 
performance? Sedgwick’s critique is situated in a very particular context – the 
popularization of deconstruction in academic literary theory – while Raad is 
dealing with the drastically different topic of the violence of war in Lebanon in the 
1970s through the 1990s. If anything, it is my own initial response to the Atlas 
Group – gleeful intrigue about where and how Raad might be pulling one over on 
me – that belongs in the category of tired paranoia, rather than the project itself. 
Indeed, I will return to the question of audience that is, I think, at the heart of 
Raad’s construction of paranoia as a form of non-knowledge that contributes to 
an understanding of the construction of history.  
 However, a closer look at one of the Atlas Group projects suggests a useful 
link with what I have discussed above. In footage of an Atlas Group lecture-
performance at the Walker Center in 2007, Raad introduces the audience to 
Yussef Bitar, a state investigator and chief explosives expert for the Lebanese 
army, who, during the civil wars, would brief the press daily about the most recent 
car bombings.  Raad describes the Atlas Group’s interest in Bitar.  He also says 
that Bitar would often confuse them (the pronoun Raad uses) with a particular 
journalist who followed Bitar in the 1980s. He was thus unable to provide 
answers to any questions beyond those he had already heard from this journalist. 
For instance, the Atlas Group could not learn why Bitar kept copies of every 
report he submitted during this period. Eventually, they came to believe that he 
was simply waiting for his day in court – the day he could present proof that the 
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original reports had been tampered with by politicians.  
 Inspired by Bitar’s doggedness and conviction, the Atlas Group decided to 
create their own complete dossier of particular car bombings (the project is titled 
My Neck Is Thinner than a Hair). The investigation began ‘arbitrarily – or as 
arbitrarily as anything can be with a car bomb that exploded in 1986 in east 
Beirut’. The caveat in that sentence is important, a clue perhaps; arbitrariness is 
relative and never free of context. Over the course of their investigations, the 
Atlas Group was able to discover the identities of some of the bombers. 
However, when they attempted to bring these identities to light, they were 
brushed off with ‘you’re not telling us anything new’. It was then, Raad claims, 
they realized their assumption that the confirmation of suspicions and revelation 
of the truth would change things was wrong, or at least profoundly limited. Raad 
says:  
What was shocking was not so much the fact that political players involved 
in the 1980s – and still shaping contemporary life in Lebanon – had been 
criminals, had been warlords who had ordered car bombs; this was not 
shocking at all. What seemed shocking was that fact that these car bombs, 
3,600 of them had in fact altered time and space in these neighborhoods, in 
a way that was very difficult to intuit and detect, and it became our job to 
become sensitive to how spatio-temporal dimensions in these ghettos 
where car bombs had detonated, had altered and had remained intact thirty 
years after these detonations.222 
 
The resonance of the Atlas Group project with Sedgwick’s paranoid reading 
might emanate from this. For Sedgwick, paranoia is non-knowledge not because 
it fails to see the truth, but because it fails to see the point. Importantly, the point 
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is situated in a context. The bombs investigated by the Atlas Group, in all their 
specific reality and violence, also speak to the reality of a period and a place. The 
fictional framework that allowed the investigation to take place is as true and as 
beside the point as the fact that the bombings are connected to powerful people 
– this, everyone already knows. Raad does not presume, however, as perhaps 
Sedwick does, that non-paranoid reading has the power to recuperate traumatic 
histories. Rather, Raad’s practice is to attend to the ‘spatio-temporal dimensions’ 
that are produced by war in the urban political landscapes he investigates, and to 
the impacts of these dimensions on the lived and felt experiences of the people 
occupying them.   
 Part of the way Raad captures these dimensions is through the creation of 
instability within the archive. Like the Museum of Jurassic Technology, part of 
what's unsettling is not just that there are fictions in the Atlas Group archive, but 
that these fictions are signalled sometimes, but not all the time. It is the 
unpredictability, the shifting ground, rather than the hoax per se that 
disorientates, even as it also signals how the writing of history is a construction. 
 Indeed, Lepecki focuses his examination of the Atlas Group on the way 
Raad insists that the document never quite catches the historical moment.  
Lepecki draws on an entry in the archive the Raad called ‘Missing Lebanese 
Wars’ which shows a sequence of photographs taken at the finish line at the 
horse races in Beirut. These photos are always taken a few moments before or 
after the horse reaches the finish line. According to Raad, a group of Marxist 
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historians used to attend the horse races, and bet, not on which horse would win, 
but on how many centimetres before or beyond the finish line the photographer 
captured the horse. The professional historians not only accept that the 
document will always be in some ways inadequate, but use that fact as the basis 
for pleasure, and to make a new type of game.  
 
 Lepecki connects the Atlas Group projects to Walter Benjamin’s work on 
historiogray, to show how re-thinking the position of material fragments of the 
past – and more, using these pieces like so many Marxist historians – can create 
a different understanding of temporality itself. He writes of ‘the temporality of the 
event not as bound to its instantaneous eruption as signifier of decline or 
progress, but as a force field whose effect ripples across space and time. (92) 
Progress or decline are eschewed, then, in this system, for a more open and 
indeterminate idea of temporality. I argue, though, that Raad also usefully attends 
to the anxieties and the mental stress that an unstable relationship to truth can 
produce, or, perhaps better, how these anxieties are related to an unstable 
understanding of whom to trust. 
 Lepecki quotes Raad speaking about his use of the lecture form, and on the 
authority that attends it, suggesting that the lecture form is partially responsible 
for creating a micro-crisis of trust: 
I [...] always mention in exhibitions and lectures that the Atlas Group 
documents are ones that I produced and that I attribute to various 
imaginary individuals. But even this direct statement fails, in many 
instances, to make evident for readers or an audience the imaginary 
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nature of the Atlas Group and its documents. This confirms to me the 
weighty associations with authority and authenticity of certain modes of 
address (the lecture, the conference) and display (the white walls of a 
museum or gallery, vinyl text, the picture frame); modes that I choose to 
lean on and play with at the same time.223  
Even though Raad explicitly alerts his audiences to the fictions in his projects, still 
the form that he uses generates doubt – not on whether to trust him, but actually 
whether not to trust him. Importantly, then, ripples of paranoia generated by the 
Atlas Group are not produced simply by the historian/author/authority. The 
audience participates in the production of both Raad’s authority and in the 
production of the instability in his histories. Lepecki argues that one of Raad's 
critical successes with the project is that it:  
…reveals the fundamental role of the audience as a crucial accomplice in 
the production of the historian’s authority—the audience as a partner in 
the historian’s many forgeries, reveries, conscious or unconscious 
manipulations, political desires, ambitious poetics, and feverish archival 
drive'. (94) 
In consciously playing with this authority (through the techniques of his staging 
and in the prestigious sites the work is presented) Raad:  
…displayed clearly how historiography is the primary discursive tool 
behind any desire to ideologically control current political discourses and 
actions—particularly when these take place in the context of open warfare. 
(94) 
Ultimately, then, the Atlas Group is a project about power, and how the 
production of historical knowledge can be a tool for control. In creating paranoid, 
unstable, parallel systems of historical knowledge, Raad may not directly undo 
any of these controls, but he does show how they profoundly they affect the living 
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participants of history. 
AARON	  WILLIAMSON:	  CRITICAL	  WONDER	  
 
 The projector is not working: an inevitable and inevitably cruel fact of public 
presentations. As Aaron Williamson speaks, the image behind him jerks and 
flickers. He is standing in the auditorium of the Whitechapel Art Gallery in 
London, on the second day of a symposium on Art Writing, in 2009. Aaron 
Williamson is meant to be giving a presentation titled ‘A language in search of its 
metalanguage’. Instead, visibly distressed with a red face and forehead gleaming 
with sweat, he is trying to get the projector to work. A technical assistant is 
running from the back of the auditorium to the front, then back again, without 
seeming to be able to understand, let alone fix the problem. The British Sign 
Language interpreter in the front row is less useful still. Williamson looks at her 
helplessly, and she simply tells him that technical assistance is outside her remit.  
The feeling in the room is pure tension, heightened by familiarity. The symphony 
of technical difficulties that has by now played out is unique only in quantity – the 
cringe-inducing failures onstage have their counterparts in countless other halls 
and auditoriums. It is the unrelenting barrage, coupled with a knee-jerk 
discomfort with watching a person with a disability struggle, which makes these 
minutes so excruciating. I wonder if I should intervene, and how. There are a few 
nervous giggles in the audience and I, slow on the uptake, condemn these 
insensitive monsters. It is several more minutes before the chaos tips into 
physical slapstick and I realize the joke is on me. This is a stunningly mimetic 
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performance of failure, a total success of a failure. Indeed, as Williamson 
deadpans in the Q&A at the end of the symposium, in terms of producing a 
virtuosic representation of failure, he ‘rocked’.  
 I struggled at first trying to place this performance into my non-knowledge 
taxonomy. It seems like an exemplary case for my study in some ways. It is clear 
that the title of the piece, ‘A language in search of its meta-language’, is not 
arbitrary, even if it is also a cheeky play on the vagueness of academic language. 
The performance was a precise illustration of the role conceptual frames play in 
understanding. Williamson was operating at the edge of his own frame, 
highlighting it through his perceived failure to act within it: the performer or 
lecturer in a recognized space (the auditorium), with conventional manner 
(composure even in the face of glitches) and technical skill (the ability to operate 
electronic equipment or liaise with those who do). He was also touching on the 
frames that condition response to disability – how prepared is the audience to 
see a deaf person as helpless? There was also an embedded comment about 
performance itself – what are the frames that allow an audience to see something 
as a performance? The group consensus which gave the audience permission to 
laugh was a precisely calibrated meta-mechanism worked out by Williamson in 
collaboration with the technician and interpreter, and ultimately with the audience 
as well.  
 
 Strangely perhaps, then, the category in which I want to place this work is 
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the category of ‘wonder’. I do not here refer to the wonder elaborated by Stephen 
Greenblatt ‘Resonance and Wonder’ – the ‘arresting’ and ‘exalted attention’ 
inspired by certain museum objects, which I discussed in Chapter 3. For 
Greenblatt, wonder is the opposite of resonance, or ‘the power of the displayed 
object to reach out beyond its formal boundaries to a larger world’.224In contrast, 
wonder blots out this larger world by compressing attention entirely within the 
object’s formal boundaries. Greenblatt celebrates this type of attention, even as 
he asserts that it is a historically constructed concept with resonance of its own.  
 I am more interested here in Sara Ahmed’s formulation of wonder. The type 
of wonder Ahmed might like to cherish and enhance has less to do with exalted 
objects in a museum, and more to do with ordinary and familiar structures. She 
begins her discussion of wonder with her own historicization, and then moves to 
develop wonder as a recognition of history. Writing about Descartes’ The 
Passions of the Soul, she states: 
Wonder here seems premised on "first-ness": the object that appears 
before the subject is encountered for the first time, or as if for the first time. 
It is hence a departure from ordinary experience; or, by implication, the 
ordinary is not experienced or felt at all. We can relate this non-feeling of 
ordinariness to the feeling of comfort, as a feeling that one does not feel 
oneself.225 
For Ahmed, ordinariness as non-feeling is a form of non-knowledge. It is the 
privilege afforded to some not to be aware of their surroundings. Being jolted out 
of that lack of awareness (a type of non-non-awareness), or even being aware of 
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that lack of awareness, might be described as a particular type of wonder. For 
instance, in Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed describes the sensation of being part 
of the only lesbian couple in a restaurant filled with heterosexual couples. She 
states: 
Rather than just seeing the familiar, which of course means that it passes 
from view, I felt wonder and surprise at the regularity of its form, as the 
form of what arrived at the table, as forms that get repeated, again and 
again, until they are “forgotten” and simply become forms of life. To 
wonder is to remember the forgetting and to see the repetition of form as 
the “taking form” of the familiar. It is hard to know why it is that we can be 
“shocked” by what passes by us as familiar.226 
Particularly interesting is this idea that wonder is defined as knowledge of the 
forgotten, as forgotten. The lack of awareness that is the ordinary or the familiar 
is informed by repetition, by the gradual mastery of an environment that comes 
from repeated, unchallenged exposure. The result – the reward – of this mastery 
is the forgetting of the environment. 
Wonder, on the other hand, seems anathema to repetition. It is the 
experience of singularity and novelty. There is a problematic dimension to this, 
however. As Ahmed puts it: 
Does such an impulse to wonder require an erasure of history, by 
forgetting that one has seen the world before, or even that the world 
precedes the impulse to wonder? It could be assumed that the "as if" 
functions as a radical form of subjectivism, in which the subject forgets all 
that has taken place before a given moment of contemplation.227 
This ‘radical form of subjectivism’ would in turn erase the possibility of action in 
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the world, as attention is absorbed completely in one’s own absolutely present 
experience. The non-knowledge of wonder might subvert the non-knowledge of 
familiarity, as long as it doesn’t subsume it. Wonder is an affective relation with 
political force only if it prompts an understanding of what has come before, or 
rather, a heightened affective experience of the coming-before-ness of the world. 
As Ahmed writes: 
I would suggest that wonder allows us to see the surfaces of the world as 
made, and as such wonder opens up rather than suspends historicity. 
Historicity is what is concealed by the transformation of the world into "the 
ordinary", into something that is already familiar or recognisable.228 
Importantly, Ahmed’s emphasis on the phrase “as if” suggests that political 
wonder might rely on a form of acting, or dramatization, an inverted suspension 
of disbelief where it is familiar or ordinary (and thus unthought-of) beliefs that are 
temporarily suspended. That temporary suspension might open the way for a 
rush of energy and motivation to change: 
This first-time-ness of wonder is not the radical present – a moment that is 
liveable only insofar as it is cut off from prior acts of perception. Rather, 
wonder involves the radicalisation of our relation to the past, which is 
transformed into that which lives and breathes in the present.229 
Thus wonder as an affective relation could be marshaled into the cause of a 
politically inflected relationality itself. 
Ahmed discusses wonder as a political practice with reference to the 
specific development of a feminist wonder. This is a type of wonder that is not 
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just conducted with a feminist lens, but which allows us to think about feminism in 
a new way. Ahmed writes: 
What is striking about feminist wonder is that the critical gaze is not simply 
directed outside; rather, feminist wonder becomes wonder about the very 
forms of feminism that have emerged here or there. This critical wonder is 
about recognising that nothing in the world can be taken for granted, which 
includes the very political movements to which we are attached.230 
Wonder allows a form of self-reflexivity which is not a celebration of the potential 
for personal self-development, but which helps to uncouple the way things are 
from the way things have always been and, most crucially, from the way things 
must always be. I suggest that Ahmed’s feminist wonder might be termed, more 
broadly, critical wonder, and that it is a useful tool for thinking how this particular 
form of non-knowledge can operate in a variety of contexts, and especially in the 
context of performance. 
 For me, that moment of excess in Williamson’s performance-lecture, when 
the barrage of technical difficulties became too much to believe, is what connects 
this work with Ahmed’s critical wonder. Occurring at a different moment for 
different audience members, yet developing in response to others’ reactions, this 
moment allowed the conceptual frames that Williamson had disrupted to slip 
back into place, but changed. As long as Williamson withheld any obvious 
delineation between choreography and accident, he organized a near-perfect 
representation of a failure of organization. Then he shifted from appearing like a 
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failure to appearing like the appearance of failure.  
 ‘Getting it’, for me, constituted the instance of critical wonder – in the eye of 
this perfect storm of malfunction was a brilliant demonstration of how critical 
wonder might operate. It created a temporary, but absolutely vital and affective, 
suspension of belief in the ordinary or familiar, such as assumptions about the 
power relationship between a deaf person and interpreter or technical assistant, 
and about disability and ‘helplessness’. This instant revealed as made (to use 
Ahmed’s term) the embodied conventions (technological and communicative) 
that both enable and impede access to knowledge.  
 Much of Williamson’s work operates as a conceptual response to the 
obstacles faced by the disabled community from the non-disabled community (or 
as, Williamson puts it, ‘the temporarily non-disabled community’.231 Williamson 
states that ‘social perception’ is the ‘main disabling aspect’ of his life, and he is 
thus a committed advocate for and explorer of ‘the cause and philosophy of 
access’.232 Access is both physical and conceptual (if it is possible to separate 
those two) – both stated and unspoken. It makes the world in that it constructs 
possibility. One of the most valuable experiences of critical wonder, then, would 
inspire understanding of the construction of access.  
 Williamson’s work has elsewhere more explicitly addressed the connection 
between wonder and access. Much of this draws directly on the history and 
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cultural mechanics of the medical marvel. For instance, in his solo performance 
Obscure Display, shown at the Victoria and Albert museum in 2000, Williamson’s 
naked body is in a glass, Victorian-style display case, covered only by a fig leaf 
over his genitals. He proceeds to smear the glass with shaving cream, until all 
transparency is obscured. Then, using a plastic edge, he slowly clears small 
squares in the shaving cream, creating a set of frames across the case. He 
strikes a series of poses, the frames exposing specific sections of his naked 
body.  
 This work sets up a theme that Williamson often returns to: the disruption of 
scientific narratives of wholeness. Like familiarity, wholeness only appears as 
such when its frame is invisible, allowing the space of display to go uninterrupted 
and unmarked. The frame is present in its absence, remarkable for being 
unremarked upon. In Williamson’s work, the fragment is not an incompleteness 
that must be repaired (the dominant medical notion of impairment) but refers to 
the shifting system of frames that can allow or bar access. In manipulating these 
frames in his work, Williamson produces, I argue, what might be called a critical 
wonder during which wholeness, familiarity and the ordinary can and must be 
redefined. In this instance, non-knowing is a verb, meaning to make the known 
surprising and the familiar new. This kind of non-knowledge is a non-knowledge 
that is ripe for action and connection, even if it is a close cousin to the type of 
wonder that is static and isolated. This non-knowledge is a failure to learn that 
rejects learning as a recapitulation of the world as it is and always has been. It is, 
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in fact, an unlearning of this world, and the unexamined assumptions it makes 
about capacity and access.  
 
CONCLUSION	  
 Through looking at a selection of projects that produce distinct experiences 
of non-knowledge, I have proposed the beginnings of a provisional taxonomy of 
non-knowledge affects. This taxonomy is purposefully not intended ever to 
exhaust the possibilities of non-knowledge, but rather to refer to its condition of 
multiplicity and constant change. Stupidity might be summarised as the refusal to 
attain depth. Paranoia might be characterised as a non-knowledge compelled 
constantly to undo and remake itself – to suspect, expose and return once again 
to suspicion. Wonder might be described as the unlearning of the known world. 
However, these summaries are inadequate to capture the various histories and 
politics of each term. I want here to emphasise here, rather, how each of these 
categories in my partial taxonomy operates differently, and contains its own 
problematic associations and distinct potentialities. As I stated in my introduction, 
it is crucial to think when the failure to learn might be productive or interventionist, 
and when it might be the product or act of exclusion or disenfranchisement. 
Insisting that non-knowledges operate differently and distinctly is perhaps an 
important first step to recognising how they might assist criticality and creativity.  
 I opened this chapter by asking how the failure to learn could be described. 
I will close with this answer: I don’t know. Yet I suggest that a multiplicity of non-
knowledges might be, and should be, identified and explored. Some of these 
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non-knowledges must be challenged and overcome. Some should be given the 




Chapter	  Five:	  We	  Need	  More	  Experts	  	  
 
INTRODUCTION	  	  
 In this chapter and the next chapter, the question of borders becomes 
particularly urgent. This can mean the physical borders of national boundaries, as 
well as the immaterial and imagined borders that make up contemporary ideas 
about nationhood as such. These borders will be explicitly in play in this chapter, 
which focuses on the radical ‘no borders’ movement which challenges global 
immigration control. I also refer to borders that define expertise itself – who is in 
and who is out of it, and which skills constitute its proper behaviours. These 
borders have been questioned throughout, both by looking at a range of non-
expert activities, and by looking at the way non-knowledge complicates what we 
might think of as expert activities. In the last two chapters, however, I want to 
think about how the borders of expertise might be addressed through modes of 
hyperbole and overidentification. How is ‘everyone is an expert’ a political 
statement? What sort of performance strategies might be employed in making 
this assertion? 
 In this chapter, I focus on a relatively short-lived project called Everyone Is 
an Expert, initiated in 2001 and continuing through 2002. The project involved the 
development of an interactive database (the ‘Expertbase’), as well as two live 
performance installations. Like Gran Fury and the Critical Art Ensemble 
discussed in the first chapter, this project has explicitly activist intentions. In this 
case, the movement the project supports is the no-borders movement, which is a 
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radical immigrants’ rights movement, which challenges the legitimacy of national 
borders. Though Everyone Is an Expert is not longer functioning, it has very 
much structured my thinking about the possibilities of approaching the politics of 
expertise from a position of participation, to the point of hyperbole. It is also 
particularly interesting as a time-piece reflecting a very specific period of thinking 
around both the performative potential of the database and the radical value of 
the Internet to promote inclusivity and participation. If thinking around these 
issues has shifted in more recent years, still this project provides an important 
opportunity to discuss how the politics of expertise frames complicated questions 
about participation.    
 
EVERYONE	  IS	  AN	  EXPERT	  
 I begin with an extended analysis of the language and presentation of the 
Everyone Is an Expert project itself, in its manifestation as an online database, 
and its appearance in two (very different) exhibition contexts.  I will look at the 
‘Expertbase’ website as it currently exists online – the database is now no longer 
operational, and exists rather as a virtual artifact.  Next, I will discuss the project’s 
presentation at the Make World festival in Munich in 2001, while also discussing 
the ethos of the festival itself, in terms of technology and self-organization, radical 
change and artistic intervention.  Finally, I will discuss the controversy that 
attended the project’s second presentation at the 'biennale internazionale arte 
giovane' ['international biennial of young art'] in Torino, Italy, in 2002.  
 As mentioned above, Everyone Is an Expert includes an online database 
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component, called the Expertbase.  The Expertbase website describes itself thus:  
Expertbase is a site for people with extraordinary skills. It's a site for people, 
who are not found in any commercial or official databases. A site for people, 
who are being ignored by vulgar headhunters and usually excluded from the 
labor market -- either because of their residence permit status or because of 
their origins, but in the last instance because of their unique abilities and 
singular qualifications. Expertbase is a site for people, who have gained 
expert knowledge on any field and who are willing to share these 
experiences with others.233  
  
Importantly, then, ‘expertise’ is self-defined, though not necessarily self- 
generated.  Everyone is an expert, if everyone decides to identify her/his own 
expertise.    
 The project underwent four manifestations.  Again from the Expertbase 
website, these include ‘Expertbase 0.7’, which was an initial reaction to then 
Chancellor Schröder’s call for more ‘expert’ immigrants to Germany in 2000.   
This reaction took the form of a printed newspaper which was distributed in the 
anti-racist bordercamp in Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  The second 
manifestation, ‘Expertbase 1.0’, took the form of an installation at the 2001 Make  
World festival.  Drawing on the aesthetic of an office, artist Shu Lea Cheang and 
photographer Armin Smailovic joined the team to reproduce a typical waiting 
room, where visitors watched for their number to appear on an LCD screen, and 
then entered details about their expertise.  This was the impetus for the 
development of the online database, which continued to exist, no longer synched 
with the installation.    
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 The Make World festival took its name from a programming command 
‘make world’, which is ‘used to completely update an operating system’. Bringing 
together ‘scientists, theorists, artists and activists ‘ for a series of ‘presentations, 
constructive conversations, reflection and debates’, the festival aimed to produce 
an environment where ‘expertism turns into ubiquitous networking, liberating 
infinite potentials and virtualities’.234 The festival’s self description situates it in 
the field of critical theory and art production, where a complex network of 
complicated ideas and realities is processed and managed. The language is 
optimistic about the potential for new technologies to fundamentally shift 
hierarchical relations of knowledge production. The ‘network’ is an energising 
principle, which has the potential to collectivise individuals and liberate controlled 
thinking. 
 The third manifestation of Everyone Is an Expert, ‘Expertbase 1.3’, ran into 
difficulties.  Invited to install a larger scale project at the 'biennale internazionale 
arte giovane' ['international biennial of young art'] in Torino, Italy in 2002, the 
group found they had arrived in the city at the same time that new immigration 
legislation was being debated in Italy.  According to the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), this legislation, 
called the Bossi-Fini Law, was the implementation of campaign promises by the  
centre-right government newly in power.  The law provided stricter restrictions 
and controls on non-EU migrants (e.g. requiring migrant labourers to provide 
                                                




contracts from employers, with the provision that the migrant must return to the 
country of origin at the end of the contract.)  Again, highly skilled workers were 
exempt from the new controls.235   
 According to the Expertbase participants, the organisers of the festival 
asked them to remove a phrase calling for the dismissal of the Bossi-Fini law 
from a newspaper and stickers they were distributing.  When they refused, they 
were removed from the festival.  The Expertbase team states that ‘this episode 
also taught us to avoid being completely dependend [sic] on the infrastructure of 
future exibitions [sic]’.236 They were able to contribute to a forum of the exhibition, 
however, and to attend a political demonstration against Bossi-Fini.  
 The final manifestation took the form of a van that toured Europe in 2003.  
The purpose was to recruit experts and to set up ‘ad-hoc networking for multiple 
purposes ranging from a roaming webcasting unit to a mobile online- library; from 
a wireless discotheque to an open-source job-market; from internet workshops 
on wheels to event-coverage in real-time’.237 Here, the ‘network’ is encouraged 
through the grassroots organising mixed with mobile communication technologies 
and social contact. Again, optimism and the sense that the act of bringing people 
together might result in unexpected and liberating possibilities is prominent.                                                   
 There is a lot of talk about self-organisation and the user in the Expertbase.   
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Usefully, however, much of this has to do with the user taking on the forms of 
technology, rather than simply producing ‘user-generated content’. Shu Lea  
Cheang, the artist associated with Expertbase 1.0, states that she does not come 
from a computer programming background, but she views the use of technology 
in her work as the ability ‘to walk around, to look for land-mines almost’.  
Because computer programming and database technology are such powerful 
tools for processing and managing complication, and because these tools are 
never neutral, the ability to understand and communicate in the language of 
technology is politically powerful.  As Cheang says, ‘I'm more of an inbetween 
agent... if I can talk to those programming people, to make an interface that is 
accessible for social use and public use - I become the agent to apply that 
technology.’238 The in-betweeness that Cheang identifies relates to my previous 
discussions of the non-expert in earlier chapters. As the tools for producing 
information and communication technology became increasingly available to 
artists, questions about these tools’ social function also became pressing. 
 So what models are necessary to think through Everyone Is an Expert?  
The project seems fairly straightforward: it consists primarily of a database 
platform that allows anyone to upload information detailing the skills and valuable 
experiences that make him or her an ‘expert’.  This information is searchable, 
and allows anyone else to draw on the expert’s skills and experiences, should 
they be required, or desired.  However, the genealogy of this category of work 
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and the history of the manifestations of the specific project are more complex, 
and they lead to broader issues connecting immigration, technology, and 
participation. I now want to look at some of these issues in more detail. 
 In the following, then, I will look at some of the background politics of 
Everyone Is an Expert. As I mentioned above, the project is directly related to the 
‘no borders’ movement, a loose association of radical anti-racist activists who 
protest repressive immigration controls, largely in Europe and the USA, though 
also significantly in Canada and Australia.  In the following, I will first briefly 
discuss some activities associated with this movement.  Then, I will analyse a 
theoretical framework that directly articulates the stakes of the movement, as 
developed by immigration lawyer Steven Cohen. I will also look at the more 
general role of state sovereignty to discuss the broader philosophical framework 
of inclusion and exclusion that manifests in the practice of deportation, and then 
look at how activist intervention has challenged this framework. 
 
BORDER	  POLITICS	  
Kein	  Mensch	  Ist	  Illegal	  	  
It would be problematic to assert a founder, or even singular founding 
moment, to the ‘no borders’ movement, but it is fair to say that since the late 
1990s, activists worldwide have been participating in actions connected to this 
movement. Many of them organize around the slogan ‘No one is illegal’. As 
Steven Cohen writes: 
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Sometimes resistance is in the name. More and more the struggle against 
immigration control is taking place under the name of No One Is Illegal. 
This is the title of the newsletter of the Greater Manchester Immigration 
Aid Unit in the UK. Even a cursory look at the internet shows groups of 
this name in Australia, Germany (Kein Mensch Ist Illegal), Spain (Niinguna 
Persona Es Illegal), Poland (Zaden Czlowick Nie Jest Nielegalny).239 
He goes on to list: an August, 1999 anarchist demonstration in Lvov, Poland; the 
French sans papiers campaign; no-border camps at German, Czech and Polish 
borders; a June 2002 demonstration in Ottawa, Canada; and an Australian 
radical media group (SKA TV) video. All of these, and more, have been 
associated with the slogan ‘No one is illegal’.240  
The Everyone Is an Expert project was developed in part by people 
associated with the ‘Kein Mensch Ist Illegal’ event in 1997 at the ‘Hybrid 
Workspace’ program of Documenta X.241 This event is held to be the first use of 
‘Kein Mensch Ist Illegal’ as an organizing cry, and a point of connection for a 
network ‘from the autonomous left as well as the church asylum movement, from 
refugee councils and the self-organisations of migrants’. 242  Documenta, a 
prestigious and highly institutionalised space, became a central gathering point 
for a much broader network of interests. As an instance of tactical organising, 
and the use of institutions as mechanisms for amplifying existing campaigns, 
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‘Kein Mensch Ist Illegal’ seems a successful example. The ongoing effects of the 
event are still felt, as chapters internationally continue to organise and fight. 
 This intersection between the art world and radical activist politics took 
place against the backdrop of what the ‘Hybrid Workspace’ website describes as 
‘the summer of content’.243 In addition to ‘Kein Mensch Ist Illegal’, the Hybrid 
workspace also supported: a ‘salon’ series on the topic of memory; the ‘Society 
for Old and New Media’ rallying for the expanded allocation of bandwidth to the 
public sphere; a temporary webradio broadcast with twenty-four hours of 
programming; a meeting of the Tactical Media Network; and a focused 
programme on cyberfeminism by ‘The Old Boys Network’. Over the 100 days of 
the Documenta festival, the Hybrid WorkSpace operated open to the public in 
one of the festival’s exhibition spaces. 
 The Hybrid Workspace programme, then, seems like an attempt to politicise 
the explosion of information, and more, the inevitable capitalistic attempts to 
absorb this explosion, that occurred with the introduction of the Internet to a 
mainstream population. ‘Content’ takes on new significance when the mechanism 
for its distribution have become radically more accessible. As I have already 
suggested, there is an optimism and an urgency around data as a radical 
proposition that situates the Hybrid Workspace as well as Everyone Is an Expert 
in a particular time. This does not, I argue, make it any less interesting for an 
inquiry into the politics of expertise.  
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No	  One	  Is	  Illegal	  
 I will now look more closely at the ‘content’ informing Everyone Is an Expert, 
specifically the politics of immigration control and their connection to expertise. In 
thinking through the background politics of the Everyone Is an Expert project, I 
have found the work of Steven Cohen – politically invested and polemical as it is 
– deeply useful. In his manifesto on the ‘no borders’ movement, Cohen, a lawyer 
and activist, argues that all immigration controls are fundamentally unjust, and 
yet so deeply at the core of political discourse, that changing them would require 
a fundamental shift in the ideology of contemporary nationhood. Cohen asserts 
that:  
Immigration law is unique.  In every other area of law it is the deed that is 
unlawful.  In immigration control it is the person who becomes illegal – an 
illegal, a pariah, a non-person.  In this way the modern migrant, immigrant 
and refugee assumes and resumes the status of the medieval outlaw – 
outside of legal norms and beyond legal protection.244  
 
Hence the organising cry of immigration activism: ‘no one is illegal’, the fact of a 
person’s existence must not be criminalized.  
 Cohen takes a historical view on immigration law, arguing that while its 
ideals or so entrenched as to seem inevitable, it is actually a relatively recent are 
of the law. He indentifies the first immigration control in the UK as the 1905 
Aliens Act, which operated, Cohen asserts, to exclude Jewish asylums seekers 
fleeing Austria. Thus not only has anti-immigration been quite recently legislated, 
its roots are tied up with bigotry, though the targets of bigotry shift with the times. 
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Since 1905, Cohen argues, 'from the perspective of the Home Office the potential 
is always that everyone is illegal'.245 
 Of course, the UK is not the only nation to embrace the control of 
immigration.  Since the late nineteenth century, immigration control has become 
an international norm. Importantly, of course, modern immigration legislation 
never aims to wholly seal national borders. Rather, it is based complex 
equations, with variables like demand for labour and the costs of domestic labour 
at their hearts.   Cohen writes immigration controls, 'all other countries have 
them.  In particular, all other capitalised, industrialised countries have them – not 
to exclude labour but to literally control labour in accordance with economic 
needs'.246 Immigration as a question of expertise begins to emerge at this point, 
though I will elaborate on this later. 
  
  Having demonstrated that immigration control is both historical (i.e. not  
‘natural’), but also ubiquitous, Cohen goes on to argue for the impossibility of 
non-racist immigration controls.  He quotes Sarah Spencer's Strangers and  
Citizens, published by Labour Party think-tank the Institute for Public Policy  
Research, which calls for ‘non discriminatory, fair and clear’ controls.247 Cohen 
insists that non-discrimination and fairness are in contradiction with immigration 
control.  He writes, 'as long as there are controls some will be excluded and 
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these some will be poor and impoverished, the colonised and neo- colonised 
workers from outside the imperialist heartlands'. He goes on to write that 
immigration controls, as the ‘historic consequences of nationalism, racism, anti-
Semitism, fascism, welfarism, labourism’, are connected to the determining 
factors which create a global class of the poor and impoverished.  As such, 
‘controls cannot be stripped from their historic roots and somehow be sanitised 
and made racism-free'. 248   Immigration is necessarily an issue that evokes 
histories of inequality and exploitation. ‘Neutral immigration law’ is a contradiction 
in terms.  
 Importantly, Cohen distinguishes his position – freedom of movement for all 
human beings – from a libertarian position. ‘The libertarian stance,’ Cohen writes, 
‘is predicated not on the freedom of movement for workers, but on the freedom of 
both global and local capital to exploit migrating labour’. He emphasizes that the 
resistance to immigration controls is not just about right to entry, but also 
contests the link between immigration status and welfare entitlements. Thus:  
Freedom of movement would require the utmost protection of the 
workplace, welfare and social rights of migrating labour, for instance right to 
the minimum wage, right to health and safety, right to trade union 
organizations, right not to suffer discrimination and the right to full welfare – 
with the latter requiring the end of internal controls and breaking the link 
between migration and welfare.249   
 
 While I am sympathetic to the position Cohen outlines, I am also aware of the 
difficulties faced by those attempting to assert this position.  In the final chapter of 
his book, Cohen admits that the idea of ‘No one is illegal’ being voluntarily 
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adopted in contemporary political discourse is almost literally unthinkable, so 
central to capitalist expansion is the control of labour, and controlled entitlement 
to welfare, gained through the control of the movement of labourers.  Thus it is 
important to analyse the strategies for resistance that have developed within 
political and cultural discourse, to identify possibilities for re-thinking the 
imperative for secure national borders. Hopefully, in re-thinking how this ‘security’ 
is defined and achieved, there may be room for undoing some of the ugly human 
consequences that are currently unchecked. 
 I want to take a moment, then, to think about how contemporary 
understandings of statehood relies on immigration control, even as the power of 
the state is in a complicated relationship with corporations as multi- or 
transnational entities. This understanding helps frame expertise as a political 
question for the state. Are experts subject to control, or do they transcend 
questions of state sovereignty? What does it say about the state of nationhood 
when the parameters and definitions expertise move and shift?  
 Peter Nyer looks at the question of contemporary state sovereignty by 
considering the figure of the asylum seeker. Asylum seekers occupy a different 
position from, for instance, economic refugees seeking labour opportunities, a 
contentious category which can spark right-wing accusations of job theft by 
foreigners. This category has obvious consequences for thinking about expertise 
and immigration. Which immigrants are seen as a drain on economic resources 
and which are seen as beneficial has much to do with questions of perceived 
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‘skill’ and competence. These questions themselves may also cover up a variety 
of other questions of culture, assimilation, tradition and other dynamics that 
contribute to the ‘imagined communities’ that create ideas of nationhood (i.e. as 
developed by Benedict Anderson250).   
 The asylum seeker is a particularly emotionally potent category of 
immigrant. On the one hand, there is a sense that those seeking asylum may be 
more deserving, somehow, than immigrants who leave their countries for 
economic reasons. And yet, asylum seekers may also be seen as a threat to the 
integrity of national borders. The way nations deal with asylum seekers is often 
controversial, but Nyer argues that what is at stake is the very foundation of state 
sovereignty. For Nyer, the contemporary state uses the possibility of extending 
protection – and denying it – to asylum seekers in order to ‘(re)found its claim to 
monopolise the political’. 251  This ‘(re)founding’ is not any less urgent, Nyer 
shows, in an age where global movement is the basis for economies. Indeed, 
under these conditions, security, control and exclusion have become the 
underlying logic of the so-called developed world, a logic which has only become 
more ingrained after 9/11 and other attacks, and in the face of increasing global 
economic insecurity.  
Nyer understands the framework of wealthy nations’ immigrant policy to be 
thus: the migrant is an object, albeit an object with particular, uncanny agencies – 
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‘unsavoury agency (ie they are identity-frauds, queuejumpers, people who under- 
mine consent in the polity)’ and ‘dangerous agency (ie they are criminals, 
terrorists,agentsof insecurity)’. In the face of these strange agencies (strange 
because objects do not usually ‘act’), nations have adopted border control 
policies the severity of which have, Nyer claims, created an ‘abject diaspora’.252  
Abjection poses a particular difficulty for any understanding of clear-cut 
‘inside’ and outside’, however, because it describes that which is rejected but 
always (at least partly) still present.  Nyer works to clarify how it might be 
possible to act politically from this position by asking:  
What are the possibilities and constraints that (dis)allow political activism by 
non- or quasi-citizens? For their agency to be recognised as legitimate and 
heard as political, does it require mediation from other citizen groups? Most 
importantly, what implications does the activism of abject migrants have for 
regimes of the political which operate on the assumption that such acts of 
agency are, in fact, impossible?253   
  
Nyer addresses these questions by developing a concept of ‘abject 
cosmopolitanism’: cosmopolitan in reference to the concept of ‘thinking and 
acting beyond the state’,254 and abject in recognition of the politically non-existent 
status of those to whom this concept is here applied, i.e. asylum seekers.  Nyer 
uses the example of a group of Algerian refugees in Montreal, Quebec to assert 
an important dual point about this concept.  This group, which calls itself Comité 
d’Action des Sans Status Algériens (CASS), successfully lobbied the Canadian 
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government to reconsider their deportation status in 2002.  Nyer shows how such 
an act of self- organization is a radical political move, stating that:  
When speechless victims begin to speak about the politics of protection, 
this has the effect of putting the political into question. This is what makes 
'no one is illegal' such a radical proclamation. Our received traditions of the 
political require that some human beings be illegal. To say that no human is 
illegal is to call into question the entire architecture of sovereignty, all its 
borders, locks and doors, internal hierarchies, etc.255   
  
The radicalism of the politics of abject cosmopolitanism extends beyond the 
internal borders of a state, as well.  ‘To engage with deportation is not only to 
engage with practices that are constitutive of citizenship, but also with practices 
that are constitutive of a state-centric world order’, Nyer writes.256  Again, when 
states perform their right to deport, they also reinforce their primacy, their 
‘monopoly’ on the realm of the political as such. Thus, to engage deportation is to 
petition for the right to participate in this realm.     
 However, Nyer shows how resilient the state-centric monopoly on the 
political can be. He describes how his case study shows both a successful 
petition on the part of asylum seekers, as well as a re-asserting of state power, 
writing that: ‘the CASS found that, while they received recognition by the 
Canadian and Quebec governments, they were unsuccessful in defining the 
conditions of this recognition’.  The Canadian government created an amnesty 
program which allowed refugees to apply for permanent residency status, as 
immigrants.  Importantly, this conflicted with the claim by CASS that they should 
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be offered asylum on the basis of protection, not immigration.  As one CASS 
member stated, 'We don't agree with this, because immigration is granted to 
people based on their job skills, their language skills. Should not speaking French 
or English mean you have less of a right not to be returned to a situation where 
you could be tortured and killed?'257 So while the Canadian government allowed 
many people to remain in Montreal – the practical purpose of the lobby – it did so 
in a way that allowed the framework for evaluating political agency to remain the 
same.  There was still a class of people who were politically speechless – 
refugees – and the Canadian government maintained this class by shunting one 
group out of that class into the politically recognized class of legal immigrant.  In 
doing so, the Canadian government simultaneously re-asserted its own power as 
the body that structures political agency internally, and the power of the ‘state’ as 
sovereign in the international arena.  Thus, Nyer writes, ‘the radical takings of 
foreigners are always at risk of being deflected and absorbed by the non- 
democratic re-takings of sovereign power for the purposes of national and 
international (re)foundings’.258   
 Relevant to this thesis, the Canadian government defines the legal 
immigrant class on the basis of skill, and it is precisely this definition that CASS 
objected to in principle. In a framework where ‘no one is illegal’, particular skills 
should be irrelevant to a person’s ability to seek protection from persecution. 
Under the current regime, however, the evocation of ‘expertise’ is a time-tested 
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way to create borders that have a controlled porosity, creating flexibility on the 
part of nations to accommodate protest whilst maintaining sovereignty.   
 
We	  Need	  More	  Experts	  	  
 If the overarching ideology of statehood require that national borders are 
asserted through the act of denying some people the right to cross them, the 
specifics of this act are subject to often rapid change. In this section, I will 
discuss the shorter term historical and political context that prompted the 
developers of Everyone Is an Expert, looking also at why they chose their slogan 
as an evolution of the phrase ‘No One Is Illegal’.  I will show how this decision is 
a response to a very particular shift in immigration policy in Germany at the 
beginning of the 21st century, and more generally Western Europe, the United 
States, Canada and Australia at the same time.  I will also show how the shifting 
nature of immigration policy is itself an object of critique and protest, as it 
produces conditions of precariousness even among the privileged within any one 
policy mood. I will also briefly examine the 2002 White Paper Secure Borders, 
Safe Haven, which led to the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill in the 
UK as a way to situate Everyone Is an Expert in a particular time with particular 
policy imperatives. 
 Florian Schneider, one of the developers of Everyone Is an Expert, wrote  
in Mute Magazine, in 2002, that:  
At the February 2000 computer convention CEBIT in Hanover, after a 
quarter-century-long, loudly-trumpeted policy of zero migration, and with an 
increasingly brutal regime arrayed along EU borders, German Chancellor 
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Gerhard Schröder declared that an acute shortage in qualified personnel in 
the IT sector demanded a liberalisation of Germany’s complicated laws on 
foreigners.259    
  
He goes on to assert that this liberalisation had the knock-on effect of deepening 
the precariousness of the situation of migrant workers of all skill-levels and types 
in Germany, as ‘other industries made claims for equal treatment, demanding the 
privilege of hiring temporary, low-wage employees from abroad’. 260   The 
complicated application of this shift in immigration policy, then, increased the 
possibility for some foreign workers to cross borders, but without an attendant 
shift in labour protections to accommodate the rights of these workers.  (At least) 
three categories of migrants must be considered, then: those privileged few 
‘experts’ whose skills are internationally respected and desired; those whose 
skills are economically necessary but not respected, and who therefore do not 
benefit from labour protections when their labour is recruited; and those whose 
skills are not economically necessary, and who are therefore excluded.   
 Germany was not the only country to enact such a policy shift around this 
period.  Indeed, the close relationship between labour, immigration and global 
capital means that policy around immigration often has international echoes.  The 
2002 White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, presented to Parliament in the 
UK, contains a similar tone to that of the German government recounted by 
Schneider.  The foreword to the paper, by David Blunkett (then Home Secretary) 
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strikes a note of considered warmth and tolerance.  He writes:  
In setting out a policy on citizenship, immigration and asylum it is this 
recognition of global movement, mass communication and the changing 
international situation that has to inform our thinking if we are determined to 
develop the type of society we all want to be part of... This means 
welcoming those who have a contribution to make to our country, offering 
refuge to those who have a well-founded fear of persecution and engaging 
those who seek citizenship so they can enjoy the full benefits of this status 
and understand the obligations that go with it.261  
 
This opening, firm but kind, draws on a sort of fuzzy universalism (‘the type of 
society we all want to be part of’) to create the sense of uncontroversial 
reasonableness. 
 However, as Rosemary Sales argues, the attitude of inclusion generated in 
the White Paper is extended only partially, to those who ‘by virtue of their skills or 
their ability to meet the strict criteria for refugee status’ are considered 
deserving.262  There is a proportionate rise in exclusion applied to those not 
considered deserving.  In the guise of tolerance, then, immigration controls have 
become more severe.  ‘The boundaries of exclusion are... shifted,’ writes Sales,’ 
and made more impenetrable’.263  The call for more experts can also shut down 
the rights of anyone who does not fit the precise niche to be filled.  
 Steven Cohen is even more condemning of Secure Borders, Safe Havens, 
while also noting its warmer tone.  He compares the document with the 1998 
White Paper Fairer, Faster and Firmer.  The rhetoric of the earlier paper warns of 
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widespread abuse of the UK’s immigration system.  The 2002 paper, by contrast, 
claims that this abuse is a myth.  To return to Blunkett’s foreword, the secretary 
asserts that the document is intended in part, he writes:  
…to expose the nonsense of the claim that people coming through the 
Channel Tunnel, or crossing in container lorries, constitutes an invasion 
when it patently demonstrates how difficult people are finding it to reach this 
country.264 
 
Again, the driving attitude is New Labour reasonableness, against the 
(presumably opposition) hysteria about a system that Blunkett argues is working 
(insofar as it is making it difficult for people to reach the UK).   Cohen, like Sales, 
shows how this note of evenhandedness conceals the increased intolerance in 
the document towards those not qualified under the new policy. He also 
vehemently objects to the way policy which affects the lives of immigrants can 
shift according to the demands of capital. He writes:   
   
So foreign labour is unwelcome when unneeded and recruited when 
required.  This labour is no longer humanity but another form of disposable 
commodity.  There is always a tension between the economic racists and 
the social racists.  The former are prepared to tolerate foreign labour when 
economically necessary without wanting its presence.  The latter don’t want 
either the labour or the presence.265   
 
The problem is not only that some are included and some are excluded, though 
this is the base of the issue.  It is also that inclusion and exclusion are defined in 
ever-shifting terms, which requires critique and activism to be equally nimble.  As 
terrorism and economic downturn increasingly dominate political discourse, 
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immigration policy will continue to shift, and those who were protected under 
earlier policies may find themselves less so. Indeed, since I started this thesis, 
international students, while sometimes prized for the income they bring to 
universities in the form of fees, are now facing increased obstacles to coming to 
the UK and increased monitoring once they are here. It will only become more 
important to think through models for objecting to repressive immigration policies. 
 It is this framework of the late 90s and early 2000s to which Everyone Is an 
Expert is responding.  The complications of international border politics are 
reflected in the sprawling applications of the seemingly simple art project.  
Schneider writes of the project that:  
It is characterised by voluntary, self-determined associations, blurred 
relations, rich diversity, and a multiplicity of tactical and strategic contexts, 
all of which draw attention to the incalculable differences and holisms of all 
productive practice.  
 
Everyone Is an Expert attempts multiplicity and flexibility in the face of uncertain 
times. The project’s approach to terminology is one example of this. The phrase 
‘Everyone Is an Expert’ is explicitly a response to the phrase ‘No One  
Is Illegal’.  Schneider writes that it ‘updates the double negation’ of the earlier 
phrase.  Further, ‘it’s turning the latter’s simplicity, redundancy, and necessary 
understatement into a political tactic of over-affirmation’.266  Keenly attuned to the 
mechanics of policy language, Everyone Is an Expert actively pre-empts the 
capitalist and state-ist applications of this language.  
  
                                                





 Having discussed some of the political commitments that drove the 
development of Everyone Is an Expert, I want to turn my attention to the way in 
worked in the context of cultural production. Very little has been written about the 
project itself, so to help me find a framework for considering Everyone Is an 
Expert in these terms, I turn to an article about another artist group associated 
with ‘Kein Mensch Ist Illegal’, which has some useful results for the project here. 
The group, called Schleuser, plays on the aesthetics of a corporation (as, to a 
degree, does Everyone Is an Expert) with pointed satire.  They claim to be an 
agency representing modern day coyotes – those who assist migrants to illegally 
cross borders.  Ole Gram, the author of the article, writes:   
In their broad repertoire of activities, from the Web site to educational 
seminars and installation art, the collective behind Schleuser parodies the 
use of international marketing language and commodity aesthetics and 
thereby questions the shifting conditions and valences with which terms 
such as “mobility” and “security” are applied to the international flow of 
capital, goods, and people.267   
 
Gram, asserts that Schleuser should be read through a Situationist framework. 
He draws on Guy Debord’s critique of ‘spectacle’268, in which Debord posits a 
pathological relationship between alienated subjects and the increasingly 
mediatized cultural landscape, which precludes a direct engagement with reality 
and produces a disaffected, apolitical population. He also references actions by 
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the French Situationist group in the 1960s aimed at disrupting the mechanisms of 
spectacle through ‘hijacking, plagiarism, and a re-functioning of “spectacular” 
images with the intention of revealing and reversing the ideological function of its 
texts and images in the process’.269 In other words, image-making was put to the 
task of un-making the distancing and alienating effects of images.    
 Schleuser is Situationism with a difference, however, Gram argues.  Highly 
aware of the visual language of media and capitalist spectacle, still, as Gram 
writes, Schleuser ‘recycle the Situationist device but largely discard the attendant 
anxieties surrounding the obfuscating powers of the “spectacle” in favor of a kind 
of preemptive embrace of capitalist sign production’.270 In a sense, then, the sign 
production of capitalism is seen to exist as part of a common pool of language, 
and is no more the ‘property’ of capital.    
 Gram suggests that Schleuser are subject to, and to a degree help to 
resolve, a common tension experience by ‘socially committed’ art, as articulated 
by Peter Bürger in his Theory of the Avant-garde.  This tension is between 
‘regressive iteration of the avant-garde impulse in the “happening” or submission 
to a seemingly irrelevant realm of art’.271 The latter is obviously problematic 
insofar as it drains art practice of any critical efficacy whatsoever and frames the 
aesthetic realm in ‘purely’ formal terms. The former is problematic because it 
risks becoming ‘citation and repetition of earlier critical artistic practices that have 
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already been fully defused, absorbed, and obfuscated by mass culture’.  For  
Gram, Schleuser resolve this tension with the production of another tension:  
The meaningful denotative “message” that risks disintegrating the 
“aesthetic” form is held in charged tension by a parodic type of expression 
that continuously threatens to destroy its political message.272   
 
In other words, in their use of parody that never quite settles on a target, 
Schleuser resist integration into either the purely formal or the crudely ‘political’ 
by use of a message that is itself never comfortable in either realm.  
 For me, however, the risk of the degradation of the aesthetic realm is less 
urgent. More than questioning if the project ‘works’ artistically or whether the 
project is political, questions of how the project works within and through various 
political frameworks and conditions make it interesting for this thesis. Everyone Is 
an Expert is far less parodic than the Schleuser projects. In fact, it might almost 
be characterized as quixotically sincere, (though perhaps the position of tongue 
vis à vis cheek is not always necessarily clear). Nevertheless, it is similar in that it 
uses image-making and the aesthetics of management. Moreover, it invests in 
ideas of ‘users’, ‘content’ and the ‘network’ that were already part of a corporate 
lexicon in 2001, and which would go on to dominate the development of web 2.0 
and the ongoing capitalization of information and communication technologies. 
The politics of immigration and the politics of technology and participation are in 
tension in Everyone Is an Expert, and an opportunity to consider these tensions 
makes the project at least worth thinking about. 
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CONCLUSION:	  PARTICIPATION	  AND	  ITS	  DISCONTENTS	  
 I have alluded to a framework of ‘radical inclusivity’ to understand Everyone 
Is an Expert, radical insofar as it produces conflict in the act of inclusion. Unlike a 
liberal position, which would aim for resolution within existing structures, or a 
position which would aim to abolish existing structures wholly – and thus perhaps 
remove itself from debate altogether – the ‘radical’ position I think Everyone Is 
and Expert occupied seeks to reveal, critique and ultimately affect systems by 
participating in them.   Expertise is a valuable tool for this radical participation, as 
it is simultaneously an easily recognizable target, and a subtly pervasive 
assumption of exclusion. In making the proposition that ‘everyone is an expert’, 
however, the organisers seem to shatter its terms.  If everyone is an expert, what 
meaning does expertise as unique and specialized knowledge have? Yet 
Everyone Is and Expert does not dismiss outright the possibility and value of 
specialized or unique knowledge. ‘Everyone is an expert’ becomes a radical 
proposition when it creates space for individuals without imposing a hierarchical 
order.  
 However, of course, Everyone Is an Expert is a failure on its own terms. ‘Its 
use is its only value’, states the project’s self- description, a rather melancholy 
assertion when viewed on a dated, non-functioning webpage.  This melancholy 
might also extend to the failed optimism of user-generated media and 
technology, and of the database as neutral facilitator for self-organisation. As 
well, since the development of Everyone Is an Expert, a critique has been 
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mounted on ‘participation’ within the cultural field. Claire Bishop’s Artificial Hells is 
a polemic against the way that art practice framed as ‘social practice’ is often 
also pitched as ‘social work’ without being measured by the criteria civil 
programmes are measured.273 At the Tate Modern’s No Soul for Sale show, 
Brooklyn-based arts and activist group Not an Alternative offered an installation 
made up of ‘the padlocked façade of a foreclosed home’, and act which both 
evokes the subprime mortgage crisis and, the group argues, ‘demands we take 
an outsider’s view, that we remain in a space of contemplation not engagement, 
and consider those excluded from the uncritical celebration of participation’.274  
All of these are, perhaps, welcome correctives to an unchecked enthusiasm for 
participation that does not consider how obstacles to participation operate. 
 Nevertheless, there is an audacity to Everyone Is an Expert that I think 
outpaces its short life. While it is certainly of its own specific time, nevertheless, I 
think it coordinates a set of problems around national borders, valued 
knowledges and the forms of intervention that cultural practices can take which 
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 This chapter continues my investigation of inclusion as a strategy for 
working on the politics of expertise. I look at Bobby Baker’s work on the gendered 
domestic sphere, as well as her engagement with the mental health professions. 
I also consider Rimini Protokoll’s ‘theatre of experts’,275 as they refer to their 
practice, specifically their Call Cutta and Cargo Sofia. In distinction to the 
Everyone Is an Expert project, this chapter looks at how these artists have 
targeted specific forms of labour that are undervalued and have presented these 
forms as ‘expert’. Far from resulting in work that patronisingly speaks for 
marginalised professions, however, both Baker and Rimini Protokoll produce 
works that both call into question the materialities of labour and the structures of 
expertise itself. 
 Before beginning my analysis of Baker and Rimini Protokoll, I want to frame 
my analysis by explicitly considering some problems with a rhetoric of radical 
inclusion that have been implicit in my previous analyses. Earlier, I discussed the 
problematic neoliberal ideal that ‘everyone is creative’, citing Angela McRobbie’s 
work in this area. To refresh, McRobbie is responding to rhetoric around the so-
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called ‘creative class’ that began to circulate in the 1990s and 2000s. In the face 
of economies shifting from manufacturing to knowledge-based and service-
orientated industries, and the concurrent deterioration of job stability and social 
benefits, this rhetoric champions the entrepreneurial individual who achieves 
through self-realisation, becoming his or her own agent and marketing 
department. If everyone could unlock their innate creative potential, they would 
be able to participate in a fulfilling, consumer- orientated, consumer lifestyle. 
McRobbie argues that seemingly radical empowerment of individuals is actually 
problematic individualisation, which – when not supported by structures of social 
security – is a recipe for economic precarity and social incohesion.276 This is the 
ugly flip side to the dream of an open field that blurs the border between art and 
life, because social practice, just like art objects, becomes available to circulate in 
markets, and is subject to the structural alienation and exploitation that occur 
when profit is the defining logic of a society. Further, when collective life is 
abandoned for entrepreneurial individualism, the rhetoric of self-determination 
leaves little room for structural support for those whose ‘creativity’ is not 
compensated by a living wage.   
 I suggest, however, that the statement that everyone is an expert might 
offer opportunities for a subtly more critical position than ‘everyone is creative’, 
because of the inherent contradiction of its terms. It is a statement of horizontal 
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inclusion in a field that is definitionally hierarchical. In other words, it is the 
specifically paradoxical relationship between inclusion on the one hand and the 
seemingly fundamental exclusiveness of expertise on the other that opens up 
possibilities for critique both about the hierarchical structure of expertise and the 
individualism of liberal ideology.   
 In using the term ‘radical inclusivity’ as I have above, I mean both a 
categorization of knowledge that includes a broad range of practices and 
subjectivities, and also a context wherein such a categorization is against the 
grain, counterintuitive, or in some other way beyond what may be perceived as 
conventional.  The terms ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ will recur throughout this chapter.  
For both of the practices in this analysis, I will define the concrete parameters 
that designate ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (for instance, in the case of Bobby Baker, 
both the mental health profession, and the status of the housewife provide fields 
for inclusion and exclusion).  However, there are structural similarities between 
Baker’s and Rimini Protokoll’s practices that can be identified as related 
conceptual approaches to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.   
 In various ways, both negotiate the need for a critical, outsider perspective 
with an equally urgent call for participation.  Inversely, each example 
demonstrates a tension between self-implication in exclusive structures, and 
rejection of the potentially paralyzing attitude towards progressive change such 
self-awareness might incur.  These ambiguities make up the ‘radical inclusivity’ I 
am arguing for.  I contrast this with a ‘liberal inclusivity’, which would work entirely 
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within existing structures to cast a wider net of inclusion, as well as perhaps 
‘revolutionary inclusivity’, which would need to reject existing structures wholly.    
 So what do I mean by ‘outside’ and ‘inside’? Inside of what? Kept out of 
where? There is a broad range of instances where this conflict emerges, and 
there are both philosophical and political consequences to staging this conflict. 
Even confining an investigation to how this conflict operates for theatre and 
performance gives an almost impossibly wide field to consider. In the Everyone 
Is an Expert project, the force of the work relied on a pragmatic universalism that 
nevertheless faced equally pragmatic difficulties – is the database really the best 
tool for communicating the message that economic competence should not 
dictate human value? For this chapter, I focus on how Baker’s and Rimini 
Protokoll’s practices focus on concrete, materially located examples and create 
situations where inside and outside are but into constant conflict and often 
contradiction – where one seems to undermine or negate the other, and vice 
versa. I argue that this flicker of contradiction is politically important because it 
allows material conditions and power dynamics to be addressed without resulting 
in stasis or isolation.   
 
BOBBY	  BAKER	  
Inclusion	  ad	  absurdum	  	  
 In this section, I will argue that Bobby Baker’s use of sites, activities and 
roles traditionally marked female, and (therefore) not traditionally marked expert 
or professional, works to structure her version of ‘radical inclusivity’.  I will 
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consider the housewife in the kitchen, as portrayed in her performance Kitchen 
Show.  I will also consider the housewife in the supermarket, as portrayed in her 
performance How to Shop.  I will suggest that the very use of these sites in  
Baker's work both points to and unsettles the hierarchy of content for 'expert 
knowledge'.  She shows that expertise is not a matter of abstract excellence, but 
is rather figured by specific social expectations.  In other words, some activities 
are more 'expert' than others in the popular imagination.    
 I will also argue, however, that Baker does more than insist on the inclusion 
of the domestic labourer in the pantheon of exalted skilled workers and 
knowledge producers.  Rather, she constructs a model of inclusion based on 
principles that operate differently the logic of excellence or ‘expert knowledge’, 
extending perhaps into the realm of the absurd.  At the end of this section, I will 
consider the ‘absurd expert’ that emerges as a critique of possible absurdities of 
expertise.  
 Baker’s Kitchen Show (1991) is one of her best-known and most written-
about works.  The piece was initially developed and performed in Baker’s own 
kitchen. It went on to tour kitchens throughout the UK and worldwide.  Kitchen 
Show involves Baker making ‘one dozen kitchen actions public’.277 Each action 
involves a ‘mark’ applied to Baker’s body, and the final action (the thirteenth, 
creating a baker’s/Baker’s dozen) has Baker standing monumentally on a cake 
stand, displaying all twelve previous ‘marks’, in triumph.     
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 This work has provided the opportunity for many critics and feminist 
theorists to reflect on the seeming contradiction of public actions in the private 
kitchen.  The kitchen has been constructed as the most private of spaces, not 
least, as Leslie Ferris points out, in theatre history.  Ferris discusses how 
classical Greek drama constructed the 'public' is located outside the palace.  The 
domestic interior is 'a hidden, secret space, an unknown and in many cases ob-
scene world in which the woman is kept and contained'.278 Violence happens in 
the house. 'Men discover in Greek tragedy that to enter the inside space is to put 
oneself in peril, as the fate of Agamemnon demonstrates'.279 The public space is 
the space of representation, of reason, of knowledge.  The private space is 
unknown and unknowable.  To be kept inside is to be placed outside of 
discourse.  From this perspective, opening the kitchen and ‘kitchen action’ to the 
public is a political act of inclusion.  It makes the kitchen a space for knowledge 
and it makes the woman in the kitchen a subject of discourse.    
 For Janet Floyd, however, the modern kitchen is a ‘private but altogether 
predictable space’.280 In the consumer age, Floyd suggests, the private space 
became known, and the housewife targeted for persuasion in the form of 
advertisement, and management in the form of mental health care. The kitchen 
space, while still outside the public – now read as professional –sphere, 
nonetheless becomes a space in which to receive professional instruction, and 
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the housewife is on the receiving end.  Baker’s actions can be seen as 
instructive.  She speaks of the time when she began to do housework seriously, 
giving the audience assurance that they are receiving seasoned, insider 
knowledge.281  Baker’s position, then, might be seen as a form of reversal, where 
the housewife no longer receives professional instruction, but transmits it.   
Interestingly, however, Floyd goes on to analyse what might be termed the 
‘Nigella Lawson’ phenomenon,282 Increasingly, Floyd suggests, with the rise of 
cooking shows like Lawson’s, the kitchen is becoming popularly seen as a site 
from which professional instruction is transmitted.  Thus the simple reversal of 
housewife as receiver to housewife as producer of professional knowledge is not 
quite enough to produce a radical reworking of the concept of expertise.  
 In How to Shop, Baker takes on a more explicitly authoritative persona.  In 
her introduction, she refers to sociological interest in the domestic arena, and she 
insists that she is an expert to whom attention must be paid.283  The following 
performance becomes a severe lesson in, indeed, how to shop – somewhere 
between a cultural studies seminar and a Victorian lecture in self-improvement.   
Interestingly, it feels more extreme to provide instructions on how to shop than 
how to be in the kitchen.  As explored above, the kitchen has become 
increasingly a place to and from where professional instruction may be 
transmitted.  However, perhaps because of a more or less conscious 
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naturalization of shopping, providing instruction on how to shop feels wrong.   
Shopping suddenly does not erupt spontaneously from merely untapped wells of 
desire, as establishments such as Marks & Spencer might prefer the shopper to 
believe.    
 This shop – the ubiquitous-in-London, multi-purpose grocery, clothing and 
household supply store – confines its explicit instructions to the financial 
transaction: queue in this direction, go to this till, hand over this amount, take 
your receipt.  The rest of the textual communication is cheerful and indirect.   
From sweetly cajoling (‘why not try one of our many other products?’) to cutely 
self-sacrificing (‘we’ve counted the calories so you don’t have to’) the aim is 
always to be helpful, but by appealing ultimately to an already existing, if 
unrealized, desire.  You know you want to.  You know you already want to.  Even 
when the tone seems instruction (‘eat three items of low fat dairy a day to 
strengthen your bones’) Marks & Spencer never instructs the customer how to 
shop.  Instructions on how to be healthy are provided.284 The necessary items 
are made available.  You know what to do.    
 So, in both Kitchen Show and How to Shop sites that have not traditionally 
been spaces for professional instruction become such spaces. However, I have 
suggested that this move also highlights complex determining and shifting factors 
that lead to the different spaces resonating in different ways.  The kitchen has 
evolved from private and unknowable, to private but known, to increasingly 
represented in public.  The supermarket is public but the semiotics of persuasion 
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in this site cause the shopper to feel her decisions are interior and self- 
determined.    
 Connecting the two sites in Baker’s work is the absurd content of the 
instructions she provides.  In Kitchen Show, Baker binds her right hand into the 
perfect shape for stirring tea, she attaches a wooden spoon to her hair in a 
slanted homage to a friend, and she applies margarine to her face.  In How to  
Shop, she responds to a compulsion related to the voice of God by stuffing her 
mouth with a large tin can of sardines, and races up and down the aisles.  These 
strange acts require a more complex reading of Baker’s position on professional 
instruction.  
 In a recent publication surveying Baker’s work, both Michèle Barrett and  
Adrian Heathfield discuss theories of the abject as a possible frame to think 
through Baker’s work.  Drawing on Julia Kristeva’s development of the concept, 
Barrett writes, ‘The abject is banished, but constantly beseeches; it is separate 
and loathsome: “Not me.  Not that.  But not nothing either.”’285 Abjection is a 
powerful tool for thinking a complicated situation of inside and outside: that which 
is rejected and yet never wholly got rid of.  However, as Barrett notes, in Baker’s 
work ‘the abjection is always trumped’.286 By this, it should not be assumed that 
Baker’s performances resolve the tension of inside and outside. I suggest that 
the term ‘absurd’ might be a better way of thinking Baker’s position on inside and 
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outside, particularly as regards the expert.  As Baker states in an interview with 
Heathfield:  
The absurd expert.  Questioning the whole notion of there being a “true” 
authority and expertise.  I am chipping away at those authority figures: the 
posturing that goes on in life.  I can’t say that I’m not a part of that, but I 
really object to it on quite a regular basis.  Those people who invest 
themselves in these bodies of knowledge, and then strut around the world 
telling people how to live and what to do.  I’m constantly fascinated by it: it 
isn’t that I don’t think they have valid things to say, or useful advice or skill 
or strategies or processes.  I suppose it is a recurring infuriation with a lack 
of awareness that we’re all just part of some giant hamster wheel. You 
know?  I suppose I want to step outside and say “Look, this is all a bit of a 
joke really”.287  
  
It is the desire to step outside and laugh, while always understanding that she 
‘can’t say that I’m not a part of that’, that I’m interested in here, in Baker’s work.  
Indeed, the struggle to step outside coupled with an inability to step outside is 
what makes Baker’s ‘inclusivity’ radical.  In the next part, I will continue this 
analysis of the ambiguity of inside and outside in Baker’s work, by examining her 
use of pastiche combined with autobiographical material.  
  
Don’t	  Be	  Ridiculous	  	  
  While I have argued above that Baker creates an absurd persona in order to 
critique the absurdity of expertise, it would be a mistake to view Baker’s work as 
a satire of expertise.  There is an ambiguity in the artist’s position with regard to 
the object of critique that makes such a reading inadequate.  Baker’s strategy 
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with regard to persona prevents her from ever standing completely outside of the 
system she is representing.  In the following section, I will discuss how Baker 
structures this ambiguity, and I will suggest wider questions of the ‘outsider’ with 
regard to Baker’s ‘radical inclusivity’.  I assert that Baker’s strategy is to collapse 
the separation between representation and identification that allows an audience 
to separate itself from even the most pointed critique.  
 In How to Live, the follow-up project to the Daily Life series, of which 
Kitchen Show and How to Shop were a part, Bobby Baker plays a ‘clinical 
psychologist’.  The quotation marks are firmly in place.  In fact, these quotation 
marks form a sort of scaffold, propping up the structure of the piece, and 
connecting it to Baker’s previous work, which nearly always draws on explicit 
pastiche of familiar sources.  Interestingly, however, another recurring element of 
Baker’s work is autobiographical information.  ‘Bobby Baker’ is just as firmly 
quoted as anything else.  In this section, I will analyze the example of How to 
Live in order to discuss the dual effect of pastiche and autobiography throughout 
Baker’s practice.  I assert that this duality signals and enacts a rich ambiguity 
between representation and identification.   
 Baker’s psychologist in How to Live offers the viewer eleven steps toward 
self-improvement. The absurdities of self-help are in full force here.  The music 
she uses ranges from perky violins, to cheerful electronic Muzak and folk-
singing/chanting – all very educational and improving.  The language she uses is 
equally glib.  Baker introduces her ‘program’ by asserting that everyone has 
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capacity to reflect on oneself and change – but an expert is needed to help.288 It 
is nearly impossible to pin down Baker’s tone.  It is almost, but never quite, 
sarcastic.  She is too goofy.  The situation is silly, but the jokes go on for too long, 
and end without a clear punch line. When Baker uses the patronizing language of 
self-empowerment, telling the audience that patients with personality disorders 
are the real experts, the language is undermined first by the fact that her 
‘patients’ are small green peas, and second by the time and care she expends on 
these legumes.   
 However, as much as the self-help professions may be skewered, the 
performance always insists that ‘Bobby Baker’ is the character occupying the role 
being skewered. The simple act of naming herself creates a truly ambiguous 
situation.  The sense described above, that the satire refuses to settle down, is 
underlined by Baker’s insistence that she is making a joke at her own expense.  
Even further than this is the fact that she is drawing on her own experiences with  
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) to inform the ‘personality disorders’ 
affecting the peas.289 So is Bobby Baker a doctor or a green pea?  Is she the 
satirist or the satirized?  Interestingly, it is possible to read the pea as a small, 
vulnerable and rather silly piece of food, but also as the silent ‘p’ of psychologist, 
psychiatrist, etc.  The pea itself is both present and absent, both patient and the 
part of the expert that is silent.                                    
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 The autobiographical functions as ‘almost real’ in How to Live, uncanny 
more than confessional.  ‘Person A’ is a recurring character who plagues the 
green peas.  He has a habit of leaving jumpers in the kitchen in the morning, and 
he is skilled at controlling the narrative of a relationship.  ‘Communicate and don’t 
give way’, insists Doctor Baker. Baker’s then long-term partner is called Andrew, 
of course. The closeness, the almost-but-not-quite of the representation makes it 
impossible for an audience member to wholly reject any of the characters in How 
to Live: Person A who was also a husband, the doctor who is also a pea.  The 
ability to stand outside and represent is constantly undermined by the compulsion 
to identify.  
 Baker insists that she is a sceptic, who must ‘explore things from the 
outside’.290   Marina Warner draws attention to the political importance of this 
aspect of Baker's work in her essay 'The Rebel at the Heart of the Joker'.  
Paraphrasing the philosopher Gillian Rose, she writes, ‘fascism... retains its hold 
when it is not faced and challenged through representation’.291 We must model 
and hold up objectionable forms, no matter how uncomfortable that might make 
us, or how implicated in them we are. However, she continues later:  
The various comic modes on which Bobby Baker draws – stand-up patter, 
self-mockery, burlesque, clowning and pantomime – consist of different 
ways of acknowledging the state of abjection and making a virtue of it, 
which is a form of refusal, but not complete denial.292   
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This subtle differentiation between refusal and denial is key to an analysis of 
Baker's use of identification and representation. Refusal without denial is not only 
valuable but necessary if Baker is going to stage a form of resistance without 
denying her/self.  
  Thus, I assert that the ambiguity I have demonstrated leads to a politically 
useful position, situated alternately ‘outside’ and ‘inside’.  From this outside 
position of representation, satire and critique are possible.  But as Baker’s 
persona constantly slips in, the practice of identification enters the 
representational field.  Self-implication joins critique, and equally, empathy joins 
satire.  This duality is key to the notion of ‘radical inclusivity’ I am developing, and 
will recur in further analyses.  
  
Expert	  Knowledge	  from	  1	  –	  Z	  	  
  In the previous part, I discussed how Baker’s performances are structured 
as interplay between representation and identification, between pastiche and 
autobiography.  These forms are themselves structured with surprising 
consistency in the form of lists.  Indeed, in How to Shop we are confronted with 
lists within lists.  Arriving at the item ‘How to know what you’re shopping for’ a 
shopping list appears, containing seven items, related to seven virtues. In the 
following section, I will consider how Baker’s use of lists connects to her 
investigation of expertise, and that her particular methodology with regard to lists 
furthers the concept of ‘radical inclusivity’, drawing again on the duality of inside 
and outside that I have developed in the previous parts.  
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  For Baker, lists are connected to work. Janet Floyd compares the actions in  
Kitchen Show to the labours of Hercules.293  There is also, of course, the more 
contemporary, prosaic to-do list.  The list is the mark of the professional.  The 
completion of the list is the necessary act to achieve professional status. Baker’s 
use of the list in this way automatically highlights the identity of domestic activity 
as labour, for instance with her use of the grocery list mentioned above.    
  Art historian Mignon Nixon proposes that list making in art can also signify 
emotional labour.  Discussing Louise Bourgeois’s work in psychoanalytic terms,  
Nixon draws on Freud’s description of mourning.  She writes:  
The work of mourning as Freud portrays it is an obsessive kind of listing.  
On the one hand are the memories and hopes bound up with the loved 
object.  On the other hand are the satisfactions of reality.  The mourner's 
task is to compile these two inventories and to work through them, sifting 
and sorting, removing and restoring – until even the energy necessary to 
mourning is dissipated.  In the end, Freud suggests, the ego turns to the 
reality of the external world as much in exhaustion as in renewed desire.294 
 
There are three important things to highlight in this concept.  First, list-making 
frames mourning as an active process, as work.  Second, the process of list- 
making doesn’t come to an end with a balanced inventory.  Rather, the work is 
complete when the list-maker can no longer list.  An additional useful point 
occurs when Nixon goes on to note that in the work of Melanie Klein and others 
post-Freud, this mental labour can be applied to any ‘emotional adversity’.295   
Further, she details the problems and tensions around the specific ‘adversity’ of 
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the ‘maternal depressive position’, emphasizing the taboo around theorizing any 
maternal ambiguity beyond support and nurture.    
  I will now apply these three points to Baker’s work, and the concepts of 
expertise and radical inclusivity.  As I mentioned above, Baker’s lists are both 
professional work and expert instruction.  However, they also recall emotional 
labour.  The work of literally including these particular items on this particular list 
requires an emotional effort.  Item number six on Baker’s How to Live programme 
is ‘make changes in your life so positive events will happen’.296 She discusses 
doing small things to make one’s life more pleasant, for instance, buying kitchen 
gadgets.  However, the most pleasant small thing one can do, Baker insists, is to 
read the pleasant events list itself.  As if surveying the fruits of her labour, Baker 
acknowledges the work of list-making as the work of returning to the external 
world.   However, despite the self-help trappings, the knowledge produced by 
Baker’s list-making effort is not the positive, can-do knowledge of what it is 
possible to do.  It is the knowledge of loss – of what it is possible to do without.    
Related to the second point made by Nixon, then, the ending of a typical Baker 
performance is usually literally a mess, and one can easily imagine that it is the 
performer’s exhaustion of the space that puts a stop to the activity, rather than 
resolution.   Finally, regarding Klein’s application of the mental labour of 
mourning to any ‘emotional adversity’, Baker’s lists take on the taboo subject of 
the dissatisfied or emotionally traumatized maternal figure.    
  However, as useful as this framework might be for analyzing Baker’s 
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recurrent use of lists, it does miss an important piece of her strategy.  While the 
lists are quite literal and structure the movement of the performance in a linear 
progression, the content of the lists are never straightforward. Baker’s 
performances proceed in lists from 1 to 13 (Kitchen Show), or 1 to 11 (How to  
Live), but the content of those lists gives rise to non-linear associations.  For 
example, in Kitchen Show the seventh action is ‘picking up small pieces of food 
and putting them in my mouth’.297  The mark is ‘to put bright red lipstick on my 
puckered lips’.  The relationship between the action and the mark is related thus:  
I chose the mark for this action because of something that happened when I was 
little.  We went to visit a friend of my mother’s who had just had a baby.  My 
mother went upstairs to see her friend and the baby in the bedroom.  I went up 
too but they were embarrassed and annoyed at my interruption because she was 
breastfeeding.  I saw the woman’s nipple.  It looked bright red like a cherry.  I 
thought she’d put lipstick on it.298 
  It is neither necessary nor even predictable that a reflection on the act of 
grazing in the kitchen as an adult would give rise to a memory of a scene 
witnessed as a child.  In this way, Baker’s lists, rather than representing loss in 
fact recall excess.  This is not to say that the details Baker uses to populate her 
associations are random.  The figure of the breast-feeding mother is thematically 
consistent with Baker’s concern with the duties of care the wife and mother figure 
has traditionally been called upon to perform.  However, the process of arriving at 
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these details operates beyond the logic of cause-and-effect.   
   Griselda Pollock suggests that this excess might operate on a 'network' 
model.  She comments on another one of Baker’s associations in Kitchen Show.  
Action number 2 is ‘resting a wooden spoon on top of a saucepan’.   This is in 
response to a memory that occurs to Baker as she discusses how her mind 
wanders when she cooks.  She remembers that a friend always places the 
wooden spoon she uses on the top of the saucepan lid, in order to avoid cooking 
the spoon.  While Baker secretly does not object to cooking the spoon, she 
always imitates her friend.  In homage, her mark for this action is to attach a 
wooden spoon to her hair.  Pollock writes:  
The placing of the spoon on a saucepan lid is a reminder of a friendship, a 
network of mutual obsessions and shared tips and hints in the perpetual 
improvement and elaboration of cooking rituals that begin to have charm as 
tokens that pass between women, invested with memory and 
association.299  
 
 Baker’s use of lists and association recalls the same duality referred to in the 
earlier parts of this analysis.  The quantitative structures of expertise are not 
wholly rejected.  Rather they are used and repurposed, to include the qualitative 
associations of memory and relationships.  
                                                  
RIMINI	  PROTOKOLL	  
Feeling	  Inclusion	  	  
 This section will consider Cargo Sofia, by Rimini Protokoll, in order to 
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consider the group’s use of the term ‘expert’ to apply to professions that may not 
traditionally be included in this category, and, more importantly, to the set of 
personal experiences and associations that attend the performance of these 
professions, rather than exclusively the knowledge and skill set required to 
execute them.  I will examine how critical responses to this move have often 
attributed to Rimini Protokoll a badge of ‘authenticity’, emphasizing the ‘reality’ 
effect they produce.  In particular, I will look in detail at a response to Cargo Sofia 
by Sara Brady in TDR in order to trace the usefulness of and limits to such a 
response.  Next I will consider Rimini Protokoll as part of a tradition of 
‘documentary theatre’ in Germany, to consider how their use of ‘reality’ differs 
from earlier, and even contemporaneous, practices.  For this I will draw on work 
by Thomas Irner, also from TDR.  Finally, I will assert that Rimini Protokoll are 
using a strategy, not of unmediated reality, but of ‘making connection’. This 
assertion of the feeling of connectedness Rimini Protokoll produces will then set 
up the arguments in the following parts of this section.  
 Cargo Sofia takes place on a container truck.  Audience members are given 
instructions on where to arrive, and then loaded into the truck bed where, instead 
of cargo, seats and a large screen are set up.  The truck pulls out and the 
audience receives a tour, both of the city through which they are driving, and the 
route to the city as narrated by the drivers.  These drivers are hired because of 
their previous experience as professional truck drivers, operating the route from  
Sofia, Bulgaria to various cities across Europe (hence the title of the 
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performance).  The narrative is a mix of documentary information about the 
container shipping industry, and the personal experiences of the labourers who 
literally drive this industry.    
 Sara Brady responded to a performance of Cargo Sofia that took place in 
Dublin, as part of the ‘We Are Here 2.0’ festival in 2007.  Writing about the ticket 
taker, the author states,’ He doesn’t appear to be an “actor”; he’s not “on”. He 
isn’t reacting to audience members as they climb into the truck and his hands are 
not an actor’s hands ­– they are rough and worn from hard work. I’m intrigued – I 
wonder if he is a “real” truck driver.’300 Emphasizing the ‘reality’ of the experience, 
and the novelty of non-actors in a theatre festival it is interesting that Brady 
highlights lack as a constitutive component of authenticity.  The man is intriguing 
partly because of what he does not do – react to audience members in a way a 
professional actor would be trained to.  Brady’s analysis figures manual labour as 
more ‘real’ than the labour of professional actors, then.  This is emphasized later.  
Brady notices, during a speech by a worker who discusses the technicalities of 
loading and unloading cargo, that the cargo ferry that delivers these good is itself 
visible on the port.  The reality of the image creates an alienated experience of 
the speech.  She writes, ‘The cargo ferry docked nearby, however, dwarves the 
scale of the crane and containers: this is the reality of this performance – or 
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reality made into performance; this is “work” made strange.’301   
 In addition to figuring manual labour as real, Brady also works to analyse 
the attraction of this ‘reality’ effect. Discussing Rimini Protokoll’s casting 
practices, Brady explains that, ‘the group finds that the “experts” who express 
their interest in their projects – by responding to Rimini Protokoll’s 
advertisements or otherwise coming in contact with the artists – offer ways into 
realities they and their audience might otherwise never know.’302 I suggest that 
under these terms of analysis, reality is figured as something elusive, rare. 
Spectating ‘authenticity’ conjures a similar feeling that classically expert skill 
might do, athletic or musical, for instance. The response is, 'how did they do it?',  
which is another way of saying, 'I could never do that'. Rimini Protokoll's experts 
are impressive, in these terms, because the audience feels as separate from 
truck driving as they do from virtuosic piano playing.    
 Both of these frameworks for thinking Rimini Protokoll's experts have some 
problems. The first is perhaps ontologically strange.  Surely, while truck driving is 
different in a multiplicity of ways from acting, both professions can be said to 
‘exist’ in more or less the same measure.  More importantly, manual labour-as- 
real risks romanticizing 'work' while simultaneously obscuring it.  Work is that 
which is 'normally' invisible, beautiful in its quaint banality. It is somewhat 
unsettling to think that Rimini Protokoll's experts are beautiful because we do not 
normally look at them.  This risks normalizing a ‘we’ and a ‘they’ and reducing an 
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analysis of manual labour to uncritical tourism.  The second framework simply 
makes permanent and aesthetic the gap between audience member and expert – 
in the same way that visiting a symphony orchestra will simply confirm most 
people as non-virtuosi.   
 And yet, the first framework does pose something interesting.  It might be 
seen to suggest that ‘reality’ itself is that which is normally invisible.  Only the 
most elaborate of theatrical frames can represent the concept 'authenticity'.  The 
artifice of authenticity is usefully theorized by Brady.  One of the more 
spectacular moments of Cargo Sofia occurs after the audience has heard a 
particular Bulgarian song for some time.  All of a sudden, the truck turns and a 
woman is visible on a traffic island.  She appears to be singing the same song. 
Brady writes of this moment that:  
The theatre of Cargo Sofia is in the imagining of fantasy – of reality 
rendered fantastic. We take in what we see in front of us and hear on our 
earphones – is this the music that Bulgarian drivers listen to on the road for 
14 hours at a time? First we heard her, then, out of the blue, the voice in our 
imagination appeared – and with this came the sudden recognition that 
what you see is what your hear; a rupture of something true in a fleeting 
moment.303  
 
Holding on to the notion that construction and mechanism are key to the ‘reality 
effect’ in Cargo Sofia, it is now necessary to ask what other frameworks there 
might be for thinking through the affect produced by Rimini Protokoll’s theatre of 
experts.  Thomas Irner puts Rimini Protokoll in a tradition of practitioners from 
Germany who have been concerned with ‘documentary theatre’ since the 1920s.  
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Irner lays out a list of the techniques and aesthetics of documentary theatre:   
Historical documents are treated as the principle material for the stage; 
characters are seen as authentic protagonists from history; and quite often 
the forms of investigation – trial or factual reconstruction – are employed to 
confront the audience with the content.304  
 
In the 1960s, this type of theatre was particularly valuable because it contributed 
‘to the repoliticization of a society that was still recuperating from the Nazi regime 
and its catastrophic consequences’.305  Work by practitioners such as Peter  
Weiss created a forum for debates about topics which had no framework for 
public dialogue, such as rebuilding and the presence of Nazi elites.  This type of 
theatre insisted on the possibility of an accurate public understanding of the past.   
Weiss and his contemporaries tasked themselves with a project of 
historiography.  Indeed, Weiss writes, in his ‘Notes on Documentary Theatre’, 
that ‘the documentary theatre stands for the alternative that reality, however 
inscrutable it may make itself appear to be, can be explained in every detail.’306    
 In contrast to the sixties incarnation, Germany’s current documentary 
theatre (of which Irner considers Rimini Protokoll a part) ‘focuses on unsolved 
problems of the present (not on the past)’.307  When an artist tries to represent 
contemporary discourse, a key characteristic of that discourse is incoherence 
and contradiction – historiography happens later. So the problem becomes how 
to create a coherent and objective representation of incoherence and immersion. 
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Irner describes a new paradigm of the artist as researcher, where the body of 
materials has expanded beyond official documents to include media culture and 
the artists’ own experiences.    
 Irner places Rimini Protokoll among relative contemporaries such as Hans-
Werner Kroesinger and Roland Brus by emphasizing their ‘research process’. He 
writes of the group, ‘Here we find no auteur-director (like Kroesinger) or on-site 
director and researcher (like Brus), but artists who implement their research 
among the subjects themselves.’308 He suggests the very act of connecting is the 
strategy, rather than necessarily producing an authentic product.  I assert that 
this strategy produces the affect ‘feeling inclusion’, which is mistaken for 
unmediated reality or ‘authenticity’.  In the following part, I will further my 
argument that ‘connection’ is the key concept for understanding Rimini Protokoll, 
over ‘reality’.  I will suggest that the ‘experts’ Rimini Protokoll recruits are not so 
called because their experiences are more authentic, but because they 
participate in structures of contemporary connection. I will also point to instances 
where connection is not enough, or where it becomes itself an object of critique.  
  
Critiquing	  Connection	  	  
 If Rimini Protokoll’s practice creates a ‘feeling of inclusion’ through the use 
of its ‘theatre of experts’, it is necessary to explore further the mechanisms and 
techniques the group uses to structure this theatre. Having explored a critical 
response to Cargo Sofia, and one genealogy of Rimini Protokoll in the tradition of 
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documentary theatre, it appears that ‘connection’ rather than ‘authenticity’ makes  
Rimini Protokoll’s work distinct.  In the following, I will further examine how 
‘connection’ operates in the staging of the production Call Cutta.  Like Cargo  
Sofia, this production is unusual in the level of audience immersion produced.   
However, I suggest that the success of the performance does not rely on a direct 
production of lasting connection between audience member and performer.  
Rather, I assert that while this performance operates directly within systems 
structured by specific forms of connectivity, the call centre outsourced to India, it 
also stages a critique of these connections.  There is thus a dual purpose  (at 
least) in Call Cutta: critique of specific connections alongside structures for 
forming new types of connection.   This duality recalls the analysis in the previous 
section of this chapter, regarding the duality of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in the work of  
Bobby Baker.   
 Call Cutta is a mobile performance that pairs individual audience members 
with a call centre employee, located in India.  The disembodied voice acts as a 
tour guide, as the audience member takes a walk based on instructions 
transmitted from miles away.  The narrator is alternately confessional and 
unreliable, as she/he reveals personal information, makes mistakes, and admits 
to previous lies.   
 As asserted in the previous chapter, the term ‘expert’ is applied by Rimini  
Protokoll in Cargo Sofia to refer to skills and knowledges pertaining to 
connection. In Call Cutta, the expert performers have knowledge and skills 
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pertaining to the drawing of connections, but they are also skilled at diverting 
connection.  Call centre employees connect customers to a business, but also re- 
direct that connection. By participating in the performance, the audience member 
is encouraged to recognize her own participation in these systems.  Much has 
been made of the feeling of personal connection that can occur between the call 
centre employees Rimini Protokoll hires, and the audience members they attract. 
However, what happens when that connection fails to occur?  Is it a failure of the 
performance?  I assert that, rather, it is an embodied critique of the system in 
which it participates.   In order to make this assertion, I will consider work by  
Susan Leigh Foster in a recent collection on the changing body of technology, 
which uses Call Cutta as a case study.   
 In her chapter ‘”Where Are You Now?”: Locating the Body in Contemporary  
Performance’, Foster outlines the structures of bodily knowledge in three 
historical periods.  She compares the worldview of those who came just before 
the development of the anatomical subject with the current worldview as it relates 
to 'mapping and orienting'.309  Previous to the development of the anatomy 
theatre during the European Renaissance, Foster asserts that physical proximity 
was the basis for a complex code of relative status.  In the Renaissance court, 
vertical hierarchies were performed on the horizontal plane of physical space.  
The closer to the highest rank one stood, the higher one stood in that ranking 
system. Foster states that:  
                                                
309 Susan Leigh Foster, ‘”Where Are You Now?”: Locating the Body in Contemporary  
Performance’, Anatomy Live: Performance and the Operating Theatre, Maaike Bleeker, ed.  
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 170.   
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The Renaissance anatomy theatre, and the culture of dissection it 
represents, inaugurated new paradigms of subjectivity and corporeality.  It 
helped to establish the body as a stable and consolidated entity capable of 
providing a singular perspective on the world. The inert and mute body of 
the corpse came to vivify the body as machine, the body that transported a 
perceiving and thinking subject.310 
                                                  
Thus, a new system of positionality developed, linked to an age of exploration 
and new cartography techniques.  This system 'required a way of reading that 
privileged the single and stationary subject'.311 
  
 Since the development of locative technology (e.g. GPS or SatNav) 
cartography now  'helps to locate a map reader who is on the move'.312 This is 
where Rimini Protokoll comes in. It could be said that mobile communication and 
satellite positioning technology have delivered us back to a time when 
relationality determines knowledge.  After all, like in the Renaissance court, 
SatNav requires constant revision of coordinates.  However, for Foster, several 
key skills are lacking in the contemporary model, ‘including an ability to note 
one's own placement in space in relation to others and an ability to respond 
appropriately to the flux of all bodies' changing positions'. These skills have 
atrophied because 'cell phone technology... discourages an awareness of other 
bodies in space'.313 As cell phone users respond to the inevitable 'where are you 
now', they perform disregard for the existing physical space around them.   For 
                                                
310 Foster, p. 169. 
311 Foster, p. 169. 
312 Foster, p. 169. 
313 Foster, p. 175 
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them, profit results not from performing well in front of each body with whom they 
come into contact but from multi-tasking so as to accomplish more contacts in a 
shorter length of time.  These bodies, equally comfortable in stillness or motion, 
transporting themselves or being transported, have learned that the body's 
motion alone is no longer responsible for the changes in volume or vision that 
they experience. These bodies rely on apparatus to modulate physical changes 
such that they no longer correlate directly with sensory experience.314  
 Foster faults Call Cutta as a performance that ‘evoked more than it critiqued 
the culture of digital surveillance in which we live today'.315 She describes her 
discomfort with her narrator, who can never be the perfect source of information 
and guidance she claims to be.  More than that, she can never fulfill the promise 
of perfect connection without emotional investment that is made by the service 
industry, generally, and seems to be made by Rimini Protokoll.   
  Indeed, this promise of connection does recur in Rimini Protokoll’s 
promotional materials.  An article in Connect, an art magazine from India, points 
out that the performers in Call Cutta ‘have been encouraged to converse freely 
with the walkers, so that they may identify with them, and cultivate a friendship 
for the span of an hour.’316 This is in contrast with other call centre employees, 
who must stick to a specific script.  However, as Foster rightly points out, it is not 
only the scripted nature of call centre work that prevents connection.  First, ‘the 
system offers no way to acquire a history of familiarity, reliability, or favor, since 
                                                
314 Foster, p. 175. 
315 Foster, p. 173. 
316 Uncredited author, ‘Call Cutta’, Connect: The Art News Magazine of India 10 (2005), p. 83. 
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each phone call routes to a different worker.  These workers are interchangeable 
and completely anonymous within the social economy'.317  Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, ‘the assistant must pass as a member of the economy s/he is 
serving while remaining solicitous of all the customer's needs'.318 While Call  
Cutta may be a relatively cushy employment opportunity, the fact that it exists in 
a theatrical context should not obscure the similarity of that context to the world 
of business.  
 Interestingly, however, it may be that the similarity between theatre and 
business is precisely the critical edge of Call Cutta.  Rimini Protokoll is not 
immune to the obstacles that block connection and instrumentalise relationality.  
However, aware of their position ‘inside the system’, they create performances 
directly on top of that system.  Call Cutta can feel uncomfortable because the 
outsourcing of labour has uncomfortable results.  This critical edge does not 
mean that Rimini Protokoll are not sincerely attempting to facilitate connection, 
which may be why Foster categorizes the work as evoking rather than critiquing.  
However, it is important that the attempt at connection happens excessively 
within the existing contemporary framework of globalization.  This framework is 
hostile to the connection Rimini Protokoll aims for, but it is also the framework 
that conditions how connection is figured in much contemporary discourse.  
 Foster concludes her piece with the call for a different type of 'theatre of 
experts'.  This would be based on skilled improvisation that allows bodies to 
                                                
317 Foster, p. 172. 
318 Foster, p. 171. 
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interact and define themselves relationally, in ‘real’ time and space.319  The 
problem is that this would have to happen outside the contemporary knowledge 
paradigm, if it were to resemble the Renaissance courts Foster analyses, rather 
than an elaborate form of contact improvisation. Rimini Protokoll is operating in a 
paradigm where connection is figured in terms of electronic telecommunication 
and globalised business.   The ground of their critique is circumscribed by these 
parameters. In an analysis of ‘delegated’ and ‘outsourced’ performance that uses  
Rimini Protokoll as a primary example, Nicholas Ridout writes:  
Far from being the paradigm of authentic self-expression, performance 
reveals itself as an exemplary commodity (it commodifies action, not just 
things) and as a site for a critique of its own commodifying processes.320    
 
Thus, in this section, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are paradoxically situated in the same 
space: the contemporary globalised economy.  The expert, then, is the figure that 
brings these positions together.  
  
Collapse	  of	  the	  Material	  	  
  
 Thus far, my analysis of Rimini Protokoll’s contribution to the framework of 
‘radical inclusivity’ that I am developing has focused on the performance event 
itself.  My discussion of Cargo Sofia and Call Cutta has drawn from the structures 
of staging and the discourse of audience response to argue for an expert 
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Agent ed. Claire Bishop and Sylvia Tramontana (London, ICA 2008), p. 131 
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connectivity the group models, produces and critiques.  However, this argument 
can be furthered by a look at factors beyond the performance itself.  ‘Material 
semiotics’, as summarized and further developed by Ric Knowles in Reading the  
Material Theatre, is a method of analysis that draws on the ‘conditions of 
production’ and the ‘conditions of reception’ as well as the performance event as 
it is constituted in discourse.  This type of performance analysis ‘understands 
meaning to be produced in the theatre as a negotiation of these shifting and 
mutually constitutive poles’. [italics original]321  
 In the following, I will apply this method to the two performance events that I 
have discussed so far. First, I will discuss the general outline of the methodology 
as developed by Knowles.  Then, I will analyze specific conditions of production 
and reception that affect Cargo Sofia and Call Cutta.  Finally, I will assert that  
Rimini Protokoll consciously operates upon these conditions, as a structural 
component of the ‘performance itself’.  This deft operation on the one hand 
constitutes the expertise of the group – the collapse of production into reception 
into performance requires virtuosic coordination and design.  On the other hand, 
it also makes possible the dual position I identified in the previous part – critique 
along with positive articulation.    
 In the spirit of material analysis, I will now identify my own conditions of 
reception of these performances, which is via the extensive documentation 
available in the Live Art Development Agency’s collection.  This affects my 
                                                
321 Ric Knowles, Reading the Material Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 3. 
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reading in two ways that are worth articulating here.  First, experiencing the work 
at a distance from the ‘event’ of the performance, I must use a performance text 
that has already been constituted in discourse.  Second, having access to a 
range of materials that would not have been available to an audience member 
(for example, extensive international press coverage, production documents such 
as the group’s tech rider, and video documentation that includes elements of the 
research process) colours my impression of the group’s intentions.  Neither factor 
makes my reading more or less valid, but each does situate the reading in the 
specific context of academic work with a stated conceptual agenda.  
  If the performance text of a production is usually self-evident, the process of 
identifying the conditions of production and reception can be less straightforward.   
An analysis of the conditions of production for Cargo Sofia must recognize that it 
requires a producing partner or partners, usually a festival.322 However, the city 
must also have a specific infrastructure.  It is useful to reproduce the Cargo  
Sofia-X tech rider in detail:  
  Possible sites:  
  - container terminal or harbor   
 - hypermarket/wholesalers for vegetables or meat  
  - truck-wash plant  
 - freight forwarding business open and working at the time when the  
 performances take place  
 - depot or production hall, at-grade, entrance 4m high so one can enter by  
 truck  
 - truck parking place/motorway service area/parking for customers/where  
                                                
322 Cargo Sofia has been produced by the Perspectives festival, in Saarbrücken, the Festival de  
Marseille, and the Festival de quartier d’été in Paris, among others. Rimini Protokoll – Cargo  




 trucks stay overnight and drivers spend their spare time  
  - roundabout without traffic lights if possible, for the singer  
  - motorway  
 - starting point: easy to find and access for the audience, preferably not in  
 the city centre because there could be traffic jams.  Max 10 min. driving  
 distance to one of the destinations above.  
 - endpoint: not necessarily the same as the starting point.  Could be next to  
 an area which is alive at night.  Public transport should be available.323  
  
Importantly, these site requirements can be fulfilled by a broad range of cities, 
insofar as they participate in international transport of goods.  There is a beautiful 
redundancy here: a production about transport that can only happen in cities with 
the infrastructure for international transport.  It just so happens that cities with the 
resources for a festival will likely have this infrastructure.                                               
 Conditions of reception are also defined by the festival setting. Interestingly, 
audience members are required to travel from usual festival venues in order to 
experience Cargo Sofia. This might partly emphasize that many audience 
members will have traveled to the city to begin with. The necessity for travel also 
provides expertise with a flipped dimension, similar to other moves by  
Rimini Protokoll with regards to expertise.  The festival site is conventionally the 
site for a production of a certain type of expertise.  As such, it is a destination 
site.  Here, however, it becomes the site from which to depart.  
 Language is another element affected by the festival setting.   In the 
production of Call Cutta in Berlin, the walkers ‘received instructions in English 
that was heavily laced with Indianisms, Hindi and Bengali phrases, and contained 
                                                




only a smattering of German’.324  After all, English is the language of international 
business, which means English becomes the necessary language for Call Cutta.  
In a setting like a performance festival in Berlin, however, it is equally likely that 
there will be a large number of English speakers present. Interestingly, Cargo  
Sofia in Basel includes an offhand comment that troubles the notion of English as 
the international language for all sectors of the global business circuits: the 
driver’s wife is Turkish, so he speaks Turkish, which means he can speak with 
other drivers on the road. Turkish is an international language in this context.  
 Rimini Protokoll’s placement in the ‘festival circuit’ opens it up to a criticism 
of Knowles’s, who states that there is a ‘generalizing wash that can happen when 
work is too often or for too long removed from the specificities of its context and 
begins to develop a fuzzy universalism’.325  He goes on to insist that:  
Theatre, as the most social and place-specific of the arts, brings with it the 
need for practitioners to take responsibilities for the work they present, and 
for its material consequences in its actual social and cultural context – the 
here and now that makes theatre and performance different from most other 
forms of cultural production.326  
  
Putting aside the genre claims Knowles makes (is theatre necessarily the most 
social and place-specific of the arts?), this statement opens the space for a 
potentially useful observation. Here, now, for many people – and not only the 
kind of people who attend European performance festivals – is profoundly 
conditioned by the material mechanisms of globalization.  The festivals that make 
                                                
324 Uncredited author, ‘Call Cutta’,  p. 84. 
325 Knowles, p. 89. 
326 Knowles, p. 89. 
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possible Rimini Protokoll’s work both mirror the ‘nomadism’ of contemporary 
capital, and materially rely on its infrastructure, like global transport and 
outsourced customer service.   
  Knowles complains that ‘[festival-oriented] productions will tend to be 
admired for virtuosity, innovation or skill rather than discussed as cultural 
interventions with particular, grounded meanings for specific audiences’. 327 
Rimini Protokoll feels like a direct response to this criticism.  Indeed they are 
admired for skill and innovation – the truck with a massive screen is amazing, the 
singer that appears on a traffic island is so cool, etc. – but the content seems to 
trump these musings about form.  The point is that Rimini Protokoll is hyper-
aware of the conditions of production and reception of their work, to the degree 
that these elements are the content of the performance text.  Where ‘theatre’ is 
the content of the work of some festival-oriented companies Knowles criticizes, 
the material conditions of the theatre, but not only of the theatre, are the content 
for Rimini Protokoll’s work.  Perhaps this collapse of conditions into content is 
what Helgard Haug means by ‘dynamite’ in the following statement:   
You can preach or you can perform pieces in which you find very important 
and sharp thoughts or exemplary definitions, and that is at a certain level 
helpful and good – on the other side, you can try and link the items to 
people and act upon reality in a concrete way, and introduce reality as 
dynamite into such a space. [Original italics]328   
 
Once again, this collapse indicates the same structure of duality I have  
                                                
327 Knowles, p. 90. 
 
328 Helgard Haug’, Rimini Protokoll website http://www.rimini-  
protokoll.de/artist_frontend.php?artist_id=3 [accessed 11 June 2007] [quoted in Brady, p. 165.] 
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analysed in all of the previous parts and sections.  Rimini Protokoll contribute to a 
concept of ‘radical inclusivity’ not by a liberalizing act of including those who have 
not been included before, but by a structural act of collapsing ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’.   
  
CONCLUSION	  
 In this chapter I have shown how the Bobby Baker uses absurdity, pastiche, 
lists and associations to develop ambiguities among expert forms and content.  
Absurdity nuances the presence of the abject in Baker’s performances.   
Rejection that is never complete is paired with laughter that is finally directed 
inward.  For Baker, it is the expert and the structures that make us listen to the 
expert that needs to be rejected but not denied.  The forms of expertise Baker 
represents in her pastiche are matched with the most personal content, which 
further reinforces the ambiguity between representation (form/critique) and 
identification (content/implication).  Finally, Baker’s lists that give way to 
associative tangents bring together mourning, professionalism, excess and the 
thematic content of female subjectivity.  The forms of expertise, then, are re- 
purposed to deliver contradictory contents, and, in turn, these contents re-figure 
the forms.  
 I have shown how Rimini Protokoll collapses content and context, using 
expertise as the ‘dynamite’ that effects this explosion.  I have demonstrated that 
the emphasis on the ‘reality’ or ‘authenticity’ produced by the group is 
understandable, but that ‘connection’ might be a more critically productive frame.  
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Further, I have shown that this principle is not based on abstract connection, but 
the connection that structures the contemporary globalised economy, an 
economy that relies on expert knowledge to function.  Finally, I have shown that 
the more specific theatre economy that directly structures Rimini Protokoll’s 
activity is a part of this larger global economy, and operates on similar principles.  
The value of the group’s work, then, is in using the material realities within which 
they operate as the tools for constructing a critique. 
 Taken together, I argue that these two examples demonstrate a focus on 
specific material practices (domestic labour, international transport, call centre 
worker) that are not often included in the categories of ‘skilled’ or ‘expert’ labour. 
Both use these practices to press against the boundaries of inclusion that 
expertise can often imply, to help re-frame what might it be possible for the 





Professor Joe Kelleher of Roehampton University introduced artists Lin 
Hixson and Matthew Goulish with the proffered caveat that little, if any, 
introduction was needed for the crowd that had gathered at the Chelsea Theatre 
in London to watch Word Butterfly: Notes toward essay as a theatrical form. 
Hixson and Goulish’s work with the performance group Goat Island is 
internationally recognised, and among a certain set of enthusiasts, they are 
superstars. These enthusiasts (myself included) were eager to see the new 
incarnation of Hixson and Goulish’s collaboration – the newly formed Every 
house has a door – but they were also eager to see one another. Earlier in the 
downstairs lobby, I heard a number of different people exclaim things along the 
lines of: everyone is here! It was clear that in addition to the work that they do, 
Hixson and Goulish also function as significant figures in a community. This 
community may have constituted itself at least in part at the time of gathering in 
World’s End Place (the appropriately dramatic street address of the Chelsea 
Theatre), and it defined itself in relation to this event, the event of watching two 
significant figures speak. 
Kelleher contextualised this event by telling the audience (now a 
community) that Hixson and Goulish were completing a project at Roehampton 
University, which involved leading students in a workshop. He reflected on the 
types of activities these two artists had engaged in during this period – writing, 
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speaking and teaching. Hixson and Goulish are, among many other things, 
excellent teachers. Part of this excellence manifests through the structure they 
use in both student workshops and in the performance work that they make 
together (and with others): they make demands. Quite literally, Hixson and 
Goulish set tasks – mundane, whimsical and/or exacting tasks.  
The evidence of this task-based process was on display in the following 
presentation. For example, a video was shown in which Goulish was tasked with 
jumping whilst wearing a pair of skis. Hixson had dictated the task precisely, 
included sequences of jumps and pauses in between. She had also informed 
Goulish that at a certain point the picture would fade to black, and the final jumps 
would not be visible but presented only through the sound that they made. At the 
final moment, however, Hixson had decided not to obscure the picture, 
compelled by curiosity about how Goulish’s performance might change when he 
thought he would not be seen. This change was visible in the video. Where at the 
beginning Goulish’s arm gestures as he prepares for the jump and the follows 
through are ornate, with little flourishes of the wrists, toward the end these subtle 
and perhaps un- or subconscious elaborations melt away and the movements 
seem to become peremptory. 
I began to wonder which of these types of movements is the more 
theatrical? The first, more visually decorative, set of movements had the element 
of excess that is often associated with the dramatic or the theatrical. The second 
had more of a sense of being for the camera, or in a way removed from its own 
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authenticity – a jump that is also a representation of a jump. I found myself 
admiring this elegant, and seemingly spontaneous, demonstration of two 
theatrical problems. Theatre is too much, and theatre is never enough. Theatre is 
showy excess, and theatre is at a distance from reality. This simple task of 
jumping became an argument for one of the defining contradictions that 
constitutes theatricality. 
All of these elements – teaching, tasks, theatricality, complexity and 
narration – threaded through Word Butterfly. Hixson and Goulish sat at a table in 
front of laptop computers, alternating the speaking role. Hixson’s sections dealt 
often with abstraction. She described the position of the teacher and the position 
of the beginner. Being able and allowed to speak implies the former, but agency 
and change necessitate the latter, Hixson told us. This attention to the structure 
of speech and the structure of action, and the connection between these 
structures and the dynamic of experts and non-experts helped demonstrate both 
Hixson’s politics and her aesthetic. She discussed the essay form, and tried to 
imagine the shape of a theatrical essay. These imaginings landed somewhere in 
the space of contradiction, with Hixson proposing that a performance lecture that 
should not be a hybrid but should be a space where two items (lecture and 
performance) resist each other, alternate between one another and fail to get 
along. The space which holds these contradictory items, and the excess between 
them, is theatre, Hixson proposed. The theatrical essay, then, resists the 
traditional thesis-antithesis-synthesis essay form by refusing to synthesise.  
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Goulish’s sections were more anecdotal. He gave us two long stories from 
his childhood – specifically from his days in primary school. The first was a story 
about show-and-tell (where students bring in items to show their classmates and 
stories to tell about these items). The second involved a school play (a 
dramatised scene from Tom Sawyer). In both, teaching and learning were 
entwined with theatricality, and theatricality had a complex relation to inside and 
outside, or more precisely, the experience of feeling inside and feeling outside. In 
the show-and-tell anecdote, a student whose family was not able to afford the 
kind of items that were being displayed by other students instead stood up and 
recounted in detail an episode from the television series Batman. Goulish’s 
classmate forged a position for himself in the community of school by claiming 
ownership over a memory (the memory of the episode of Batman) by standing in 
front of an audience and speaking it aloud, when that memory was properly 
communal (everyone else had already seen this episode). The theatre of show- 
and-tell became a theatre of expertise which was only allowed because it 
wastheatre. In any other circumstance, episodes of Batman do not belong to 
people as objects. 
In the anecdote of the school play, Goulish was cast as the narrator. When 
the version of Tom Sawyer came to be performed, Goulish’s clearly audible 
speaking style as narrator contrasted with the chaotic performing style of the 
other young actors who played the parts without speaking, instead tumbling 
about onstage. Goulish pointed to the contrast of lucid narration and opaque 
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enactment in evidence onstage in the school building. This anecdote was another 
argument for the key contradiction in theatricality of too much, and never enough. 
Wholly invested in the play of Tom Sawyer, the characters were too much inside 
the action to be able to communicate it. Meanwhile, Goulish, communicating 
perfectly clearly, was able to do so by virtue of standing at a distance, outside the 
play. These elements, never reconcilable but always in tension, remain at the 
core of the performance work Hixson and Goulish produce. Importantly, Goulish 
told of a moment after the performance’s end when one of the actors is 
compelled to rehash everything that happened onstage with Goulish. The boy 
intuitively understands that Goulish, in his role as narrator – both part of the play 
and able to observe it from the outside – is the perfect, and perhaps only 
possible, listener for this story. 
Abstract and personal, observer and participant, making demands and 
then wondering at the outcomes – these elements structure the performance 
work Hixson and Goulish make, and it is also, I suspect, their particular way of 
bringing these elements into their pedagogy that makes them both excellent 
teachers. I argue that Hixson and Goulish hold a position of a particular type of 
expertise in the community that forms around them. They are expert theatre 
makers, but they are also theatrical experts. As part of this conclusion, I want to 
take some time to think through what this might mean. 
RETURN	  
I began this thesis by sharing the motivation behind this project. It was a 
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conjunction of personal interests and recognition of external trends in 
performance. I found myself increasingly interested in knowledge production, and 
I found myself noticing that artists – and particularly performing artists – were 
making work in, around and against knowledge production. No doubt my interest 
and my notice were mutually reinforcing. 
One potential problem with writing about contemporary work – work that is 
happening around me as I write about it – is the possibility of getting caught up in 
fads and fashions. On the one hand, I do in fact think that the idea of fads and 
fashions can be vibrant and interesting. On the other hand, it is important to 
maintain an awareness of the biases and oppressive hierarchies that attend the 
contemporary art and performance worlds, and which condition what becomes 
fashionable. In my introduction I stated that the central driving thesis of this 
project is that the contemporary dynamic between expertise, power and 
knowledge must be problematised, and that performance is particularly equipped 
to do such problematising. This is not least because the dynamic between 
expertise, power and knowledge plays out in particular ways in every context in 
which performance practitioners find themselves. This dynamic feeds trends, and 
it is up to the artists to do the work of problematising, to avoid reiterating the 
problems that have come before. This process as I have seen it is fundamentally 
complex. I have looked for artists who take difficult positions with relation to 
expertise – artists who do not necessarily reject the value of specialist 
knowledge, for instance, but who question how and where specialist knowledge 
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comes into being, and the access or barriers to access that it produces. 
In this thesis, I have outlined three areas where I argue artists have done 
significant work to do this problematising. I have chosen to focus on these areas 
in large part because of the scope they give for dealing with complexity. In 
looking at non-experts within expert spaces (using the laboratory as a crucial 
contemporary example of an expert space) I have shown artists dealing with the 
complexity of empiricism, universality and determinism as these concepts affect 
multiple, subjective and contingent bodies. In looking at the ways artists have 
used forms of expertise to produce or consider non-knowledge, I have shown 
them dealing with the complexity of absence and affect as components of 
knowledge. Finally, in looking at radical inclusivity, I have shown artists making 
complex negotiations with insides and outsides. It is not enough that these artists 
have been dealing with complexity, either. I have argued that in these dealings 
often there emerge challenges and refigurations which have consequences for 
performance at least, and often for much wider contexts. 
CONTEXT	  
It has been important, then, to insist as well for the significance of context 
for the problematising of expertise in performance. I want here to list the range of 
institutional spaces and forms I have covered, not to suggest that I have been 
exhaustive, but to show the variety of spaces in which the conjunction of 
performance and expertise is occurring. When I suggest that performance 
practitioners must problematise expertise because expertise is a problem for 
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performance that does not mean that such practices must become insular or 
territorial. 
I said above that I looked at ‘the laboratory’ as an example of an expert 
space, when I should have said that I looked at ‘laboratories’. I have considered a 
variety of different laboratories, developed for experimentation with genetics, cell 
tissue, environmental science, pharmacology, chemistry and the engineering of 
weapons. I have focused on artists who directly engage with the variety and 
complexity of scientific inquiry, and the specific conventions, dynamics and 
unspoken rules that give the lie to the idea that the establishment of scientific fact 
is a straightforward or transparent undertaking. Beginning to understand these 
performative networks of behaviour is crucial to any re-thinking of access or 
influence in laboratory spaces and the political and economic spaces they 
interact with. 
Another of the important spaces of expertise I have considered is the 
space where expertise is developed or transmitted. I considered pedagogy in a 
variety of ways, from arts education – both in schools and as a component of 
professional institutions (education programmes at museums, including symposia 
and lectures by artists) – to alternative and experimental pedagogy, to teaching- 
as-art and variations of the form of the lecture as performance. The space of 
pedagogy can be the space were hierarchies are enforced and access becomes 
segmented, but it can also be a space where expertise has not yet been settled, 
and where there is space for re-figuring. 
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Crucial to all of these spaces have been the forms of labour that support, 
maintain and produce them, from domestic labour to manual labour to affective 
and service orientated work. Clearly the distinctions that are made between 
skilled and unskilled labour are significant to an investigation of the politics of 
expertise, but just as important to this investigation have been the various 
movements these distinctions enable or restrict, whether it is the outsourcing of 
labour or the deportation of certain types of labouring bodies. As ideas of 
expertise shift and change, so, too, do the hospitality and hostility of spaces. 
ALTERNATIVE	  PATHS	  
There have been, of course, many more possible routes that I have not 
taken, some of which I hope to pursue as the research begun in this thesis 
develops. Two major avenues that I have hardly explored include physical 
expertise (or virtuosity) and the relationship between expertise and management. 
While virtuosity and its relationship to cultural conditions surrounding metrics and 
ideas of ‘excellence’ would be both timely and interesting,329 nevertheless, a 
critical cultural analysis of the mechanisms and contexts of virtuosity lies outside 
of the scope for this thesis. As well, the role of management for certain types 
performance, particularly in the business sector, has become increasingly a topic 
for performance studies scholars. Again, however, as this thesis focused on the 
way artists have worked to challenge the terms of expertise through uses of 
contradiction and paradox, this was not the space for an in-depth study of the 
                                                
329 See, for instance, Brian McMaster, Supporting Excellence in the Arts: From Measurement to 
Judgment (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2008).  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way behaviours are managed by experts. 
Another overlooked avenue of inquiry in this thesis might deal explicitly with 
questions of technology and technique. Richard Sennett’s work on craft, for 
instance, might be a resource for thinking through the cultural consequences of 
technology, and the role of those who create the tools of technology for producing 
understanding of these consequences. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s work, 
Sennett acknowledges the often-brutal consequences of technological ingenuity. 
He figures Arendt’s take on the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, as a warning 
about the dangers of curiosity. He discusses Robert Oppenheimer as the 
emblem of an expert who let things get out of control and then asks, 'If the 
experts cannot make sense of their work, what of the public?'330 The answer, for 
Hannah Arendt, was public dialogue about technological progress. Through the 
process of dialogue, the public will learn to deal responsibly and in humane ways 
with the tools that are developed by humans. Sennett summarises Arendt’s 
position thus: 'In this public realm, through debate, people ought to decide which 
technologies should be encouraged and which repressed'.331 
Sennett has a different take on the relationship of technology to the public, 
which has to do with his understanding of technique. For Sennett, it is necessary 
that 'thinking and feeling are contained within the process of making',332 and thus, 
that public understanding of technology does not have to develop in an arena 
                                                
330 Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p. 4. 
331 Sennett, p. 5. 
332 Sennett, p. 7. 
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that is separate from the making of technology. This is possible because there is 
no reason that technique, or expertise, should be far out of the reach of almost 
everyone: 
We share in common and in roughly equal measure the raw abilities that 
allow us to become good craftsmen; it is the motivation and aspiration for 
quality that takes people along different paths in their lives. Social 
conditions shape these motivations.333 
For Sennett, then, it is the job of the cultural critic to work out what social 
conditions shape motivation, and how they can be changed so that a greater 
proportion of the public can participate significantly in the development of 
technology and the development of understanding of the consequences of 
technology. It is a programme of liberal reform, which has at its heart a 
commitment to ‘an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well for 
its own sake'.334 My investments have been somewhat different in this thesis. I 
have been arguing for the need to complicate basic and enduring things, and to 
think through the consequences – and the possible value – of not doing a job 
well. 
Throughout this thesis, I have argue for the value of performance, and 
particularly, for theatricality in doing this kind of work. I want to take some time in 
this conclusion to make a final pitch for the importance of thinking expertise with 
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theatricality. 
THEATRICALITY	  AND	  EXPERTISE	  
It is clear that knowledge, and particularly expert knowledge, performs. To 
use Jon McKenzie’s outline of the three ‘performance paradigms’,335 it can be 
efficacious, efficient and effective. Moreover, expertise helps set the guidelines 
for what constitutes efficacious, efficient and effective performance. Expert policy 
makers establish social goals for efficacious arts programmes, expert managers 
and consultants develop behaviour guidelines for efficient business performance 
and expert technologists design tests to measure the effectiveness of machines. 
Much work has been done to show how performance is a valuable concept for 
thinking through this variety of functions (and indeed, for thinking through 
functionality as such). This thesis, however, has often been concerned with 
instances where expertise does not function, or functions in contradictory and 
paradoxical ways. I have argued for the importance of non-expertise and non- 
knowledge, asserting as well that these need not be thought as opposed to 
expertise and knowledge, but that they interact in complex and various ways with 
expertise in knowledge. I have also investigated instances where a seeming 
defining characteristic of expertise – its exclusivity and hierarchical structure – 
has been turned inside out. One of the key ways I have thought of this non-
functioning or paradoxically functioning expertise is to think about it as theatrical. 
In recent years, many performance studies scholars have been (re)turning 
                                                
335 Jon McKenzie, Perform – or Else (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 27. 
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to theatricality as a rich analytical tool. In the far-reaching Theatricality, Tracy 
Davis and Thomas Postlethwait attempt to rigourously both historicise and 
theorise the concept from a range of examples and perspectives. They 
acknowledge that the task is both difficult and crucial because of theatricality’s 
power as a descriptive term, that is ‘yet often open-ended and even contradictory 
in its associative implications’. While they are nervous that a too-broad or 
unreflective application of the term can render it meaningless, nonetheless they 
acknowledge that ‘it offers, at least potentially, a protean flexibility that lends 
richness to both historical study and theoretical analysis’.336 
For Marvin Carlson, theatricality is a way of thinking the value of some of 
the reasons theatre has been criticized – e.g. ‘that it is artificial, removed from 
everyday life, exaggerated, extreme, flamboyant, distracting’ – even if this does 
lead Carlson to a slightly uncritical argument for theatre as ‘celebrative 
expression of human potential’.337 Rebecca Schneider more forcefully argues for 
the importance of theatricality for a re-thinking of performance studies, because it 
allows her to argue for the value of the field’s ‘hollowness, its (in)capacity, its 
necessary infelicity’ [original emphasis].338 In Schneider’s view, new work on 
theatricality offers an opportunity for a form of scholarship that takes seriously 
‘what failure does, how infelicity succeeds, and what ambivalence achieves’ 
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[original emphasis].339 This argument has attended my own investigations into 
contradiction and paradox in expertise, and helped me frame them as something 
that performance studies has begun to get a particular handle on. 
In setting up performativity and theatricality as distinct from one another, 
however, I have risked making it seem like their relationship, and even their 
separateness, is uncontroversial. As Shannon Jackson makes clear, this is not 
the case. The development of disciplinary objects, one of the fundamental 
processes that underlies expertise, is almost always fraught and rarely 
straightforward. Jackson outlines a litany of unresolved questions in her 
examination of performativity and its genealogy (or genealogies) as a disciplinary 
object. 
Is theatre a subset of performance? Is performance a foundation for or a 
symptom of performativity? Is performativity’s act the same as “acting”? What is 
the difference between performance studies and performativity studies?340 While 
she works to address these questions, she also acknowledges the risk that ‘The 
effort to disentangle disciplinary equivalences can transform into the territorial 
quest to erect impermeable boundaries’.341 It is a matter of maintaining a critical 
awareness of both the erasures of histories and investments that can come with 
collapsing concepts into one another, and of the ‘territorial’ power dynamic that 
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often attends the formation of disciplinary borders. In discussing contemporary 
performance and expertise, I have worked to maintain just such a critical 
awareness. 
Politically speaking, I argue that theatricality also allows the opportunity to 
think the significance of identity without succumbing to essentialism. For 
Jackson, again, this is precisely what has made theatricality both appealing and 
contentious for a generation of scholars who would use it as a critical frame. She 
asserts that it ‘functions ubiquitously and contradictorily because of the term’s 
“flexible essentialism”’. Theatricality’s ability to play on (at least) two teams – 
sometimes flying the flag for ‘authenticity’, for example, while just as often 
cheering for the artificial, constructed or ‘inauthentic’ – is not necessarily a good 
thing, according to Jackson. It can lead to confusion, which can in turn lead to 
erasure of responsibility or blindness to implication or defensive territorialism. 
Nevertheless, she tentatively acknowledges that on occasion ‘confusion can be 
experienced as enabling’.342 Drawing on the emergence of gender studies as a 
discipline, Jackson shows how key figures like Elin Diamond, Sue-Ellen Case 
and Judith Butler found theatricality useful for balancing the seemingly 
contradictory need to de-essentialise identity, while maintaining an activist 
orientated political programme. 
In order to illustrate the importance of interrogating and sometimes 
deploying the ‘flexible essentialism’ of theatricality, and to connect this to an 
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investigation of expertise, I want to turn to Matthew Goulish’s 39 Microlectures. It 
is a book I admire and feel is important for, among other things, the way it opens 
out what can be thought of as knowledge, creates new opportunities for 
pedagogy, and performs a rigourous modesty that subtly rejects the expert 
position as dominating and hierarchical. Nevertheless, there is a section that 
troubles me. It is a section on women and directing, which specifically and 
intentionally avoids formulating a thesis about women and directing. At the end, 
Goulish includes a list of things he did not say about the subject: 
I did not say that the details I singled out arose from some innate quality 
that my subjects share because they are women. I also did not indicate 
any commonality between these methods because their practitioners are 
women. Nor did I say that since Goat Island's director is also a woman, 
that we only look to other women directors as examples, or that Lin as a 
woman inevitably draws from the work of other women.343 
Throughout, Goulish professes a confusion about gender definitions, and this 
also works as an attempt to spread productive confusion about definitions. I 
appreciate this commitment to performing the non-essentialism of gender, and to 
multiplicity over reductiveness. 
Nevertheless, I think it is important that Goat Island was directed by a 
woman. I think there is something to say about definitions, even while 
maintaining that definitions never tell the whole story. It is not enough to say 
identity does not matter, even if it does not. All of what Goulish says about not 
saying certain things about women and directing may be true and real, and still 
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there are things to say about women and directing. What, for example, makes 
performance, or a specific kind of performance, an amenable place for women 
directors? Further, what makes it possible for women directors to work in this 
kind of performance and not foreground gender? I think not just of Lin Hixson in 
these terms, but also Elizabeth LeCompte (Wooster Group), Marianne Weems 
(The Builder’s Association) or Anne Bogart (SITI Company), for example. All of 
these women head leading experimental theatre companies, producing 
complicated work that refigures identity and categorical boundaries in such a way 
that it is not necessary to announce that they are doing so. Somehow, the 
combination of ‘experimental’ with ‘theatre’ has proved a fertile match for this 
type of work, and it is important that women have played a prominent role in 
developing it, even as the category ‘woman’ is something that the work imagines 
might be largely irrelevant. 
This is not to say that Goulish is not aware of these questions. Indeed, 
while I am being somewhat critical of this chapter in 39 Microlectures, it still 
begins to do something that I want to emphasise. I want to argue for the 
simultaneous possibility of identity mattering absolutely and identity mattering not 
at all – for the need to acknowledge the importance of identity (for the need to 
devote a chapter to ‘Women and Directing’ for example), and for the need to 
reject the imperative for identity. I argue that theatricality is something that allows 
us to think this contradiction as contradiction: real and not real, material and 
illusion. It allows us to avoid asserting that identity does not matter, thereby 
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ignoring – and thus not fighting against – dominating forces. At the same time it 
allows us to avoid asserting that identity does matter, in the sense that it is 
fundamental, essential or immutable. I argue that while identity may be 
performative, theatricality allows us to understand identity as both contradictory 
and consequential. 
Ultimately, it is this match between contradiction and consequence that I 
have been working to trace throughout this thesis, while arguing for the 
importance of the work performance practitioners have been doing to foster it. 
EXPERTISE,	  NOW	  
I have worked to emphasise that performance studies as an academic 
discipline, and performance as a creative practice both have a significant 
purchase on questions of knowledge, expertise and power. As a final statement, I 
will now discuss the importance of addressing expertise now. What are the 
contemporary anxieties and power dynamics that inform the work that I have 
looked at, and that motivated my interest in the question of expertise to begin 
with? What can be drawn from the analyses that I have performed so far, and 
how can this contribute to a broader context? How can the practices I have 
considered here help extend the terms by which we value the political and social 
implications of knowing what others do not, and delivering the impression of that 
knowledge? 
I initially envisioned this project as a question of information as it is figured 
today. It is a commonplace observation that as the internet and mobile 
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communication devices have joined earlier broadcast media, new strategies must 
develop for making sense of the unprecedented mass of statistical data and 
recorded audio/visual imagery that is now available. From there, it became clear 
to me that key to the optimisms and anxieties of our times, is the concept of the 
expert. Increasingly, the ability not only to navigate information but to guide 
others through information will be will be loaded with power. From search 
engines to lifestyle guides, 'information overload' has become an opportunity to 
capitalise on skillfulness with data. Projects that are keen to make something of 
the promise of democratised access to information and skills, like Free Software 
or Creative Commons, still exist.344 Nevertheless, the enthusiasm for the possible 
reach of such democratisation has waned. This enthusiasm went along with the 
image of an emancipated public of tech-savvy individuals able to use myriad 
information channels, and importantly, add to them. This image was already 
starting to appear dusty when I began this project in 2008, and now feels 
positively ancient. Billions are being made by tech entrepreneurs from the 
images, stories and relationships of people who use their social networks – it is 
time to re-think how collectivity and connection can be marshaled to more 
equitable ends. 
It is also important to remember how and why ‘information overload’ 
occurs. The rise in surveillance in recent years is a key contemporary anxiety. 
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Who is watching, and what sorts of intelligence exists to process, connect and 
act upon the CCTV tapes, archived credit card numbers or illegal wiretaps? In the 
case of surveillance, anxiety is a product not only of not knowing, but of not 
knowing who knows. These anxieties take on a more profound political 
dimension within the logic of terror and perpetual crisis and threat that have come 
to structure contemporary governance.345 While nominally assigned to the Islamic 
world or underprivileged urban youth, terror is increasingly abstracted from any 
identifiable perpetrator. As the threat of disruption and violence seems ever more 
widespread and dispersed, the call for elite experts who can perpetually rescue a 
society in crisis increases. In this cult of competence, vigilance takes precedence 
over reflection, and control must be ceded – always only temporarily, though the 
end of threat never arrives (and never can) – to those whose with the expertise to 
handle whatever unknown catastrophe might arise. 
However, as the function of the expert is imbued with increasing power 
while the concept of an enemy of the state is abstracted, it is nonetheless 
necessary to be concrete in response. People are still being divided into 
categories, and different categories of people are affected by the politics of 
expertise in drastically different ways. This is, in part, why I have chosen to use 
identity as a focus for this investigation. The other part is because I believe 
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change has to come about through encounters (often antagonistic) within existing 
structures and forms. Some of the artists I have considered in this thesis are 
working to propose new forms of knowing and learning (often together). I think is 
crucial work to do, not least because the hopefulness such work may produce 
can be profoundly sustaining. Nevertheless, I have concentrated the major part of 
this thesis on works that operates on contradictions, paradoxes and failures 
within existing forms of expertise. This is because I want to insist on the 
importance of working against hierarchical and oppressive structures of 
knowledge production. This working against cannot take place at some neutral or 
critically transcendent remove. Rather, we must find ways of confronting from the 
inside. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that performance is a vital tool for 
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